Narrative:

When we extended the landing gear only the nose green illuminated. We went around, headed out of the area and ran our emergency checklists. While we were doing that the r- hand main green illuminated. We had to pump down the l- hand main. Even though this exact situation occurred on this plane a few days prior, and my first officer and I had talked about what we would do, there was a little confusion as to what to do and when to do it. I think more in-depth checklists made by the airline would help. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this pilot is also on the accident investigation committee at his air carrier and he was very familiar with previous gear and hydraulic problems on this aircraft. In this case, he asked a mechanic about a previous gear repair and this particular mechanic knew nothing about it. The reporter said that he and his first officer discussed various gear and hydraulic procedure, but did not read each checklist during their discussion. During the actual gear problem the reporter said that he and the first officer did read every checklist that applied to their situation and noted that they would probably lose their nosewheel steering capability, but did not discuss the probability of also losing the brakes. The brake accumulator allowed them to bring the aircraft to a safe stop. After coming to a stop the reporter said that he noticed that all hydraulic qty indicators read zero. Later he found that the maintenance manual did state that qty would be lost when pumping down the gear. The reporter said that he is still attempting to get the hydraulic loss and landing gear alternate extension checklists expanded.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR JETSTREAM 3200 FLC HAD TROUBLE GETTING THE L MAIN LNDG GEAR TO EXTEND, BUT WERE ABLE TO GET IT DOWN USING THE ALTERNATE EXTENSION METHOD. THEY DID NOT REALIZE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE BRAKING THROUGH THE ACCUMULATOR FLUID ONLY.

Narrative: WHEN WE EXTENDED THE LNDG GEAR ONLY THE NOSE GREEN ILLUMINATED. WE WENT AROUND, HEADED OUT OF THE AREA AND RAN OUR EMER CHKLISTS. WHILE WE WERE DOING THAT THE R- HAND MAIN GREEN ILLUMINATED. WE HAD TO PUMP DOWN THE L- HAND MAIN. EVEN THOUGH THIS EXACT SIT OCCURRED ON THIS PLANE A FEW DAYS PRIOR, AND MY FO AND I HAD TALKED ABOUT WHAT WE WOULD DO, THERE WAS A LITTLE CONFUSION AS TO WHAT TO DO AND WHEN TO DO IT. I THINK MORE IN-DEPTH CHKLISTS MADE BY THE AIRLINE WOULD HELP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS PLT IS ALSO ON THE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE AT HIS ACR AND HE WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH PREVIOUS GEAR AND HYD PROBS ON THIS ACFT. IN THIS CASE, HE ASKED A MECH ABOUT A PREVIOUS GEAR REPAIR AND THIS PARTICULAR MECH KNEW NOTHING ABOUT IT. THE RPTR SAID THAT HE AND HIS FO DISCUSSED VARIOUS GEAR AND HYD PROC, BUT DID NOT READ EACH CHKLIST DURING THEIR DISCUSSION. DURING THE ACTUAL GEAR PROB THE RPTR SAID THAT HE AND THE FO DID READ EVERY CHKLIST THAT APPLIED TO THEIR SIT AND NOTED THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY LOSE THEIR NOSEWHEEL STEERING CAPABILITY, BUT DID NOT DISCUSS THE PROBABILITY OF ALSO LOSING THE BRAKES. THE BRAKE ACCUMULATOR ALLOWED THEM TO BRING THE ACFT TO A SAFE STOP. AFTER COMING TO A STOP THE RPTR SAID THAT HE NOTICED THAT ALL HYD QTY INDICATORS READ ZERO. LATER HE FOUND THAT THE MAINT MANUAL DID STATE THAT QTY WOULD BE LOST WHEN PUMPING DOWN THE GEAR. THE RPTR SAID THAT HE IS STILL ATTEMPTING TO GET THE HYD LOSS AND LNDG GEAR ALTERNATE EXTENSION CHKLISTS EXPANDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.