Narrative:

To start, I was giving a 'mock' practical examination to a student who was in final preparation for his commercial single/multi engine oral and practical test. We were in the process of flying a practice ILS approach course. As we were flying the approach my student performed all the necessary procedures for a restart and finished by securing the engine and retarding the propeller control towards the feather position in order to simulate the engine's inability to restart. However, I prevented him from feathering the engine because the engine was still running at idle. Just before we passed the final approach fix I began asking my student questions to divert his attention as a designated examiner would do. On short final approach to the runway I noticed my student's hands on the control column was blocking my view of the gear indicator lights and selector knob. I lifted his hand just enough to get a quick glance at the gear indicator lights which appeared to show a down and locked indication, in fact, they were not indicating this. During the initial flare portion of the landing, we heard the propellers begin to hit the pavement. My student's reaction was to pitch up, add full power, and put the gear selector in the down position. I immediately took control of the aircraft. Realizing how slow we were and the danger of losing an engine so far below VMC I brought both throttles to idle, mixtures to idle cutoff, and the propellers to feather at the same time lowering the pitch to prevent a stall. I then brought the aircraft back down, but the gear did not have sufficient time to extend and lock. I set the aircraft down as soft and smooth as possible. We slid on the runway about 400 ft coming to rest on the runway centerline about 1000 ft from the threshold. There was no injury or property damage, and the aircraft suffered minimal damage, except for the propellers which were bent beyond repair. Part of a flight instructor's job is to provide realistic distraction to his/her students. I not only distracted my student, but became distracted myself. If I had been paying closer attention to my student's actions I might have noticed he had not placed the gear selector in the down position. In addition, if both my student and I had performed the approach to landing checklist provided in the aircraft instead of relying on memory, we both would have discovered our discrepancy. Finally, I should not have relied on the gear indicator lights alone to verify the gear was down. My student and I have taken this situation as a learning experience and are striving to correct our own inadequacies to insure the safer operation of aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING A PRACTICE MULTI ENG TRAINING FLT, THE SMA TWIN WAS LANDED GEAR UP WHEN THE TRAINEE FORGOT TO LOWER THE LNDG GEAR AND THE INSTRUCTOR FAILED TO CONFIRM GEAR WAS DOWN.

Narrative: TO START, I WAS GIVING A 'MOCK' PRACTICAL EXAMINATION TO A STUDENT WHO WAS IN FINAL PREPARATION FOR HIS COMMERCIAL SINGLE/MULTI ENG ORAL AND PRACTICAL TEST. WE WERE IN THE PROCESS OF FLYING A PRACTICE ILS APCH COURSE. AS WE WERE FLYING THE APCH MY STUDENT PERFORMED ALL THE NECESSARY PROCS FOR A RESTART AND FINISHED BY SECURING THE ENG AND RETARDING THE PROP CTL TOWARDS THE FEATHER POS IN ORDER TO SIMULATE THE ENG'S INABILITY TO RESTART. HOWEVER, I PREVENTED HIM FROM FEATHERING THE ENG BECAUSE THE ENG WAS STILL RUNNING AT IDLE. JUST BEFORE WE PASSED THE FINAL APCH FIX I BEGAN ASKING MY STUDENT QUESTIONS TO DIVERT HIS ATTN AS A DESIGNATED EXAMINER WOULD DO. ON SHORT FINAL APCH TO THE RWY I NOTICED MY STUDENT'S HANDS ON THE CTL COLUMN WAS BLOCKING MY VIEW OF THE GEAR INDICATOR LIGHTS AND SELECTOR KNOB. I LIFTED HIS HAND JUST ENOUGH TO GET A QUICK GLANCE AT THE GEAR INDICATOR LIGHTS WHICH APPEARED TO SHOW A DOWN AND LOCKED INDICATION, IN FACT, THEY WERE NOT INDICATING THIS. DURING THE INITIAL FLARE PORTION OF THE LNDG, WE HEARD THE PROPS BEGIN TO HIT THE PAVEMENT. MY STUDENT'S REACTION WAS TO PITCH UP, ADD FULL PWR, AND PUT THE GEAR SELECTOR IN THE DOWN POS. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT. REALIZING HOW SLOW WE WERE AND THE DANGER OF LOSING AN ENG SO FAR BELOW VMC I BROUGHT BOTH THROTTLES TO IDLE, MIXTURES TO IDLE CUTOFF, AND THE PROPS TO FEATHER AT THE SAME TIME LOWERING THE PITCH TO PREVENT A STALL. I THEN BROUGHT THE ACFT BACK DOWN, BUT THE GEAR DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME TO EXTEND AND LOCK. I SET THE ACFT DOWN AS SOFT AND SMOOTH AS POSSIBLE. WE SLID ON THE RWY ABOUT 400 FT COMING TO REST ON THE RWY CTRLINE ABOUT 1000 FT FROM THE THRESHOLD. THERE WAS NO INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE, AND THE ACFT SUFFERED MINIMAL DAMAGE, EXCEPT FOR THE PROPS WHICH WERE BENT BEYOND REPAIR. PART OF A FLT INSTRUCTOR'S JOB IS TO PROVIDE REALISTIC DISTR TO HIS/HER STUDENTS. I NOT ONLY DISTRACTED MY STUDENT, BUT BECAME DISTRACTED MYSELF. IF I HAD BEEN PAYING CLOSER ATTN TO MY STUDENT'S ACTIONS I MIGHT HAVE NOTICED HE HAD NOT PLACED THE GEAR SELECTOR IN THE DOWN POS. IN ADDITION, IF BOTH MY STUDENT AND I HAD PERFORMED THE APCH TO LNDG CHKLIST PROVIDED IN THE ACFT INSTEAD OF RELYING ON MEMORY, WE BOTH WOULD HAVE DISCOVERED OUR DISCREPANCY. FINALLY, I SHOULD NOT HAVE RELIED ON THE GEAR INDICATOR LIGHTS ALONE TO VERIFY THE GEAR WAS DOWN. MY STUDENT AND I HAVE TAKEN THIS SIT AS A LEARNING EXPERIENCE AND ARE STRIVING TO CORRECT OUR OWN INADEQUACIES TO INSURE THE SAFER OP OF ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.