Narrative:

I departed from ft lauderdale executive airport with mr X, an FAA safety inspector/pilot on a part 141 training flight. The training session began with a preflight briefing on all maneuvers that we would conduct during this session. Prior to beginning this flight lesson, I consulted with the instructor who had performed practice autorotations with mr X during the previous day. His comments as well as the grades in his student file indicated to me that mr X was at or above commercial pilot standards in performing power recovery autorotations. This training period was to include touchdown autorotations. This maneuver was discussed during the preflight briefing. I am current in teaching touchdown autorotations as I have done so with more than 30 FAA inspectors within the last 6 months (company is under contract with the FAA to supply recurrency training). A flight plan was not filed. WX information for the local area was obtained by listening to the ATIS report at ft lauderdale executive airport, and was said to be clear, visibility greater than 6 mi and wind calm. We then departed for pompano airpark (where we conduct our training operations). We carried no passenger. We arrived at pompano airpark and landed on taxiway D. Mr X and I then discussed performing our first practice touchdown autorotation, and I stated that at 100 ft AGL, if our safety parameters (ie, airspeed, trim, rate of descent, rotor RPM or glide distance) were not correct, then we would initiate a power recovery. That was agreed upon. I then proceeded to obtain 'option clearance' from the control tower and requested repositioning to taxiway B which allowed us more room to slide or overshoot or undershoot our planned touchdown point than did our previously assigned operation area. We then proceeded to fly our traffic pattern. On final approach we entered autorotation. Our entry altitude was 500 ft AGL, and our airspeed was approximately 80 KIAS. During our established glide, mr X stated that he thought the rotor RPM was low. I responded that it was normal. It was in the low to mid green area and stable,which is normal for this type of helicopter loaded lightly as it was. At 100 ft AGL, I made a determination that all safety parameters were met, and that we could successfully manage the touchdown portion of the maneuver. At approximately 50 ft AGL, he began a cyclic flare. He made the initial pitch pull at approximately 15-20 ft AGL. I believed this was a little high, and he must have too, because he then fully lowered the collective. This I know because at that time I had my hand on the collective. At that point I may have either removed my hand from the collective or relaxed guarding it, because he then proceeded to pull in nearly full up collective. At this point, we were at approximately 5-10 ft AGL with a nose high attitude. I attempted to level the helicopter, but it would not level off completely perhaps due to the low RPM caused by the premature collective pitch pull. The heels of the skids contacted the ground first and caused the nose to pitch down suddenly. This in turn caused a catapult effect of the tail boom which consequently suffered wrinkle damage. The retreating rotor blade (flexing downward) contacted the tail rotor drive shaft and cover. The aircraft slid straight forward approximately 5 ft. I then opened the door and looked at the tail boom noticing that the tail rotor was not turning. We then shut down the engine and stopped the rotor using the brake. After turning off the overhead switches, we exited the helicopter from the 2 front doors. Neither of us suffered any injuries. It has become an issue of debate among helicopter instructors as to whether or not practicing touchdown autorotations is of any real value. It is not a required maneuver under any of far part 61. Only 1 practical test standards guide requires demonstration of this maneuver, the CFI. The FAA has made this maneuver a required item in their contract demands for out of agency recurrency training. According to preliminary accident reports as collected and circulated to the helicopter industry, the most common training accident involves the practicing of touchdown autorotations. The military abolished this training procedure several years ago after determining through a statistical study that it was of little or no value. The touchdown autorotation demands a very high degree of skill of the pilot. In order to remain safe in conducting this maneuver, a pilot must continue to practice them on a regular basis. The FAA inspectors do not fly on a regular basis and will not, by their own admission, remain current, therefore I can see no real value in being required to allow them to perform them during this recurrency training course. With regards to my accident, I believe now and have always, that this maneuver does not afford a flight instructor enough time to correct mistakes made by the student once the collective pitch pull is made. This means that in order to prevent an eventual accident, the instructor must either choose to perform the maneuver himself with his student riding the controls, or allow his student to perform the maneuver with the possibility of him committing an irreversible unrecoverable error. The touchdown phase of the autorotation should only be taught by ground discussion just like other inherently dangerous nonstandard maneuvers like retreating blade stall, low G hazards, and dynamic rollover. It is obvious from this accident that a pilot current on power recovery autorotations but not touchdown autorotations (mr X) will walk away without injury in the unlikelihood that he must actually perform a touchdown autorotation. The helicopter is damaged, but the occupants will remain unscathed. I believe the basis of the military's study suggested the very same thing. It is my belief that staying current on power recovery autorotations and by teaching the touchdown phase of the autorotation by ground discussion, only then can we eliminate this type of accident. Until then, we will continue to see more and more helicopters substantially damaged or destroyed by this maneuver. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter was required to take a 609 ride with the FSDO representative to prove he was a competent instructor. There has been no other follow up from FAA. The case is closed. The helicopter was a bell jet ranger 206B. Analyst inquired about any other follow up by reporter such as through a helicopter organization or use of a hotline. Reporter indicated the company has a new in house policy they want to adopt to prevent a recurrence. They must present it to FAA for their approval.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HELI INSTRUCTOR TAKING PART 141 TRAINING FLT WITH FAA INSPECTOR HAS DAMAGE ON PRACTICING AUTOROTATION PROCS WITH FAA INSPECTOR FLYING.

Narrative: I DEPARTED FROM FT LAUDERDALE EXECUTIVE ARPT WITH MR X, AN FAA SAFETY INSPECTOR/PLT ON A PART 141 TRAINING FLT. THE TRAINING SESSION BEGAN WITH A PREFLT BRIEFING ON ALL MANEUVERS THAT WE WOULD CONDUCT DURING THIS SESSION. PRIOR TO BEGINNING THIS FLT LESSON, I CONSULTED WITH THE INSTRUCTOR WHO HAD PERFORMED PRACTICE AUTOROTATIONS WITH MR X DURING THE PREVIOUS DAY. HIS COMMENTS AS WELL AS THE GRADES IN HIS STUDENT FILE INDICATED TO ME THAT MR X WAS AT OR ABOVE COMMERCIAL PLT STANDARDS IN PERFORMING PWR RECOVERY AUTOROTATIONS. THIS TRAINING PERIOD WAS TO INCLUDE TOUCHDOWN AUTOROTATIONS. THIS MANEUVER WAS DISCUSSED DURING THE PREFLT BRIEFING. I AM CURRENT IN TEACHING TOUCHDOWN AUTOROTATIONS AS I HAVE DONE SO WITH MORE THAN 30 FAA INSPECTORS WITHIN THE LAST 6 MONTHS (COMPANY IS UNDER CONTRACT WITH THE FAA TO SUPPLY RECURRENCY TRAINING). A FLT PLAN WAS NOT FILED. WX INFO FOR THE LCL AREA WAS OBTAINED BY LISTENING TO THE ATIS RPT AT FT LAUDERDALE EXECUTIVE ARPT, AND WAS SAID TO BE CLR, VISIBILITY GREATER THAN 6 MI AND WIND CALM. WE THEN DEPARTED FOR POMPANO AIRPARK (WHERE WE CONDUCT OUR TRAINING OPS). WE CARRIED NO PAX. WE ARRIVED AT POMPANO AIRPARK AND LANDED ON TXWY D. MR X AND I THEN DISCUSSED PERFORMING OUR FIRST PRACTICE TOUCHDOWN AUTOROTATION, AND I STATED THAT AT 100 FT AGL, IF OUR SAFETY PARAMETERS (IE, AIRSPD, TRIM, RATE OF DSCNT, ROTOR RPM OR GLIDE DISTANCE) WERE NOT CORRECT, THEN WE WOULD INITIATE A PWR RECOVERY. THAT WAS AGREED UPON. I THEN PROCEEDED TO OBTAIN 'OPTION CLRNC' FROM THE CTL TWR AND REQUESTED REPOSITIONING TO TXWY B WHICH ALLOWED US MORE ROOM TO SLIDE OR OVERSHOOT OR UNDERSHOOT OUR PLANNED TOUCHDOWN POINT THAN DID OUR PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED OP AREA. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO FLY OUR TFC PATTERN. ON FINAL APCH WE ENTERED AUTOROTATION. OUR ENTRY ALT WAS 500 FT AGL, AND OUR AIRSPD WAS APPROX 80 KIAS. DURING OUR ESTABLISHED GLIDE, MR X STATED THAT HE THOUGHT THE ROTOR RPM WAS LOW. I RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NORMAL. IT WAS IN THE LOW TO MID GREEN AREA AND STABLE,WHICH IS NORMAL FOR THIS TYPE OF HELI LOADED LIGHTLY AS IT WAS. AT 100 FT AGL, I MADE A DETERMINATION THAT ALL SAFETY PARAMETERS WERE MET, AND THAT WE COULD SUCCESSFULLY MANAGE THE TOUCHDOWN PORTION OF THE MANEUVER. AT APPROX 50 FT AGL, HE BEGAN A CYCLIC FLARE. HE MADE THE INITIAL PITCH PULL AT APPROX 15-20 FT AGL. I BELIEVED THIS WAS A LITTLE HIGH, AND HE MUST HAVE TOO, BECAUSE HE THEN FULLY LOWERED THE COLLECTIVE. THIS I KNOW BECAUSE AT THAT TIME I HAD MY HAND ON THE COLLECTIVE. AT THAT POINT I MAY HAVE EITHER REMOVED MY HAND FROM THE COLLECTIVE OR RELAXED GUARDING IT, BECAUSE HE THEN PROCEEDED TO PULL IN NEARLY FULL UP COLLECTIVE. AT THIS POINT, WE WERE AT APPROX 5-10 FT AGL WITH A NOSE HIGH ATTITUDE. I ATTEMPTED TO LEVEL THE HELI, BUT IT WOULD NOT LEVEL OFF COMPLETELY PERHAPS DUE TO THE LOW RPM CAUSED BY THE PREMATURE COLLECTIVE PITCH PULL. THE HEELS OF THE SKIDS CONTACTED THE GND FIRST AND CAUSED THE NOSE TO PITCH DOWN SUDDENLY. THIS IN TURN CAUSED A CATAPULT EFFECT OF THE TAIL BOOM WHICH CONSEQUENTLY SUFFERED WRINKLE DAMAGE. THE RETREATING ROTOR BLADE (FLEXING DOWNWARD) CONTACTED THE TAIL ROTOR DRIVE SHAFT AND COVER. THE ACFT SLID STRAIGHT FORWARD APPROX 5 FT. I THEN OPENED THE DOOR AND LOOKED AT THE TAIL BOOM NOTICING THAT THE TAIL ROTOR WAS NOT TURNING. WE THEN SHUT DOWN THE ENG AND STOPPED THE ROTOR USING THE BRAKE. AFTER TURNING OFF THE OVERHEAD SWITCHES, WE EXITED THE HELI FROM THE 2 FRONT DOORS. NEITHER OF US SUFFERED ANY INJURIES. IT HAS BECOME AN ISSUE OF DEBATE AMONG HELI INSTRUCTORS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT PRACTICING TOUCHDOWN AUTOROTATIONS IS OF ANY REAL VALUE. IT IS NOT A REQUIRED MANEUVER UNDER ANY OF FAR PART 61. ONLY 1 PRACTICAL TEST STANDARDS GUIDE REQUIRES DEMONSTRATION OF THIS MANEUVER, THE CFI. THE FAA HAS MADE THIS MANEUVER A REQUIRED ITEM IN THEIR CONTRACT DEMANDS FOR OUT OF AGENCY RECURRENCY TRAINING. ACCORDING TO PRELIMINARY ACCIDENT RPTS AS COLLECTED AND CIRCULATED TO THE HELI INDUSTRY, THE MOST COMMON TRAINING ACCIDENT INVOLVES THE PRACTICING OF TOUCHDOWN AUTOROTATIONS. THE MIL ABOLISHED THIS TRAINING PROC SEVERAL YEARS AGO AFTER DETERMINING THROUGH A STATISTICAL STUDY THAT IT WAS OF LITTLE OR NO VALUE. THE TOUCHDOWN AUTOROTATION DEMANDS A VERY HIGH DEGREE OF SKILL OF THE PLT. IN ORDER TO REMAIN SAFE IN CONDUCTING THIS MANEUVER, A PLT MUST CONTINUE TO PRACTICE THEM ON A REGULAR BASIS. THE FAA INSPECTORS DO NOT FLY ON A REGULAR BASIS AND WILL NOT, BY THEIR OWN ADMISSION, REMAIN CURRENT, THEREFORE I CAN SEE NO REAL VALUE IN BEING REQUIRED TO ALLOW THEM TO PERFORM THEM DURING THIS RECURRENCY TRAINING COURSE. WITH REGARDS TO MY ACCIDENT, I BELIEVE NOW AND HAVE ALWAYS, THAT THIS MANEUVER DOES NOT AFFORD A FLT INSTRUCTOR ENOUGH TIME TO CORRECT MISTAKES MADE BY THE STUDENT ONCE THE COLLECTIVE PITCH PULL IS MADE. THIS MEANS THAT IN ORDER TO PREVENT AN EVENTUAL ACCIDENT, THE INSTRUCTOR MUST EITHER CHOOSE TO PERFORM THE MANEUVER HIMSELF WITH HIS STUDENT RIDING THE CTLS, OR ALLOW HIS STUDENT TO PERFORM THE MANEUVER WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF HIM COMMITTING AN IRREVERSIBLE UNRECOVERABLE ERROR. THE TOUCHDOWN PHASE OF THE AUTOROTATION SHOULD ONLY BE TAUGHT BY GND DISCUSSION JUST LIKE OTHER INHERENTLY DANGEROUS NONSTANDARD MANEUVERS LIKE RETREATING BLADE STALL, LOW G HAZARDS, AND DYNAMIC ROLLOVER. IT IS OBVIOUS FROM THIS ACCIDENT THAT A PLT CURRENT ON PWR RECOVERY AUTOROTATIONS BUT NOT TOUCHDOWN AUTOROTATIONS (MR X) WILL WALK AWAY WITHOUT INJURY IN THE UNLIKELIHOOD THAT HE MUST ACTUALLY PERFORM A TOUCHDOWN AUTOROTATION. THE HELI IS DAMAGED, BUT THE OCCUPANTS WILL REMAIN UNSCATHED. I BELIEVE THE BASIS OF THE MIL'S STUDY SUGGESTED THE VERY SAME THING. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT STAYING CURRENT ON PWR RECOVERY AUTOROTATIONS AND BY TEACHING THE TOUCHDOWN PHASE OF THE AUTOROTATION BY GND DISCUSSION, ONLY THEN CAN WE ELIMINATE THIS TYPE OF ACCIDENT. UNTIL THEN, WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEE MORE AND MORE HELIS SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGED OR DESTROYED BY THIS MANEUVER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR WAS REQUIRED TO TAKE A 609 RIDE WITH THE FSDO REPRESENTATIVE TO PROVE HE WAS A COMPETENT INSTRUCTOR. THERE HAS BEEN NO OTHER FOLLOW UP FROM FAA. THE CASE IS CLOSED. THE HELI WAS A BELL JET RANGER 206B. ANALYST INQUIRED ABOUT ANY OTHER FOLLOW UP BY RPTR SUCH AS THROUGH A HELI ORGANIZATION OR USE OF A HOTLINE. RPTR INDICATED THE COMPANY HAS A NEW IN HOUSE POLICY THEY WANT TO ADOPT TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE. THEY MUST PRESENT IT TO FAA FOR THEIR APPROVAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.