Narrative:

A B727 flight to atl was issued a takeoff clearance for runway 23L at cleveland hopkins airport. The aircraft started a takeoff roll on runway 28 from the intersection of runway 23L. It was not discovered by the local controller until the aircraft was past the runway 18 intersection, too late for an abort. The aircraft became airborne at the very end of the runway, barely. Total length of the runway available was 4500 ft. This situation has occurred many times at cleveland hopkins. All previous occurrences have been resolved by either the controller instructing the pilot to abort, or the pilot aware of the mistake aborts on his own. Someone is going to get killed! Some possible solutions: 1) close and barricade runway 28 just beyond runways 23L or 23R, 2) designate taxiway west as the takeoff threshold for runway 23L, 3) place a large sign at the intersection of runways 28 and 23L advising pilots of the confusing intersection and 4) completely redesign the intersection to avoid the confusion. Supplemental information from acn 324152: aircraft cleared from gate area to taxi to runway 23L. Turn was made onto taxiway J to hold short runway 23L. Clearance was given for takeoff on runway 23L. All ramp, txwys and runways were snow covered and markings difficult to distinguish. A rolling takeoff was accomplished. At approximately 100 KIAS, the 3000 ft remaining was sighted and we were aware that we had taken off on runway 28 instead of runway 23. Due to the ice and snow covered runway, an abort was not attempted and the takeoff continued. Lift-off was accomplished within the runway confines but with only 1000 ft remaining. It was certainly our responsibility to align the aircraft on the proper runway for takeoff. Contributing factors include: 1) failure of the flight crew to xchk compass heading with that of the departure runway, 2) darkness in a snow covered environment, 3) no visible markings on any runway due to snow and ice coverage, 4) no visible lighted signs above the snow line, and 5) failure of the tower to monitor the position of the aircraft prior to or after the commencement of takeoff roll. Recommendations: 1) a NOTAM reemphasizing the special attention required during night operations at unfamiliar airports, 2) airport requirement to have lighted signs denoting each runway threshold especially where two intersect, and 3) airport requirement to clear the runway identify markings on all runways, but most especially those which intersect.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727-200 FLT CREW DEPARETS WRONG RWY AT CLE.

Narrative: A B727 FLT TO ATL WAS ISSUED A TKOF CLRNC FOR RWY 23L AT CLEVELAND HOPKINS ARPT. THE ACFT STARTED A TKOF ROLL ON RWY 28 FROM THE INTXN OF RWY 23L. IT WAS NOT DISCOVERED BY THE LCL CTLR UNTIL THE ACFT WAS PAST THE RWY 18 INTXN, TOO LATE FOR AN ABORT. THE ACFT BECAME AIRBORNE AT THE VERY END OF THE RWY, BARELY. TOTAL LENGTH OF THE RWY AVAILABLE WAS 4500 FT. THIS SIT HAS OCCURRED MANY TIMES AT CLEVELAND HOPKINS. ALL PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY EITHER THE CTLR INSTRUCTING THE PLT TO ABORT, OR THE PLT AWARE OF THE MISTAKE ABORTS ON HIS OWN. SOMEONE IS GOING TO GET KILLED! SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: 1) CLOSE AND BARRICADE RWY 28 JUST BEYOND RWYS 23L OR 23R, 2) DESIGNATE TXWY W AS THE TKOF THRESHOLD FOR RWY 23L, 3) PLACE A LARGE SIGN AT THE INTXN OF RWYS 28 AND 23L ADVISING PLTS OF THE CONFUSING INTXN AND 4) COMPLETELY REDESIGN THE INTXN TO AVOID THE CONFUSION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 324152: ACFT CLRED FROM GATE AREA TO TAXI TO RWY 23L. TURN WAS MADE ONTO TXWY J TO HOLD SHORT RWY 23L. CLRNC WAS GIVEN FOR TKOF ON RWY 23L. ALL RAMP, TXWYS AND RWYS WERE SNOW COVERED AND MARKINGS DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH. A ROLLING TKOF WAS ACCOMPLISHED. AT APPROX 100 KIAS, THE 3000 FT REMAINING WAS SIGHTED AND WE WERE AWARE THAT WE HAD TAKEN OFF ON RWY 28 INSTEAD OF RWY 23. DUE TO THE ICE AND SNOW COVERED RWY, AN ABORT WAS NOT ATTEMPTED AND THE TKOF CONTINUED. LIFT-OFF WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE RWY CONFINES BUT WITH ONLY 1000 FT REMAINING. IT WAS CERTAINLY OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO ALIGN THE ACFT ON THE PROPER RWY FOR TKOF. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE: 1) FAILURE OF THE FLC TO XCHK COMPASS HDG WITH THAT OF THE DEP RWY, 2) DARKNESS IN A SNOW COVERED ENVIRONMENT, 3) NO VISIBLE MARKINGS ON ANY RWY DUE TO SNOW AND ICE COVERAGE, 4) NO VISIBLE LIGHTED SIGNS ABOVE THE SNOW LINE, AND 5) FAILURE OF THE TWR TO MONITOR THE POS OF THE ACFT PRIOR TO OR AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF TKOF ROLL. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) A NOTAM REEMPHASIZING THE SPECIAL ATTN REQUIRED DURING NIGHT OPS AT UNFAMILIAR ARPTS, 2) ARPT REQUIREMENT TO HAVE LIGHTED SIGNS DENOTING EACH RWY THRESHOLD ESPECIALLY WHERE TWO INTERSECT, AND 3) ARPT REQUIREMENT TO CLR THE RWY IDENT MARKINGS ON ALL RWYS, BUT MOST ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH INTERSECT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.