Narrative:

Operated flight from pit to las. Prior to leaving gate, WX was reported 2500 ft broken, 10 mi visibility and 'sf' (light snow flurries). Temperature was 27 degree F, calm winds. On preflight inspection I did not see any snow or ice adhering to exterior of aircraft. Crew initially decided to deice due to observed light snow flurries. Communication breakdown #1: captain made an announcement to this effect to passenger, but unknown to first officer. Upon taxi out snow flurries ceased and a visual inspection was made from the cockpit through an open cockpit window to ascertain if any accumulation had occurred since pushback from gate. None was observed. At this point, over first officer's slight objections, captain elected not to deice since original condition requiring deicing (snow flurries) had ceased. Aircraft taxied to active runway and took off uneventfully. The captain did not make a subsequent announcement to the passenger to let them know we wouldn't be deicing. This caused them some concern. Communication problem #2: since first officer did not hear captain's first announcement concerning deicing, he was not concerned about making a subsequent announcement negating the first announcement. At this point the passenger were under the impression we would be deicing for takeoff, however the captain never told them he changed his mind. This leads to the insidious problem. A passenger sitting on the wing noted some snow and ice at the wing root, on top. He was a qualified air transport pilot. He did not come forward with his information due to the fact that he thought we were going to the deice pad (based on the captain's announcement). This ice stayed on the aircraft until passing FL200 where it apparently sublimated. He then informed us of his observation. Analysis: as first officer, I should have been more forceful in my convictions and insisted on being deiced. I followed along rather than cause a conflict with this captain who was a confrontational, overbearing type of person. In addition, I should have made a visual inspection from the passenger cabin. The captain should have followed basic 'CRM' principles by informing me, that he had informed the passenger we would be deicing. This would have prompted me to say something to the passenger when he decided not to deice. Instead this announcement was never made. Useful information concerning ice and crusty snow on the wing was not forthcoming from this passenger. This situation became unsafe as a series of communication foul ups transpired. We should have been ultra conservative and deiced, even though we didn't see any accumulation. In addition, a follow up announcement should have been made by the captain, to the passenger. Supplemental information from acn 321722: captain used CRM to make an informed decision to bypass deicing. Crew decided to inform flight attendants prior to departure. A decision was made not to inform passenger for fear of appearing indecisive of creating unnecessary alarm.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLC DID NOT FOLLOW SOPS FOR PRETKOF ICE CONTAMINATION CHK AND DEPARTED WITH ICE AND SNOW ON THE WING ROOT.

Narrative: OPERATED FLT FROM PIT TO LAS. PRIOR TO LEAVING GATE, WX WAS RPTED 2500 FT BROKEN, 10 MI VISIBILITY AND 'SF' (LIGHT SNOW FLURRIES). TEMP WAS 27 DEG F, CALM WINDS. ON PREFLT INSPECTION I DID NOT SEE ANY SNOW OR ICE ADHERING TO EXTERIOR OF ACFT. CREW INITIALLY DECIDED TO DEICE DUE TO OBSERVED LIGHT SNOW FLURRIES. COM BREAKDOWN #1: CAPT MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS EFFECT TO PAX, BUT UNKNOWN TO FO. UPON TAXI OUT SNOW FLURRIES CEASED AND A VISUAL INSPECTION WAS MADE FROM THE COCKPIT THROUGH AN OPEN COCKPIT WINDOW TO ASCERTAIN IF ANY ACCUMULATION HAD OCCURRED SINCE PUSHBACK FROM GATE. NONE WAS OBSERVED. AT THIS POINT, OVER FO'S SLIGHT OBJECTIONS, CAPT ELECTED NOT TO DEICE SINCE ORIGINAL CONDITION REQUIRING DEICING (SNOW FLURRIES) HAD CEASED. ACFT TAXIED TO ACTIVE RWY AND TOOK OFF UNEVENTFULLY. THE CAPT DID NOT MAKE A SUBSEQUENT ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX TO LET THEM KNOW WE WOULDN'T BE DEICING. THIS CAUSED THEM SOME CONCERN. COM PROB #2: SINCE FO DID NOT HEAR CAPT'S FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING DEICING, HE WAS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT MAKING A SUBSEQUENT ANNOUNCEMENT NEGATING THE FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT. AT THIS POINT THE PAX WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION WE WOULD BE DEICING FOR TKOF, HOWEVER THE CAPT NEVER TOLD THEM HE CHANGED HIS MIND. THIS LEADS TO THE INSIDIOUS PROB. A PAX SITTING ON THE WING NOTED SOME SNOW AND ICE AT THE WING ROOT, ON TOP. HE WAS A QUALIFIED AIR TRANSPORT PLT. HE DID NOT COME FORWARD WITH HIS INFO DUE TO THE FACT THAT HE THOUGHT WE WERE GOING TO THE DEICE PAD (BASED ON THE CAPT'S ANNOUNCEMENT). THIS ICE STAYED ON THE ACFT UNTIL PASSING FL200 WHERE IT APPARENTLY SUBLIMATED. HE THEN INFORMED US OF HIS OBSERVATION. ANALYSIS: AS FO, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE FORCEFUL IN MY CONVICTIONS AND INSISTED ON BEING DEICED. I FOLLOWED ALONG RATHER THAN CAUSE A CONFLICT WITH THIS CAPT WHO WAS A CONFRONTATIONAL, OVERBEARING TYPE OF PERSON. IN ADDITION, I SHOULD HAVE MADE A VISUAL INSPECTION FROM THE PAX CABIN. THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED BASIC 'CRM' PRINCIPLES BY INFORMING ME, THAT HE HAD INFORMED THE PAX WE WOULD BE DEICING. THIS WOULD HAVE PROMPTED ME TO SAY SOMETHING TO THE PAX WHEN HE DECIDED NOT TO DEICE. INSTEAD THIS ANNOUNCEMENT WAS NEVER MADE. USEFUL INFO CONCERNING ICE AND CRUSTY SNOW ON THE WING WAS NOT FORTHCOMING FROM THIS PAX. THIS SIT BECAME UNSAFE AS A SERIES OF COM FOUL UPS TRANSPIRED. WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ULTRA CONSERVATIVE AND DEICED, EVEN THOUGH WE DIDN'T SEE ANY ACCUMULATION. IN ADDITION, A FOLLOW UP ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE CAPT, TO THE PAX. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 321722: CAPT USED CRM TO MAKE AN INFORMED DECISION TO BYPASS DEICING. CREW DECIDED TO INFORM FLT ATTENDANTS PRIOR TO DEP. A DECISION WAS MADE NOT TO INFORM PAX FOR FEAR OF APPEARING INDECISIVE OF CREATING UNNECESSARY ALARM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.