Narrative:

This is a summary of events. Aircraft was deiced twice at gate area. Aircraft taxied to takeoff runway. Captain was advised of need to perform pre takeoff contamination check of wings. When asked if he would like to do it, or if I should do it, he simply said no. Because taxi operations were difficult due to WX conditions, we were at runway end and taxied into position and hold. This is the point I intervened and asked who would do the takeoff contamination check. Very shortly after his answer no! We were cleared for takeoff. I advised he should 'stop, at the least he would get a violation for this.' he advanced the power, and I rushed to perform the rest of what I could of our takeoff checklist items. After takeoff and sterile operations, I advised I was extremely uncomfortable with the takeoff. His response was that we all feel that way sometimes. I refused to fly with him any more and removed myself from the rest of scheduled flying and reported this incident to company management immediately. I feel I did everything I could, short of assuming command, to deter this takeoff. I think additional training and instruction to coplts concerning when they should take aircraft controls are needed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG DEPARTED WITH NO VISUAL CHK OF WING CONTAMINATION.

Narrative: THIS IS A SUMMARY OF EVENTS. ACFT WAS DEICED TWICE AT GATE AREA. ACFT TAXIED TO TKOF RWY. CAPT WAS ADVISED OF NEED TO PERFORM PRE TKOF CONTAMINATION CHK OF WINGS. WHEN ASKED IF HE WOULD LIKE TO DO IT, OR IF I SHOULD DO IT, HE SIMPLY SAID NO. BECAUSE TAXI OPS WERE DIFFICULT DUE TO WX CONDITIONS, WE WERE AT RWY END AND TAXIED INTO POS AND HOLD. THIS IS THE POINT I INTERVENED AND ASKED WHO WOULD DO THE TKOF CONTAMINATION CHK. VERY SHORTLY AFTER HIS ANSWER NO! WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. I ADVISED HE SHOULD 'STOP, AT THE LEAST HE WOULD GET A VIOLATION FOR THIS.' HE ADVANCED THE PWR, AND I RUSHED TO PERFORM THE REST OF WHAT I COULD OF OUR TKOF CHKLIST ITEMS. AFTER TKOF AND STERILE OPS, I ADVISED I WAS EXTREMELY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE TKOF. HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT WE ALL FEEL THAT WAY SOMETIMES. I REFUSED TO FLY WITH HIM ANY MORE AND REMOVED MYSELF FROM THE REST OF SCHEDULED FLYING AND RPTED THIS INCIDENT TO COMPANY MGMNT IMMEDIATELY. I FEEL I DID EVERYTHING I COULD, SHORT OF ASSUMING COMMAND, TO DETER THIS TKOF. I THINK ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND INSTRUCTION TO COPLTS CONCERNING WHEN THEY SHOULD TAKE ACFT CTLS ARE NEEDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.