Narrative:

This was our 20TH flight together. My student has approximately 25- 30 hours of instruction logged over the past 3 months, all of it from me, and I have given approximately 1200 hours of instruction over the past 3 yrs. This combination of experience may sometimes lead to a somewhat lackadaisical mood in the cockpit, and an atmosphere exists that assumes the student to be trustworthy of radio calls, taxiing, navigation, and engine priming/starting without the same constant attention given to a first-lesson student. Before my student primed the engine for start, he mentioned to me that he had attended an AOPA convention in atlantic city a few days before and I asked him one or two questions about it. After listening to ATIS, my student contacted ground control for taxi clearance but during this time, trusting my student and instead of listening closely to the taxi clearance, my mind had wandered back to the AOPA convention and some of my student's comments on it. One of the few items I did pick up from the ATIS was the fact that the wind was 240 degrees at 10 KTS and variable. Danbury airport has 2 perpendicular runways (17/35 and 8/26) which intersect at the center of the airport. My FBO is located on the southwest corner of the airport. We proceeded to taxi eastbound on taxiway C towards runway 26. During the taxi our conversation continued. I did hear ground control clear a cessna conquest at the other end of the field to runway 26. As we approached the intersection of runway 17/35 with taxiway C, my student began slowing the warrior, and a moment later seemed hesitant and unsure in his operation of the aircraft. Remembering that the wind was from 240 degrees and that another aircraft had just been cleared to taxi to runway 26, I assumed my student was reducing speed in order to look both ways before crossing runway 17/35. My student continued straight ahead, asking 'aren't we supposed to turn somewhere here?' I responded by asking 'aren't we cleared to runway 26?' and taking control of the airplane, slowing it further. My student responded by saying, 'I thought he said runway 17.' at this point I stopped the warrior and asked the ground controller 'which runway are we using?' the controller replied, 'as you read back, runway 17.' I then informed the controller we would taxi to runway 17. However, though our warrior had not taxied onto runway 17, and though there was no traffic landing or taking off on that runway, the nose of the aircraft had crossed the 'hold bars' by approximately 5 ft. I believe this situation could have been avoided, first and most importantly, by enforcing the same 'sterile cockpit' rule currently in effect at 135 and 121 operations. Taxi has the potential of being one of the most hazardous phases of flight, especially when approaching a runway. I will personally make this a point with every student and on every flight from this point forward. I didn't have to remind myself during the latter half of this taxi that I was the PIC no matter what my student did or what his experience level. An instructor should never assume his student knows what he is doing. Always employ vigilance, listen carefully to all clrncs and never simply assume. Since my student was taxiing towards runway 26, another aircraft had just been cleared to runway 26 (albeit a turbine aircraft and runway 26 is longer and preferred) and the wind was from 240 degrees, I had simply assumed the controller had cleared us to runway 26, otherwise my student would have turned left and crossed runway 26 near our FBO, which is a common procedure and a preferred taxi route.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION. UNAUTH RWY ENTRY.

Narrative: THIS WAS OUR 20TH FLT TOGETHER. MY STUDENT HAS APPROX 25- 30 HRS OF INSTRUCTION LOGGED OVER THE PAST 3 MONTHS, ALL OF IT FROM ME, AND I HAVE GIVEN APPROX 1200 HRS OF INSTRUCTION OVER THE PAST 3 YRS. THIS COMBINATION OF EXPERIENCE MAY SOMETIMES LEAD TO A SOMEWHAT LACKADAISICAL MOOD IN THE COCKPIT, AND AN ATMOSPHERE EXISTS THAT ASSUMES THE STUDENT TO BE TRUSTWORTHY OF RADIO CALLS, TAXIING, NAV, AND ENG PRIMING/STARTING WITHOUT THE SAME CONSTANT ATTN GIVEN TO A FIRST-LESSON STUDENT. BEFORE MY STUDENT PRIMED THE ENG FOR START, HE MENTIONED TO ME THAT HE HAD ATTENDED AN AOPA CONVENTION IN ATLANTIC CITY A FEW DAYS BEFORE AND I ASKED HIM ONE OR TWO QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. AFTER LISTENING TO ATIS, MY STUDENT CONTACTED GND CTL FOR TAXI CLRNC BUT DURING THIS TIME, TRUSTING MY STUDENT AND INSTEAD OF LISTENING CLOSELY TO THE TAXI CLRNC, MY MIND HAD WANDERED BACK TO THE AOPA CONVENTION AND SOME OF MY STUDENT'S COMMENTS ON IT. ONE OF THE FEW ITEMS I DID PICK UP FROM THE ATIS WAS THE FACT THAT THE WIND WAS 240 DEGS AT 10 KTS AND VARIABLE. DANBURY ARPT HAS 2 PERPENDICULAR RWYS (17/35 AND 8/26) WHICH INTERSECT AT THE CTR OF THE ARPT. MY FBO IS LOCATED ON THE SW CORNER OF THE ARPT. WE PROCEEDED TO TAXI EBOUND ON TXWY C TOWARDS RWY 26. DURING THE TAXI OUR CONVERSATION CONTINUED. I DID HEAR GND CTL CLR A CESSNA CONQUEST AT THE OTHER END OF THE FIELD TO RWY 26. AS WE APCHED THE INTXN OF RWY 17/35 WITH TXWY C, MY STUDENT BEGAN SLOWING THE WARRIOR, AND A MOMENT LATER SEEMED HESITANT AND UNSURE IN HIS OP OF THE ACFT. REMEMBERING THAT THE WIND WAS FROM 240 DEGS AND THAT ANOTHER ACFT HAD JUST BEEN CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 26, I ASSUMED MY STUDENT WAS REDUCING SPD IN ORDER TO LOOK BOTH WAYS BEFORE XING RWY 17/35. MY STUDENT CONTINUED STRAIGHT AHEAD, ASKING 'AREN'T WE SUPPOSED TO TURN SOMEWHERE HERE?' I RESPONDED BY ASKING 'AREN'T WE CLRED TO RWY 26?' AND TAKING CTL OF THE AIRPLANE, SLOWING IT FURTHER. MY STUDENT RESPONDED BY SAYING, 'I THOUGHT HE SAID RWY 17.' AT THIS POINT I STOPPED THE WARRIOR AND ASKED THE GND CTLR 'WHICH RWY ARE WE USING?' THE CTLR REPLIED, 'AS YOU READ BACK, RWY 17.' I THEN INFORMED THE CTLR WE WOULD TAXI TO RWY 17. HOWEVER, THOUGH OUR WARRIOR HAD NOT TAXIED ONTO RWY 17, AND THOUGH THERE WAS NO TFC LNDG OR TAKING OFF ON THAT RWY, THE NOSE OF THE ACFT HAD CROSSED THE 'HOLD BARS' BY APPROX 5 FT. I BELIEVE THIS SIT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, BY ENFORCING THE SAME 'STERILE COCKPIT' RULE CURRENTLY IN EFFECT AT 135 AND 121 OPS. TAXI HAS THE POTENTIAL OF BEING ONE OF THE MOST HAZARDOUS PHASES OF FLT, ESPECIALLY WHEN APCHING A RWY. I WILL PERSONALLY MAKE THIS A POINT WITH EVERY STUDENT AND ON EVERY FLT FROM THIS POINT FORWARD. I DIDN'T HAVE TO REMIND MYSELF DURING THE LATTER HALF OF THIS TAXI THAT I WAS THE PIC NO MATTER WHAT MY STUDENT DID OR WHAT HIS EXPERIENCE LEVEL. AN INSTRUCTOR SHOULD NEVER ASSUME HIS STUDENT KNOWS WHAT HE IS DOING. ALWAYS EMPLOY VIGILANCE, LISTEN CAREFULLY TO ALL CLRNCS AND NEVER SIMPLY ASSUME. SINCE MY STUDENT WAS TAXIING TOWARDS RWY 26, ANOTHER ACFT HAD JUST BEEN CLRED TO RWY 26 (ALBEIT A TURBINE ACFT AND RWY 26 IS LONGER AND PREFERRED) AND THE WIND WAS FROM 240 DEGS, I HAD SIMPLY ASSUMED THE CTLR HAD CLRED US TO RWY 26, OTHERWISE MY STUDENT WOULD HAVE TURNED L AND CROSSED RWY 26 NEAR OUR FBO, WHICH IS A COMMON PROC AND A PREFERRED TAXI RTE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.