Narrative:

Air carrier flight X accepted a visual approach to runway 25R lax based on visual contact with an air carrier heavy 7 mi ahead. At approximately 15 mi on GS and localizer, experienced an abrupt 15-20 degree roll to the left. Captain disconnected autoplt and continued approach on localizer and 1/2 DOT above GS. Received series of 3 separate RA's. 13 mi out, traffic RA, followed immediately by descend RA. Green band on vsi directed 1500-2000 FPM descent. TCASII showed target varying 300-400 ft high and slightly left. Captain followed RA but remained above GS. Received clear of conflict message. No visual contact. Second RA, same target, same TCASII commands at 11 mi. Captain followed RA but was able to visually identify target aircraft, a brasilia. The brasilia came as close to air carrier X as 200 ft. TCASII clear of conflict. Third RA at 8 mi. TCASII monitor vertical speed. Captain complied with TCASII RA, kept brasilia in sight. First officer made call to socal approach asking to verify landing runway for the brasilia. Several previous attempts were blocked. Socal approach stated that brasilia had air carrier X in sight and was on a visual approach for runway 25L. Air carrier X switched to runway 25R tower at 6.1 mi. Brasilia remained at 400 ft on TCASII for remainder of approach. At gate, first officer made phone call to lax tower. Tower representative stated 'there are several gars per week because of similar scenarios' and 'commuters often snug up to aircraft on parallel approach when cleared for visual.' both captain and first officer felt certain that the brasilia was right of the runway 25L localizer. Air carrier X was on runway 25R localizer or slightly right at all times. Both captain and first officer agreed that a missed approach was a last resort for following reasons. 1) proximity of brasilia above and slightly left of air carrier X. Air carrier X crew was not confident that brasilia crew could maintain visual contact or that visual contact had not been lost. 2) captain had brasilia in sight after first RA. 3) additional traffic at 3 O'clock for runway 24R.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SUPER 80 HAS NMAC WITH BRASILIA ON APCH. TCASII ACTIVATED.

Narrative: ACR FLT X ACCEPTED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 25R LAX BASED ON VISUAL CONTACT WITH AN ACR HVY 7 MI AHEAD. AT APPROX 15 MI ON GS AND LOC, EXPERIENCED AN ABRUPT 15-20 DEG ROLL TO THE L. CAPT DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND CONTINUED APCH ON LOC AND 1/2 DOT ABOVE GS. RECEIVED SERIES OF 3 SEPARATE RA'S. 13 MI OUT, TFC RA, FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY DSND RA. GREEN BAND ON VSI DIRECTED 1500-2000 FPM DSCNT. TCASII SHOWED TARGET VARYING 300-400 FT HIGH AND SLIGHTLY L. CAPT FOLLOWED RA BUT REMAINED ABOVE GS. RECEIVED CLR OF CONFLICT MESSAGE. NO VISUAL CONTACT. SECOND RA, SAME TARGET, SAME TCASII COMMANDS AT 11 MI. CAPT FOLLOWED RA BUT WAS ABLE TO VISUALLY IDENT TARGET ACFT, A BRASILIA. THE BRASILIA CAME AS CLOSE TO ACR X AS 200 FT. TCASII CLR OF CONFLICT. THIRD RA AT 8 MI. TCASII MONITOR VERT SPD. CAPT COMPLIED WITH TCASII RA, KEPT BRASILIA IN SIGHT. FO MADE CALL TO SOCAL APCH ASKING TO VERIFY LNDG RWY FOR THE BRASILIA. SEVERAL PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS WERE BLOCKED. SOCAL APCH STATED THAT BRASILIA HAD ACR X IN SIGHT AND WAS ON A VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 25L. ACR X SWITCHED TO RWY 25R TWR AT 6.1 MI. BRASILIA REMAINED AT 400 FT ON TCASII FOR REMAINDER OF APCH. AT GATE, FO MADE PHONE CALL TO LAX TWR. TWR REPRESENTATIVE STATED 'THERE ARE SEVERAL GARS PER WK BECAUSE OF SIMILAR SCENARIOS' AND 'COMMUTERS OFTEN SNUG UP TO ACFT ON PARALLEL APCH WHEN CLRED FOR VISUAL.' BOTH CAPT AND FO FELT CERTAIN THAT THE BRASILIA WAS R OF THE RWY 25L LOC. ACR X WAS ON RWY 25R LOC OR SLIGHTLY R AT ALL TIMES. BOTH CAPT AND FO AGREED THAT A MISSED APCH WAS A LAST RESORT FOR FOLLOWING REASONS. 1) PROX OF BRASILIA ABOVE AND SLIGHTLY L OF ACR X. ACR X CREW WAS NOT CONFIDENT THAT BRASILIA CREW COULD MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT OR THAT VISUAL CONTACT HAD NOT BEEN LOST. 2) CAPT HAD BRASILIA IN SIGHT AFTER FIRST RA. 3) ADDITIONAL TFC AT 3 O'CLOCK FOR RWY 24R.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.