Narrative:

I was scheduled to fly this airplane on sep/sun/95. On sep/fri/95 thrust reverser warning light was written up. Maintenance responded by 'wiring thrust lever and pinning reverser doors' and putting it on mco. The light was still on (in cockpit when we came to preflight the plane). Checked airport reference manual and noted that the identing mco reference number referenced to an inoperative thruster reverser system even though another mco number was available for the warning system. I called the maintenance coordinator about the discrepancy. He said system was disabled because we no longer had the maintenance personnel at all stations to do the repetitive check to verify the reverser had stowed. In other words, a working thrust reverser was disabled for an indicator. Mind you, this was the third day it was inoperative after sitting in a maintenance station, jfk. It also flew into pwm (6800 ft runway) and was scheduled to go into lga (7000 ft runway). It should be noted that the captain's VOR/DME and a circuit breaker for the first officer's altimeter vibrator were on mco. I know the FAA devised the MEL system so acrs could get an aircraft to a maintenance station. In these days of downsizing, it's being abused into a maintenance delay and staff reduction. No one seems to care about the impact on safety. I guess passenger will have to be killed, an investigation 'reveals' the abuses and public outcry results in the politically wind blown FAA doing something. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this captain was operating a B727-200 that had a malfunctioning reverser operating light. The light would stay illuminated even though the reverser was stowed. This system could have been operated as long as the reverser was verified as stowed by a mechanic after the aircraft landed (usually done in the gate). In this case the maintenance department decided to MEL the reverser as inoperative rather than pay a contract maintenance person to verify that it was stowed after each landing. This reporter is now flying the L1011 and he said that the maintenance scrimping is not peculiar to the B727. He has flown an L1011 with a reverser and the automatic-spoilers out at the same time. He does not think that the FAA is watching for cumulative of apparently unrelated system may have on particular performance parameters. The reporter said that he is sending more reports on the same subjects.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIRLINE MAINT POLICY. ACR CAPT COMPLAINS THAT THE MEL AS USED BY THE COMPANY AND APPROVED BY THE FAA RESULTS IN SEEMINGLY UNRELATED SYS HAVING A CUMULATIVE DETERIORATION IN ACFT PERFORMANCE. ALSO THAT THE COMPANY IS USING THE MEL TO CUT MAINT PERSONNEL AND AS A BASIS FOR OTHER OPERATIONAL DECISIONS.

Narrative: I WAS SCHEDULED TO FLY THIS AIRPLANE ON SEP/SUN/95. ON SEP/FRI/95 THRUST REVERSER WARNING LIGHT WAS WRITTEN UP. MAINT RESPONDED BY 'WIRING THRUST LEVER AND PINNING REVERSER DOORS' AND PUTTING IT ON MCO. THE LIGHT WAS STILL ON (IN COCKPIT WHEN WE CAME TO PREFLT THE PLANE). CHKED ARPT REF MANUAL AND NOTED THAT THE IDENTING MCO REF NUMBER REFED TO AN INOP THRUSTER REVERSER SYS EVEN THOUGH ANOTHER MCO NUMBER WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE WARNING SYS. I CALLED THE MAINT COORDINATOR ABOUT THE DISCREPANCY. HE SAID SYS WAS DISABLED BECAUSE WE NO LONGER HAD THE MAINT PERSONNEL AT ALL STATIONS TO DO THE REPETITIVE CHK TO VERIFY THE REVERSER HAD STOWED. IN OTHER WORDS, A WORKING THRUST REVERSER WAS DISABLED FOR AN INDICATOR. MIND YOU, THIS WAS THE THIRD DAY IT WAS INOP AFTER SITTING IN A MAINT STATION, JFK. IT ALSO FLEW INTO PWM (6800 FT RWY) AND WAS SCHEDULED TO GO INTO LGA (7000 FT RWY). IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE CAPT'S VOR/DME AND A CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR THE FO'S ALTIMETER VIBRATOR WERE ON MCO. I KNOW THE FAA DEVISED THE MEL SYS SO ACRS COULD GET AN ACFT TO A MAINT STATION. IN THESE DAYS OF DOWNSIZING, IT'S BEING ABUSED INTO A MAINT DELAY AND STAFF REDUCTION. NO ONE SEEMS TO CARE ABOUT THE IMPACT ON SAFETY. I GUESS PAX WILL HAVE TO BE KILLED, AN INVESTIGATION 'REVEALS' THE ABUSES AND PUBLIC OUTCRY RESULTS IN THE POLITICALLY WIND BLOWN FAA DOING SOMETHING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS CAPT WAS OPERATING A B727-200 THAT HAD A MALFUNCTIONING REVERSER OPERATING LIGHT. THE LIGHT WOULD STAY ILLUMINATED EVEN THOUGH THE REVERSER WAS STOWED. THIS SYS COULD HAVE BEEN OPERATED AS LONG AS THE REVERSER WAS VERIFIED AS STOWED BY A MECH AFTER THE ACFT LANDED (USUALLY DONE IN THE GATE). IN THIS CASE THE MAINT DEPT DECIDED TO MEL THE REVERSER AS INOP RATHER THAN PAY A CONTRACT MAINT PERSON TO VERIFY THAT IT WAS STOWED AFTER EACH LNDG. THIS RPTR IS NOW FLYING THE L1011 AND HE SAID THAT THE MAINT SCRIMPING IS NOT PECULIAR TO THE B727. HE HAS FLOWN AN L1011 WITH A REVERSER AND THE AUTO-SPOILERS OUT AT THE SAME TIME. HE DOES NOT THINK THAT THE FAA IS WATCHING FOR CUMULATIVE OF APPARENTLY UNRELATED SYS MAY HAVE ON PARTICULAR PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS. THE RPTR SAID THAT HE IS SENDING MORE RPTS ON THE SAME SUBJECTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.