Narrative:

Peak hub arrival at pit. 170 KTS final with minimum spacing. At 300 ft AGL approximately 1 mi on final controller cleared the second departure for takeoff between us and the airplane we followed on final. Given our close proximity to the other airplane who was not yet rolling I did not believe I could maintain an adequate margin of safety on the departure particularly in the event of an abort on the departure or a missed approach on our part. I considered the actions on the part of the veteran controller to be intentional, calculated and cavalier. It was obviously an attempt to push acceptance rate over safety, good judgement and common sense. This is the 4TH serious incident I have had with pit ATC in the past 90 days. Pit ATC management appears unable/unwilling to correct a growing number and increasing trend of operational deficiencies. The operational motto seems to be 'move the metal boys -- let the pilots sort out the small stuff.' another example of this is in a 30 min period last week 1 local controller was involved in 4 (and possibly 6) gars in a 30 min period. This situation is unacceptable and must be corrected prior to the merging of metal! Controllers must understand that this is not a video game, we are real people and airplanes subject to the laws of physics. At night distances and closure rates are more difficult to judge. Unanticipated pitch and roll rates caused by the preceding very close departure are more difficult to react to successfully. This should not be a game to see how far to push the pilots. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated these incidents had been reported to the facility management. A meeting has been set up between all interested parties. Reporter would call back with results of meeting and if any changes to ATC handling were made.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATC SPACING AND SEPARATION REDUCED DUE TO SYS CAPACITY.

Narrative: PEAK HUB ARR AT PIT. 170 KTS FINAL WITH MINIMUM SPACING. AT 300 FT AGL APPROX 1 MI ON FINAL CTLR CLRED THE SECOND DEP FOR TKOF BTWN US AND THE AIRPLANE WE FOLLOWED ON FINAL. GIVEN OUR CLOSE PROX TO THE OTHER AIRPLANE WHO WAS NOT YET ROLLING I DID NOT BELIEVE I COULD MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE MARGIN OF SAFETY ON THE DEP PARTICULARLY IN THE EVENT OF AN ABORT ON THE DEP OR A MISSED APCH ON OUR PART. I CONSIDERED THE ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE VETERAN CTLR TO BE INTENTIONAL, CALCULATED AND CAVALIER. IT WAS OBVIOUSLY AN ATTEMPT TO PUSH ACCEPTANCE RATE OVER SAFETY, GOOD JUDGEMENT AND COMMON SENSE. THIS IS THE 4TH SERIOUS INCIDENT I HAVE HAD WITH PIT ATC IN THE PAST 90 DAYS. PIT ATC MGMNT APPEARS UNABLE/UNWILLING TO CORRECT A GROWING NUMBER AND INCREASING TREND OF OPERATIONAL DEFICIENCIES. THE OPERATIONAL MOTTO SEEMS TO BE 'MOVE THE METAL BOYS -- LET THE PLTS SORT OUT THE SMALL STUFF.' ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THIS IS IN A 30 MIN PERIOD LAST WK 1 LCL CTLR WAS INVOLVED IN 4 (AND POSSIBLY 6) GARS IN A 30 MIN PERIOD. THIS SIT IS UNACCEPTABLE AND MUST BE CORRECTED PRIOR TO THE MERGING OF METAL! CTLRS MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS NOT A VIDEO GAME, WE ARE REAL PEOPLE AND AIRPLANES SUBJECT TO THE LAWS OF PHYSICS. AT NIGHT DISTANCES AND CLOSURE RATES ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO JUDGE. UNANTICIPATED PITCH AND ROLL RATES CAUSED BY THE PRECEDING VERY CLOSE DEP ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO REACT TO SUCCESSFULLY. THIS SHOULD NOT BE A GAME TO SEE HOW FAR TO PUSH THE PLTS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THESE INCIDENTS HAD BEEN RPTED TO THE FACILITY MGMNT. A MEETING HAS BEEN SET UP BTWN ALL INTERESTED PARTIES. RPTR WOULD CALL BACK WITH RESULTS OF MEETING AND IF ANY CHANGES TO ATC HANDLING WERE MADE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.