Narrative:

I was on a short final to runway 17L 2 mi inside the OM. I called for flaps 15 degrees all operations normal. I called for gear down, all operations normal. Within 2 or 3 seconds the hydraulic warning came on. The main accumulator was below red radial line, all other readings were normal. I went to manual override but the main accumulator did not move. I then went to hydraulic pump off and elected to land with flaps 15 degrees. Gear was down and locked with 3 green lights. After landing, I attempted to exit the runway on the high speed with the tiller but it became inoperative. I then used rudder and differential power to control the aircraft and exit the runway and highspd taxiway so as not to block any other aircraft from using it. I turned north onto a parallel taxiway and brought the aircraft to a stop. I then attempted to set the parking brake but it would not set. I then decided to feather the engines to keep the aircraft from moving. I feathered the right engine and the aircraft moved forward and turned to the left. I had no control at this point except for rudder and power on the left engine. I managed to keep the aircraft off the grass and avoided hitting any taxiway lights as the aircraft made a 270 degree turn. The aircraft was now facing east pointed toward the highspd taxiway which I just exited. Another aircraft landed and was using this same high speed taxiway. I immediately shut the aircraft down in order to stop it from moving further. The aircraft came to a stop with no further problems or incidents. I told the flight attendant and passenger (14) to remain seated and I would get back to them shortly. I then secured the aircraft and notified all appropriate ground personnel. I then went into the cabin to tell everyone what had happened, that everything was ok and under control and a bus would be out shortly to pick them up. At all times I felt my actions and decisions were prudent and safe and that my crew, passenger and aircraft were not in danger at any time. There needs to be a backup system for our hydraulics on this aircraft. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: when hydraulic warning came on and the reporter noticed the main accumulator below the red line, at first he tried going to 'automatic then override,' but there was no change so, as per handbook procedure, turned off the hydraulic pump. After landing and attempting to turn off using the tiller, that, plus braking depleted the accumulator pressure. Consequently, there was no hydraulic pressure left. Post-flight inspection revealed a broken hydraulic line. Reporter believes there should be a back up hydraulic system on this saab 340 aircraft. He also says that he would do things differently should the hydraulic failure occur again. Instead of landing on the arrival runways, he would notify the tower of the hydraulic problem and request landing on runway 13. (It was being used for departures). Then, he would request the full runway for rollout to the end of the runway. With the longer rollout accumulator pressure could be conserved until at the end and the aircraft could be turned off and stopped.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB. HYD FAILURE .

Narrative: I WAS ON A SHORT FINAL TO RWY 17L 2 MI INSIDE THE OM. I CALLED FOR FLAPS 15 DEGS ALL OPS NORMAL. I CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN, ALL OPS NORMAL. WITHIN 2 OR 3 SECONDS THE HYD WARNING CAME ON. THE MAIN ACCUMULATOR WAS BELOW RED RADIAL LINE, ALL OTHER READINGS WERE NORMAL. I WENT TO MANUAL OVERRIDE BUT THE MAIN ACCUMULATOR DID NOT MOVE. I THEN WENT TO HYD PUMP OFF AND ELECTED TO LAND WITH FLAPS 15 DEGS. GEAR WAS DOWN AND LOCKED WITH 3 GREEN LIGHTS. AFTER LNDG, I ATTEMPTED TO EXIT THE RWY ON THE HIGH SPD WITH THE TILLER BUT IT BECAME INOP. I THEN USED RUDDER AND DIFFERENTIAL PWR TO CTL THE ACFT AND EXIT THE RWY AND HIGHSPD TXWY SO AS NOT TO BLOCK ANY OTHER ACFT FROM USING IT. I TURNED N ONTO A PARALLEL TXWY AND BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A STOP. I THEN ATTEMPTED TO SET THE PARKING BRAKE BUT IT WOULD NOT SET. I THEN DECIDED TO FEATHER THE ENGS TO KEEP THE ACFT FROM MOVING. I FEATHERED THE R ENG AND THE ACFT MOVED FORWARD AND TURNED TO THE L. I HAD NO CTL AT THIS POINT EXCEPT FOR RUDDER AND PWR ON THE L ENG. I MANAGED TO KEEP THE ACFT OFF THE GRASS AND AVOIDED HITTING ANY TXWY LIGHTS AS THE ACFT MADE A 270 DEG TURN. THE ACFT WAS NOW FACING E POINTED TOWARD THE HIGHSPD TXWY WHICH I JUST EXITED. ANOTHER ACFT LANDED AND WAS USING THIS SAME HIGH SPD TXWY. I IMMEDIATELY SHUT THE ACFT DOWN IN ORDER TO STOP IT FROM MOVING FURTHER. THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP WITH NO FURTHER PROBS OR INCIDENTS. I TOLD THE FLT ATTENDANT AND PAX (14) TO REMAIN SEATED AND I WOULD GET BACK TO THEM SHORTLY. I THEN SECURED THE ACFT AND NOTIFIED ALL APPROPRIATE GND PERSONNEL. I THEN WENT INTO THE CABIN TO TELL EVERYONE WHAT HAD HAPPENED, THAT EVERYTHING WAS OK AND UNDER CTL AND A BUS WOULD BE OUT SHORTLY TO PICK THEM UP. AT ALL TIMES I FELT MY ACTIONS AND DECISIONS WERE PRUDENT AND SAFE AND THAT MY CREW, PAX AND ACFT WERE NOT IN DANGER AT ANY TIME. THERE NEEDS TO BE A BACKUP SYS FOR OUR HYDS ON THIS ACFT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: WHEN HYD WARNING CAME ON AND THE RPTR NOTICED THE MAIN ACCUMULATOR BELOW THE RED LINE, AT FIRST HE TRIED GOING TO 'AUTO THEN OVERRIDE,' BUT THERE WAS NO CHANGE SO, AS PER HANDBOOK PROC, TURNED OFF THE HYD PUMP. AFTER LNDG AND ATTEMPTING TO TURN OFF USING THE TILLER, THAT, PLUS BRAKING DEPLETED THE ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE WAS NO HYD PRESSURE LEFT. POST-FLT INSPECTION REVEALED A BROKEN HYD LINE. RPTR BELIEVES THERE SHOULD BE A BACK UP HYD SYS ON THIS SAAB 340 ACFT. HE ALSO SAYS THAT HE WOULD DO THINGS DIFFERENTLY SHOULD THE HYD FAILURE OCCUR AGAIN. INSTEAD OF LNDG ON THE ARR RWYS, HE WOULD NOTIFY THE TWR OF THE HYD PROB AND REQUEST LNDG ON RWY 13. (IT WAS BEING USED FOR DEPS). THEN, HE WOULD REQUEST THE FULL RWY FOR ROLLOUT TO THE END OF THE RWY. WITH THE LONGER ROLLOUT ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE COULD BE CONSERVED UNTIL AT THE END AND THE ACFT COULD BE TURNED OFF AND STOPPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.