Narrative:

On jul/xx/95 I decided to do some solo practice in the morning. During the preflight check, I took samples from both wing tank sumps, the fuel strainer, and the under fuselage sump, checking for water and contamination. My visual inspection of the fuel tanks seemed to show about 1/2 tanks, which was what the fuel gauges had also indicated at the beginning of the preflight inspection. After the preflight, I flew to donaldson center to practice accuracy lndgs. After 3 power off accuracy lndgs in the pattern at donaldson, I departed west to the practice area. I was practicing some commercial maneuvers and had begun the return to greenville downtown airport when the engine started to run a little rough. I turned the magneto switch to the left and right position to check if one of the magnetos might be going bad. The engine was still running rough so I leaned the mixture, thinking the spark plugs may be fouling. The engine then failed completely and shortly ceased windmilling. I completed a memorized engine failure checklist while gliding to the field I had selected. As I continued the approach I reviewed the written checklist but was unable to effect a restart. I continued the approach into the field and landed the airplane without further incident. I was uninjured and the airplane proved to be undamaged in any way. After contacting flight school officials, I walked back to the airplane and decided to check the fuel tanks which I found empty. The airplane was dismantled so it could be removed from the field. When the wings were removed and their contents drained, less then the unusable fuel was removed. I believed this incident occurred because of 2 primary mistakes on my part. The first was when I checked the fuel quantity indicators and used that admittedly inaccurate information to confirm what I saw visually checked the tanks. The second mistake was thinking I could accurately determine the amount of fuel on board by looking into the tanks. In retrospect, I will not use the fuel the fuel quantity indicators on this caliber of airplane to get any reliable ideas of the amount on board. Though I believe it is important to visually check the tanks, I now know that without the help of a calibrated dipstick or similar device, I cannot accurately determine the exact quantity except when it is topped.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OFF ARPT FORCED LNDG DUE TO ENG FAILURE CAUSED BY FUEL EXHAUSTION.

Narrative: ON JUL/XX/95 I DECIDED TO DO SOME SOLO PRACTICE IN THE MORNING. DURING THE PREFLT CHK, I TOOK SAMPLES FROM BOTH WING TANK SUMPS, THE FUEL STRAINER, AND THE UNDER FUSELAGE SUMP, CHKING FOR WATER AND CONTAMINATION. MY VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE FUEL TANKS SEEMED TO SHOW ABOUT 1/2 TANKS, WHICH WAS WHAT THE FUEL GAUGES HAD ALSO INDICATED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PREFLT INSPECTION. AFTER THE PREFLT, I FLEW TO DONALDSON CTR TO PRACTICE ACCURACY LNDGS. AFTER 3 PWR OFF ACCURACY LNDGS IN THE PATTERN AT DONALDSON, I DEPARTED W TO THE PRACTICE AREA. I WAS PRACTICING SOME COMMERCIAL MANEUVERS AND HAD BEGUN THE RETURN TO GREENVILLE DOWNTOWN ARPT WHEN THE ENG STARTED TO RUN A LITTLE ROUGH. I TURNED THE MAGNETO SWITCH TO THE L AND R POS TO CHK IF ONE OF THE MAGNETOS MIGHT BE GOING BAD. THE ENG WAS STILL RUNNING ROUGH SO I LEANED THE MIXTURE, THINKING THE SPARK PLUGS MAY BE FOULING. THE ENG THEN FAILED COMPLETELY AND SHORTLY CEASED WINDMILLING. I COMPLETED A MEMORIZED ENG FAILURE CHKLIST WHILE GLIDING TO THE FIELD I HAD SELECTED. AS I CONTINUED THE APCH I REVIEWED THE WRITTEN CHKLIST BUT WAS UNABLE TO EFFECT A RESTART. I CONTINUED THE APCH INTO THE FIELD AND LANDED THE AIRPLANE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I WAS UNINJURED AND THE AIRPLANE PROVED TO BE UNDAMAGED IN ANY WAY. AFTER CONTACTING FLT SCHOOL OFFICIALS, I WALKED BACK TO THE AIRPLANE AND DECIDED TO CHK THE FUEL TANKS WHICH I FOUND EMPTY. THE AIRPLANE WAS DISMANTLED SO IT COULD BE REMOVED FROM THE FIELD. WHEN THE WINGS WERE REMOVED AND THEIR CONTENTS DRAINED, LESS THEN THE UNUSABLE FUEL WAS REMOVED. I BELIEVED THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF 2 PRIMARY MISTAKES ON MY PART. THE FIRST WAS WHEN I CHKED THE FUEL QUANTITY INDICATORS AND USED THAT ADMITTEDLY INACCURATE INFO TO CONFIRM WHAT I SAW VISUALLY CHKED THE TANKS. THE SECOND MISTAKE WAS THINKING I COULD ACCURATELY DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF FUEL ON BOARD BY LOOKING INTO THE TANKS. IN RETROSPECT, I WILL NOT USE THE FUEL THE FUEL QUANTITY INDICATORS ON THIS CALIBER OF AIRPLANE TO GET ANY RELIABLE IDEAS OF THE AMOUNT ON BOARD. THOUGH I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO VISUALLY CHK THE TANKS, I NOW KNOW THAT WITHOUT THE HELP OF A CALIBRATED DIPSTICK OR SIMILAR DEVICE, I CANNOT ACCURATELY DETERMINE THE EXACT QUANTITY EXCEPT WHEN IT IS TOPPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.