Narrative:

Aircraft was on autoplt using FMS navigation in md-11 aircraft. Approach control directed aircraft on a heading to intercept the runway 5L localizer at rcpt. FMS was previously loaded with data for a runway 5L ILS. The runway 5L identifier, itia, was tuned and idented by both pilots, as being correct for runway 5L. The captain had also hand tuned the itia/53 into the navigation/radio page of the FMS. Aircraft intercepted localizer normally. Approach alerted crew to being southeast of course. Localizer needle showed centered but localizer frequency had automatic-tuned to icks, the localizer frequency for ILS-DME runway 6, without the pilot's knowledge nor through either pilot's actions. Received vector to intercept runway 5L localizer and landed without further incident. Captain on this flight had not seen anything of this kind in his 4 yrs experience on the md-11. I suggest a fail-safe mode with required hand tuning of ILS frequencys be written into the FMS programming to ensure that automatic-tuning not occur in this critical phase of flight. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporting first officer glanced down at the FMS and assured that the proper ILS had automatic-tuned as part of his approach procedure. He does not know if the captain retuned the ILS manually, and put in the wrong ILS, or whether the FMS jumped to the wrong ILS by itself. The reporter is relatively new to the md-11 and has not heard of this type occurrence before. The captain did not admit that he had mistuned the ILS. If the ILS frequency is typed into the FMS, the FMS reads the morse code identifier and writes it onto the FMS 'navigation radio' page. The captain, the PNF, was a check airman. The reporting first officer knows that he did not aurally check the ILS identifier and he believes that the captain probably did not either.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LINED UP ON THE WRONG RWY.

Narrative: ACFT WAS ON AUTOPLT USING FMS NAV IN MD-11 ACFT. APCH CTL DIRECTED ACFT ON A HDG TO INTERCEPT THE RWY 5L LOC AT RCPT. FMS WAS PREVIOUSLY LOADED WITH DATA FOR A RWY 5L ILS. THE RWY 5L IDENTIFIER, ITIA, WAS TUNED AND IDENTED BY BOTH PLTS, AS BEING CORRECT FOR RWY 5L. THE CAPT HAD ALSO HAND TUNED THE ITIA/53 INTO THE NAV/RADIO PAGE OF THE FMS. ACFT INTERCEPTED LOC NORMALLY. APCH ALERTED CREW TO BEING SE OF COURSE. LOC NEEDLE SHOWED CTRED BUT LOC FREQ HAD AUTO-TUNED TO ICKS, THE LOC FREQ FOR ILS-DME RWY 6, WITHOUT THE PLT'S KNOWLEDGE NOR THROUGH EITHER PLT'S ACTIONS. RECEIVED VECTOR TO INTERCEPT RWY 5L LOC AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. CAPT ON THIS FLT HAD NOT SEEN ANYTHING OF THIS KIND IN HIS 4 YRS EXPERIENCE ON THE MD-11. I SUGGEST A FAIL-SAFE MODE WITH REQUIRED HAND TUNING OF ILS FREQS BE WRITTEN INTO THE FMS PROGRAMMING TO ENSURE THAT AUTO-TUNING NOT OCCUR IN THIS CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTING FO GLANCED DOWN AT THE FMS AND ASSURED THAT THE PROPER ILS HAD AUTO-TUNED AS PART OF HIS APCH PROC. HE DOES NOT KNOW IF THE CAPT RETUNED THE ILS MANUALLY, AND PUT IN THE WRONG ILS, OR WHETHER THE FMS JUMPED TO THE WRONG ILS BY ITSELF. THE RPTR IS RELATIVELY NEW TO THE MD-11 AND HAS NOT HEARD OF THIS TYPE OCCURRENCE BEFORE. THE CAPT DID NOT ADMIT THAT HE HAD MISTUNED THE ILS. IF THE ILS FREQ IS TYPED INTO THE FMS, THE FMS READS THE MORSE CODE IDENTIFIER AND WRITES IT ONTO THE FMS 'NAV RADIO' PAGE. THE CAPT, THE PNF, WAS A CHK AIRMAN. THE RPTING FO KNOWS THAT HE DID NOT AURALLY CHK THE ILS IDENTIFIER AND HE BELIEVES THAT THE CAPT PROBABLY DID NOT EITHER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.