Narrative:

From VFR on top, I requested an IFR descent from approach. Approach cleared me, assigned a transponder code and gave me radar vectors to the active ILS approach. I was not IFR current and accepted an approach for which the aircraft was not equipped as I had no localizer GS receiver. Rather than tell ATC that I had no localizer, I accepted the ILS approach while intending to fly the NDB approach to the same runway 19R at fairbanks. The aircraft was equipped for the NDB runway 19R approach and that is the approach I actually flew, but I did not tell ATC that and, instead, accepted the runway 19R ILS. While being vectored to the initial approach fix for the NDB approach, then, on crossing it and flying the approach, part of my attention was distraction by thinking about how I was going to fly the NDB approach so accurately that it would not indicate to ATC that I did not or may not be ILS equipped. This distraction me from flying the airplane enough that, through the whole descent and approach, I did not pull carburetor heat, and, as a result, the engine quit on about a 2 mi final. Fortunately I was visual at that time and had canceled IFR. I and the FAA FSDO inspectors are, I believe, in agreement that the cause of the power loss was carburetor ice as it was wet in the clouds that day with temperatures in the 40-50 degree range for the 20 mins or so before the engine quit and I did not pull carburetor heat during that time. On checking for fuel at the gascolator, tank sump drains and by comparing the expected fuel burn (23-24 gals) with the fuel on board for this flight (40 gals), it could not have burned all the fuel unless the engine began burning much more fuel than normal on this flight. Another contributing factor in the human performance area is that I have owned this airplane, a cessna 180, since only last august, but have owned and had recently flown a cessna 185 for 18 yrs. They handle, feel and perform close to the same, but the 185 is fuel injected, the 180 carbureted. I have over 1000 hours in the 185, but only about 40 hours in the 180. I believe this caused me to use 185 flying habits on this descent and approach, neglecting the carburetor heat without getting the uneasy feeling that I had missed something. There were, I believe, 2 other human performance factors. One, I was using a checklist taken from a combined 180-185 checklist prepared by a pilot who flies both. I now see this was a mistake because the carburetor heat is important for the 180 pre-approach checklist but, of course, is missing entirely from the 185 checklist. The 2ND is that, since I was not IFR current and was flying the NDB approach instead of the ILS, I was too busy to use the pre-approach or landing checklist and checking off all items by memory, brought up my 185 experience (without carburetor heat). Corrective actions: I will revise the approach/landing checklist to include carburetor heat. I will put a yellow (cautionary) arc on my manifold pressure gauge from 18 inches to 12 inches and teach myself that I means carburetor heat is to be on when operating at such low power settings. I will (1) get a localizer/GS for this airplane so the airplane is equipped to fly the approachs most commonly offered at this, my home airport. I will get some IFR dual, then an IFR check-ride in this airplane, paying particular attention to using a pre-approach checklist and pulling carburetor heat when in IMC or at reduced power and pairing up the pitot heat (which I had pulled on entering IMC) with the carburetor heat, as much of the time, if one is on, so should be the other. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: as the aircraft was descending without power, the pilot notified the tower of condition, and landed on a highway. Fuel was added, and with the assistance of the sheriff (blocking the highway), the pilot flew the airplane to fairbanks and attended church. The FAA investigation required a mechanic to check the fuel flow rate (1.5 times the fuel demand of the engine), and the venting system. Fuel exhaustion was not cited as the cause of engine failure, nor was carburetor ice. Investigation was closed. Reporter states confidentially, that it still might be possible that fuel exhaustion was the cause of the failure -- there are varying reports from mechanics on actual unusable amounts. Pilot doesn't know what pushed him so far, but feels that his attitude toward risk taking is altered. The instrument panel has a new narco 122 installed, too.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: IN VIOLATION OF EQUIP REQUIREMENTS AND CURRENCY FAR'S, A PLT REQUESTED DSCNT AND APCH CLRNC THROUGH A CLOUD LAYER. DURING DSCNT, THE C-180'S ENG FAILED, AND THE FLT WAS FORCED TO LAND ON A HWY.

Narrative: FROM VFR ON TOP, I REQUESTED AN IFR DSCNT FROM APCH. APCH CLRED ME, ASSIGNED A XPONDER CODE AND GAVE ME RADAR VECTORS TO THE ACTIVE ILS APCH. I WAS NOT IFR CURRENT AND ACCEPTED AN APCH FOR WHICH THE ACFT WAS NOT EQUIPPED AS I HAD NO LOC GS RECEIVER. RATHER THAN TELL ATC THAT I HAD NO LOC, I ACCEPTED THE ILS APCH WHILE INTENDING TO FLY THE NDB APCH TO THE SAME RWY 19R AT FAIRBANKS. THE ACFT WAS EQUIPPED FOR THE NDB RWY 19R APCH AND THAT IS THE APCH I ACTUALLY FLEW, BUT I DID NOT TELL ATC THAT AND, INSTEAD, ACCEPTED THE RWY 19R ILS. WHILE BEING VECTORED TO THE INITIAL APCH FIX FOR THE NDB APCH, THEN, ON XING IT AND FLYING THE APCH, PART OF MY ATTN WAS DISTR BY THINKING ABOUT HOW I WAS GOING TO FLY THE NDB APCH SO ACCURATELY THAT IT WOULD NOT INDICATE TO ATC THAT I DID NOT OR MAY NOT BE ILS EQUIPPED. THIS DISTR ME FROM FLYING THE AIRPLANE ENOUGH THAT, THROUGH THE WHOLE DSCNT AND APCH, I DID NOT PULL CARB HEAT, AND, AS A RESULT, THE ENG QUIT ON ABOUT A 2 MI FINAL. FORTUNATELY I WAS VISUAL AT THAT TIME AND HAD CANCELED IFR. I AND THE FAA FSDO INSPECTORS ARE, I BELIEVE, IN AGREEMENT THAT THE CAUSE OF THE PWR LOSS WAS CARB ICE AS IT WAS WET IN THE CLOUDS THAT DAY WITH TEMPS IN THE 40-50 DEG RANGE FOR THE 20 MINS OR SO BEFORE THE ENG QUIT AND I DID NOT PULL CARB HEAT DURING THAT TIME. ON CHKING FOR FUEL AT THE GASCOLATOR, TANK SUMP DRAINS AND BY COMPARING THE EXPECTED FUEL BURN (23-24 GALS) WITH THE FUEL ON BOARD FOR THIS FLT (40 GALS), IT COULD NOT HAVE BURNED ALL THE FUEL UNLESS THE ENG BEGAN BURNING MUCH MORE FUEL THAN NORMAL ON THIS FLT. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE AREA IS THAT I HAVE OWNED THIS AIRPLANE, A CESSNA 180, SINCE ONLY LAST AUGUST, BUT HAVE OWNED AND HAD RECENTLY FLOWN A CESSNA 185 FOR 18 YRS. THEY HANDLE, FEEL AND PERFORM CLOSE TO THE SAME, BUT THE 185 IS FUEL INJECTED, THE 180 CARBURETED. I HAVE OVER 1000 HRS IN THE 185, BUT ONLY ABOUT 40 HRS IN THE 180. I BELIEVE THIS CAUSED ME TO USE 185 FLYING HABITS ON THIS DSCNT AND APCH, NEGLECTING THE CARB HEAT WITHOUT GETTING THE UNEASY FEELING THAT I HAD MISSED SOMETHING. THERE WERE, I BELIEVE, 2 OTHER HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACTORS. ONE, I WAS USING A CHKLIST TAKEN FROM A COMBINED 180-185 CHKLIST PREPARED BY A PLT WHO FLIES BOTH. I NOW SEE THIS WAS A MISTAKE BECAUSE THE CARB HEAT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE 180 PRE-APCH CHKLIST BUT, OF COURSE, IS MISSING ENTIRELY FROM THE 185 CHKLIST. THE 2ND IS THAT, SINCE I WAS NOT IFR CURRENT AND WAS FLYING THE NDB APCH INSTEAD OF THE ILS, I WAS TOO BUSY TO USE THE PRE-APCH OR LNDG CHKLIST AND CHKING OFF ALL ITEMS BY MEMORY, BROUGHT UP MY 185 EXPERIENCE (WITHOUT CARB HEAT). CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: I WILL REVISE THE APCH/LNDG CHKLIST TO INCLUDE CARB HEAT. I WILL PUT A YELLOW (CAUTIONARY) ARC ON MY MANIFOLD PRESSURE GAUGE FROM 18 INCHES TO 12 INCHES AND TEACH MYSELF THAT I MEANS CARB HEAT IS TO BE ON WHEN OPERATING AT SUCH LOW PWR SETTINGS. I WILL (1) GET A LOC/GS FOR THIS AIRPLANE SO THE AIRPLANE IS EQUIPPED TO FLY THE APCHS MOST COMMONLY OFFERED AT THIS, MY HOME ARPT. I WILL GET SOME IFR DUAL, THEN AN IFR CHK-RIDE IN THIS AIRPLANE, PAYING PARTICULAR ATTN TO USING A PRE-APCH CHKLIST AND PULLING CARB HEAT WHEN IN IMC OR AT REDUCED PWR AND PAIRING UP THE PITOT HEAT (WHICH I HAD PULLED ON ENTERING IMC) WITH THE CARB HEAT, AS MUCH OF THE TIME, IF ONE IS ON, SO SHOULD BE THE OTHER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: AS THE ACFT WAS DSNDING WITHOUT PWR, THE PLT NOTIFIED THE TWR OF CONDITION, AND LANDED ON A HWY. FUEL WAS ADDED, AND WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE SHERIFF (BLOCKING THE HWY), THE PLT FLEW THE AIRPLANE TO FAIRBANKS AND ATTENDED CHURCH. THE FAA INVESTIGATION REQUIRED A MECH TO CHK THE FUEL FLOW RATE (1.5 TIMES THE FUEL DEMAND OF THE ENG), AND THE VENTING SYS. FUEL EXHAUSTION WAS NOT CITED AS THE CAUSE OF ENG FAILURE, NOR WAS CARB ICE. INVESTIGATION WAS CLOSED. RPTR STATES CONFIDENTIALLY, THAT IT STILL MIGHT BE POSSIBLE THAT FUEL EXHAUSTION WAS THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE -- THERE ARE VARYING RPTS FROM MECHS ON ACTUAL UNUSABLE AMOUNTS. PLT DOESN'T KNOW WHAT PUSHED HIM SO FAR, BUT FEELS THAT HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD RISK TAKING IS ALTERED. THE INST PANEL HAS A NEW NARCO 122 INSTALLED, TOO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.