Narrative:

En route from agc to cmh we experienced a sputter and subsequent failure of our right engine then sputter and failure of our left engine. This resulted in an off-airport landing roughly 2 mi south of cmh airport. The left fuel gauge was showing fluctuations but often stabilized on the expected indication of between 1/4 and 1/2, the right fuel gauge held a steady indication of just under 1/2. Due to the heavy payloads that we often carry, we are not able to top off our aircraft with fuel. Since the fuel system and fuel tank design is such that a large slant of each tank is built into the wing, dipping the tanks is not an accurate measurement. This leaves us with calculating our fuel load based upon the indication of the gauges. The captain and I did all the necessary figuring and calculating we could, to plan for the fuel needed for our flight. Unfortunately, we had only the gauges to base our current total before adding extra. This error in the fuel gauges led to our subsequent forced landing. The fuel monitoring system of the beechcraft baron is terribly unreliable and places its pilots in great risk. After our forced landing, our gauges still indicated fuel was present in both tanks. This is an example of the gross inaccuracy of this system. A redesign of the current system or most likely a completely new design of the fuel monitoring system is needed to avoid putting good and competent pilots in the same danger that we encountered.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE-58 FREIGHT FLC WAS FORCED TO LAND IN A FIELD AS A RESULT OF FUEL EXHAUSTION. THE CAPT STATED THAT INACCURATE FUEL MEASUREMENT, MISCOMS WITH ATC, AND INEFFECTIVE USE OF COPLT CONTRIBUTED TO FAILURE TO MAKE THE RWY.

Narrative: ENRTE FROM AGC TO CMH WE EXPERIENCED A SPUTTER AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF OUR R ENG THEN SPUTTER AND FAILURE OF OUR L ENG. THIS RESULTED IN AN OFF-ARPT LNDG ROUGHLY 2 MI S OF CMH ARPT. THE L FUEL GAUGE WAS SHOWING FLUCTUATIONS BUT OFTEN STABILIZED ON THE EXPECTED INDICATION OF BTWN 1/4 AND 1/2, THE R FUEL GAUGE HELD A STEADY INDICATION OF JUST UNDER 1/2. DUE TO THE HVY PAYLOADS THAT WE OFTEN CARRY, WE ARE NOT ABLE TO TOP OFF OUR ACFT WITH FUEL. SINCE THE FUEL SYS AND FUEL TANK DESIGN IS SUCH THAT A LARGE SLANT OF EACH TANK IS BUILT INTO THE WING, DIPPING THE TANKS IS NOT AN ACCURATE MEASUREMENT. THIS LEAVES US WITH CALCULATING OUR FUEL LOAD BASED UPON THE INDICATION OF THE GAUGES. THE CAPT AND I DID ALL THE NECESSARY FIGURING AND CALCULATING WE COULD, TO PLAN FOR THE FUEL NEEDED FOR OUR FLT. UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAD ONLY THE GAUGES TO BASE OUR CURRENT TOTAL BEFORE ADDING EXTRA. THIS ERROR IN THE FUEL GAUGES LED TO OUR SUBSEQUENT FORCED LNDG. THE FUEL MONITORING SYS OF THE BEECHCRAFT BARON IS TERRIBLY UNRELIABLE AND PLACES ITS PLTS IN GREAT RISK. AFTER OUR FORCED LNDG, OUR GAUGES STILL INDICATED FUEL WAS PRESENT IN BOTH TANKS. THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE GROSS INACCURACY OF THIS SYS. A REDESIGN OF THE CURRENT SYS OR MOST LIKELY A COMPLETELY NEW DESIGN OF THE FUEL MONITORING SYS IS NEEDED TO AVOID PUTTING GOOD AND COMPETENT PLTS IN THE SAME DANGER THAT WE ENCOUNTERED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.