Narrative:

Approximately 40 mi northeast balance on V278 received clearance to cross 15 mi northeast balance VOR at 12000 ft and 250 KTS. We were at FL220 with first officer flying, airspeed 350 KTS. I told first officer to start descending immediately. I then switched my communication to dca ATIS, and diverted my attention to that. Because of loud ambient cabin noise and static, had to listen 3 times to ATIS. After copying ATIS, I noticed that the first officer was not descending rapidly enough, his airspeed was too high, and thrust levers were not at idle. It became apparent that we would need spoilers to make crossing restr at 250 KTS. I told first officer to bring power to idle, and hurry down. I then turned around to make sure our 1 passenger was securely buckled in, and to warn him that we were about to commence a rapid, spoiler assisted descent. When I finished warning passenger, I turned around to see that the first officer had not reduced power. I told him to power back to idle, and deploy spoilers, which he did. We crossed 15 mi northeast balance (the restr) at about 13200 ft and 208 KTS. Additionally, when the center controller confronted us at 14 mi northeast balance, he asked us why we didn't cross 20 mi northeast balance at 12000 ft. I replied that we understood that the clearance was 15 mi northeast balance at 12000 ft, and that we had read back 15 mi northeast balance at 12000 ft and 250 KTS when we initially received clearance. Contributing factors: 1) should have gotten dca (destination) ATIS sooner. 2) should have commenced descent more aggressively. 3) copilot only had approximately 40 hours turbojet experience. 4) I don't know if in fact we read back clearance incorrectly, but if we did, controller did not correct our mistake. 5) I gave first officer too much authority/authorized. He and I flew a lot together in turboprops, where he proved to be an excellent pilot, but in a jet he was not up to speed, which I did not anticipate. 6) lear jet cockpit is loud at lower altitudes because of wind noise, should have turned headset volume very loud to understand ATIS first time. 7) we were both tired. Day before up at early morning (both of us). 14 hour duty day. This day up at early morning, too.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIR TAXI FAILS TO MAKE XING ALT AND SPD RESTR.

Narrative: APPROX 40 MI NE BAL ON V278 RECEIVED CLRNC TO CROSS 15 MI NE BAL VOR AT 12000 FT AND 250 KTS. WE WERE AT FL220 WITH FO FLYING, AIRSPD 350 KTS. I TOLD FO TO START DSNDING IMMEDIATELY. I THEN SWITCHED MY COM TO DCA ATIS, AND DIVERTED MY ATTN TO THAT. BECAUSE OF LOUD AMBIENT CABIN NOISE AND STATIC, HAD TO LISTEN 3 TIMES TO ATIS. AFTER COPYING ATIS, I NOTICED THAT THE FO WAS NOT DSNDING RAPIDLY ENOUGH, HIS AIRSPD WAS TOO HIGH, AND THRUST LEVERS WERE NOT AT IDLE. IT BECAME APPARENT THAT WE WOULD NEED SPOILERS TO MAKE XING RESTR AT 250 KTS. I TOLD FO TO BRING PWR TO IDLE, AND HURRY DOWN. I THEN TURNED AROUND TO MAKE SURE OUR 1 PAX WAS SECURELY BUCKLED IN, AND TO WARN HIM THAT WE WERE ABOUT TO COMMENCE A RAPID, SPOILER ASSISTED DSCNT. WHEN I FINISHED WARNING PAX, I TURNED AROUND TO SEE THAT THE FO HAD NOT REDUCED PWR. I TOLD HIM TO PWR BACK TO IDLE, AND DEPLOY SPOILERS, WHICH HE DID. WE CROSSED 15 MI NE BAL (THE RESTR) AT ABOUT 13200 FT AND 208 KTS. ADDITIONALLY, WHEN THE CTR CTLR CONFRONTED US AT 14 MI NE BAL, HE ASKED US WHY WE DIDN'T CROSS 20 MI NE BAL AT 12000 FT. I REPLIED THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CLRNC WAS 15 MI NE BAL AT 12000 FT, AND THAT WE HAD READ BACK 15 MI NE BAL AT 12000 FT AND 250 KTS WHEN WE INITIALLY RECEIVED CLRNC. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN DCA (DEST) ATIS SOONER. 2) SHOULD HAVE COMMENCED DSCNT MORE AGGRESSIVELY. 3) COPLT ONLY HAD APPROX 40 HRS TURBOJET EXPERIENCE. 4) I DON'T KNOW IF IN FACT WE READ BACK CLRNC INCORRECTLY, BUT IF WE DID, CTLR DID NOT CORRECT OUR MISTAKE. 5) I GAVE FO TOO MUCH AUTH. HE AND I FLEW A LOT TOGETHER IN TURBOPROPS, WHERE HE PROVED TO BE AN EXCELLENT PLT, BUT IN A JET HE WAS NOT UP TO SPD, WHICH I DID NOT ANTICIPATE. 6) LEAR JET COCKPIT IS LOUD AT LOWER ALTS BECAUSE OF WIND NOISE, SHOULD HAVE TURNED HEADSET VOLUME VERY LOUD TO UNDERSTAND ATIS FIRST TIME. 7) WE WERE BOTH TIRED. DAY BEFORE UP AT EARLY MORNING (BOTH OF US). 14 HR DUTY DAY. THIS DAY UP AT EARLY MORNING, TOO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.