Narrative:

River visual approach to runway 18. PF overload resulted in overshoot of turn to final. Bright morning sun, and fog over the river, combined to reduce in-flight visibility below 'advertised' value. This made the river more difficult than normal. I was concentrating on referencing the east bank of the river while xchking DME verses altitude. As a result of my 'inside' checks, my 'outside' scan was impaired, even more than it had been, by the marginal visibility. As a result, I 'let go' of the runway while ensuring that I didn't penetrate prohibited areas P-56. I didn't immediately reacquire the runway, visually, in time to execute a normal turn to final. The result: the aircraft was out of position for a normal landing. I elected to go around, rather than attempt to land. While this doesn't qualify as an 'incident,' it highlights the difficulty in flying charted visual approachs, in less than ideal visibility. Additionally, recent company emphasis on standardized callouts deprived me of additional help from the PNF. Our current policy calls for standard callouts and prohibits non-standard or 'comfort' callouts. I could have used a 'comfort callout' of altitude and DME every 100 ft below 1000 ft AGL, so I could have concentrated more on outside cues. In the future, I will use my 'captain's authority/authorized' to request additional callouts, when I think they might be beneficial.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CAPT EXECUTED A GAR FROM A CHARTED VISUAL APCH, CITING LESS THAN ADVERTISED VISIBILITY, AND DIVISION OF ATTN DIFFICULTIES, AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE VISUAL LOSS OF THE RWY.

Narrative: RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18. PF OVERLOAD RESULTED IN OVERSHOOT OF TURN TO FINAL. BRIGHT MORNING SUN, AND FOG OVER THE RIVER, COMBINED TO REDUCE INFLT VISIBILITY BELOW 'ADVERTISED' VALUE. THIS MADE THE RIVER MORE DIFFICULT THAN NORMAL. I WAS CONCENTRATING ON REFERENCING THE E BANK OF THE RIVER WHILE XCHKING DME VERSES ALT. AS A RESULT OF MY 'INSIDE' CHKS, MY 'OUTSIDE' SCAN WAS IMPAIRED, EVEN MORE THAN IT HAD BEEN, BY THE MARGINAL VISIBILITY. AS A RESULT, I 'LET GO' OF THE RWY WHILE ENSURING THAT I DIDN'T PENETRATE PROHIBITED AREAS P-56. I DIDN'T IMMEDIATELY REACQUIRE THE RWY, VISUALLY, IN TIME TO EXECUTE A NORMAL TURN TO FINAL. THE RESULT: THE ACFT WAS OUT OF POS FOR A NORMAL LNDG. I ELECTED TO GAR, RATHER THAN ATTEMPT TO LAND. WHILE THIS DOESN'T QUALIFY AS AN 'INCIDENT,' IT HIGHLIGHTS THE DIFFICULTY IN FLYING CHARTED VISUAL APCHS, IN LESS THAN IDEAL VISIBILITY. ADDITIONALLY, RECENT COMPANY EMPHASIS ON STANDARDIZED CALLOUTS DEPRIVED ME OF ADDITIONAL HELP FROM THE PNF. OUR CURRENT POLICY CALLS FOR STANDARD CALLOUTS AND PROHIBITS NON-STANDARD OR 'COMFORT' CALLOUTS. I COULD HAVE USED A 'COMFORT CALLOUT' OF ALT AND DME EVERY 100 FT BELOW 1000 FT AGL, SO I COULD HAVE CONCENTRATED MORE ON OUTSIDE CUES. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL USE MY 'CAPT'S AUTH' TO REQUEST ADDITIONAL CALLOUTS, WHEN I THINK THEY MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.