Narrative:

During the first day of a 3 day B-737 trip out of washington national airport a right aft cabin door problem developed. During our first stop at manchester, new hampshire, just prior to push back, the B flight attendant said she could not get the right aft galley door open. I went back to investigate and, after moving it once, was able to get it to work normally and not able to determine what the problem may be. After a brief discussion, it was decided to have maintenance at washington check it out. When we arrived at washington, maintenance did investigate. Maintenance and I both agreed that the door was operable. We also felt that when the aircraft arrived in orlando, maintenance should check the door handle because, if the handle was moved beyond the orange stripes that lined up, it made it more difficult to open. The a flight attendant felt a little uncomfortable with the situation, but I never got the impression that she felt it was unsafe or unacceptable. If I had understood her true feelings, I would have had a maintenance foreman come out and get a third opinion. We then flew the aircraft to orlando where I entered into the logbook that I felt the door should be looked at. In retrospect, I feel that I should have used cockpit resource management more effectively in trying to ascertain the flight attendants real concern. I also feel it is imperative for pilots to appreciate and understand the role the cabin crewmembers have in the safety arena. I also believe that pilots should not in any way intimidate flight attendants into doing something that is not safe.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CABIN ATTENDANT FOUND A CABIN GALLEY DOOR HARD TO OPEN AND WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH FURTHER OP AFTER CAPT AND MAINT SAID IT WOULD OPEN AND DELAYED FURTHER REVIEW TO THE MAIN MAINT BASE.

Narrative: DURING THE FIRST DAY OF A 3 DAY B-737 TRIP OUT OF WASHINGTON NATIONAL ARPT A R AFT CABIN DOOR PROB DEVELOPED. DURING OUR FIRST STOP AT MANCHESTER, NEW HAMPSHIRE, JUST PRIOR TO PUSH BACK, THE B FLT ATTENDANT SAID SHE COULD NOT GET THE R AFT GALLEY DOOR OPEN. I WENT BACK TO INVESTIGATE AND, AFTER MOVING IT ONCE, WAS ABLE TO GET IT TO WORK NORMALLY AND NOT ABLE TO DETERMINE WHAT THE PROB MAY BE. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION, IT WAS DECIDED TO HAVE MAINT AT WASHINGTON CHK IT OUT. WHEN WE ARRIVED AT WASHINGTON, MAINT DID INVESTIGATE. MAINT AND I BOTH AGREED THAT THE DOOR WAS OPERABLE. WE ALSO FELT THAT WHEN THE ACFT ARRIVED IN ORLANDO, MAINT SHOULD CHK THE DOOR HANDLE BECAUSE, IF THE HANDLE WAS MOVED BEYOND THE ORANGE STRIPES THAT LINED UP, IT MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO OPEN. THE A FLIGHT ATTENDANT FELT A LITTLE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SIT, BUT I NEVER GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT SHE FELT IT WAS UNSAFE OR UNACCEPTABLE. IF I HAD UNDERSTOOD HER TRUE FEELINGS, I WOULD HAVE HAD A MAINT FOREMAN COME OUT AND GET A THIRD OPINION. WE THEN FLEW THE ACFT TO ORLANDO WHERE I ENTERED INTO THE LOGBOOK THAT I FELT THE DOOR SHOULD BE LOOKED AT. IN RETROSPECT, I FEEL THAT I SHOULD HAVE USED COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT MORE EFFECTIVELY IN TRYING TO ASCERTAIN THE FLT ATTENDANTS REAL CONCERN. I ALSO FEEL IT IS IMPERATIVE FOR PLTS TO APPRECIATE AND UNDERSTAND THE ROLE THE CABIN CREWMEMBERS HAVE IN THE SAFETY ARENA. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT PLTS SHOULD NOT IN ANY WAY INTIMIDATE FLT ATTENDANTS INTO DOING SOMETHING THAT IS NOT SAFE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.