Narrative:

On mar/thu/95 I flew an aircraft which had major repairs recently performed involving engine and wing removal. This aircraft was on-line a day and a half after these repairs when I first flew it. I was departing hnl for lanai airport. This was my 9TH takeoff of the day. On my climb out, after the post takeoff check was completed, both of my generators went off line. My right generator reset. The left one would not, so I returned to hnl. The next day I was off so I don't know if the aircraft flew or not. On mar/sat/95 the afternoon crew, that was assigned, spent all day in maui due to a mechanical. The captain of this crew told me that 3 times on the way to maui from molokai the generators went off line, but they reset each time. He grounded the plane when he landed in maui and called for a mechanic. The mechanic replaced the right generator, and the plane flew a midnight flight to maui (same crew that had the plane in the afternoon). The next day, mar/sun/95, I was assigned the plane for my afternoon schedule. My first officer was on a double schedule (morning and afternoon) and she had been flying this aircraft since she started. All day our flts were uneventful. My 7TH leg of the day was from kahalui, maui to lanai. I had just returned from hana, maui and I left my right engine running while on the ground in maui. I started my left engine by use of battery power. It was my first officer's leg. On the takeoff roll, the autofeather arm light did not arm and I called that out. We took off, and shut off the automatic feather in the post takeoff checklist. I decided that I would continue the flight to lanai and have the autofeather MEL'ed over the phone. About 5 mi south of the field I thought I saw our GPWS inoperative light flash on. I wasn't sure if it lit up or the sun just hit it, and it appeared that way. A little while later I thought I saw it light up again. By this time we were about 1/2 way to lanai. We started our descent and approximately 12 mi from the field we had a visual. We canceled IFR and received a frequency change to CTAF. I made a radio call to lanai, stating our position, and we completed the prelndg checklist. At 6.8 DME, I made another radio call to CTAF. My first officer called for 10 degrees of flaps about 3 mins from the field. As I was reaching up to extend the flaps, I attempted to make another call to CTAF to report left base. I had no side tone on my external transmission. At no time did any of my caution lights on my caution light panel illuminate. My communication/navigation was blank. The DME had red dashes through it. The CDI needles were jumping back and forth, inoperative flags were flashing on and off, and the gyros were spinning. I was getting a loud crackling sound in my headsets and the navigation/communication lights were flickering. We were getting close to the airport. We used hand signals to communicate for the rest of the flaps. During this time, many things flashed through my mind. First, I thought I had an electrical short that was only affecting my instrument panel in front of me. No caution light was illuminated. Second, I thought of shutting off the master avionics switch because I thought if there was a short the wires might catch fire. I opted not to since the instruments were flickering on and off. I was hoping my radios might come back on if I needed to make a radio call. I also thought about switching on my emergency avionics, but thought if I had a short that wouldn't help and besides, both of the last actions would require me to lose outside visibility. I was very concerned about scanning the area of lanai airport for traffic. I knew that a DC9 was scheduled to arrive about the same time my flight was. Also, lanai airport is very busy at times. I was scanning the sky, the runway, and the ramp trying to see that no aircraft on the ground had started up their engines. All of this was occurring within a min or two. We touched down uneventfully. As I taxied into the ramp, I saw my ground crew waving me in. Next to our stop was a jet that was parked. I turned to park well right of the jet, and as I did, the doors between the cockpit and the cabin slid open a little bit and I saw total darkness in the back. This was my first indication of a more serious electrical problem. Just about the same time, I shut down my left engine and my aircraft started turning strongly to the left. This is when I noticed I had lost hydraulics and my nosewheel was turning on its own, all the way to the left. I shut down both engines right where I was. The aircraft was stopped. The voltage was reading 16 volts on the battery. I reset my parking brake and retracted the flaps. I then lost all power again and my hydraulics were indicating '0.' I then wrote up in the maintenance log, total electrical failure and total hydraulic failure, because this is what I had when I finally left the plane. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: unofficially, the captain states that maintenance had been performed incorrectly on this particular dash 6 prior to captain's original flight. When the wing was replaced an electrical harness was mismatched, causing an electrical short. The reporter claims to have been chastised by management for having written 'total electrical failure and total hydraulic failure' in the maintenance log. Reporter states that this write-up involved total frustration and 'indeed, that was what I had when I left the plane.' the electrical failure did not activate the caution annunciator panel (ie, 'generator fail') because the relay was no longer closed due to the electrical failure. Reporter states that the company exercises the option of removing the aircraft's standby battery so time on battery power, alone, was further limited, unnecessarily. The hydraulics that were remaining after landing and taxi were accumulator only. (The hydraulic pumps are electrical.) the reporter's main concern is that, had the main system pressure depleted any faster, the flight crew would have lost steering control of the aircraft during landing. The captain questions why there is not a backup ctring mechanism to control nosewheel steering in the event of hydraulic main system depletion. Reporter is consulting with union attorneys and is no longer bothered by management.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DEHAVILLAND DASH 6 FLC EXPERIENCED REPEATED ELECTRICAL PROBS WITH THE ACFT. FOLLOWING A TOTAL ELECTRICAL FAILURE, AND ACCOMPANYING HYDS FAILURE (ELECTRICAL HYD PUMPS) THE ACFT WAS GNDED.

Narrative: ON MAR/THU/95 I FLEW AN ACFT WHICH HAD MAJOR REPAIRS RECENTLY PERFORMED INVOLVING ENG AND WING REMOVAL. THIS ACFT WAS ON-LINE A DAY AND A HALF AFTER THESE REPAIRS WHEN I FIRST FLEW IT. I WAS DEPARTING HNL FOR LANAI ARPT. THIS WAS MY 9TH TKOF OF THE DAY. ON MY CLBOUT, AFTER THE POST TKOF CHK WAS COMPLETED, BOTH OF MY GENERATORS WENT OFF LINE. MY R GENERATOR RESET. THE L ONE WOULD NOT, SO I RETURNED TO HNL. THE NEXT DAY I WAS OFF SO I DON'T KNOW IF THE ACFT FLEW OR NOT. ON MAR/SAT/95 THE AFTERNOON CREW, THAT WAS ASSIGNED, SPENT ALL DAY IN MAUI DUE TO A MECHANICAL. THE CAPT OF THIS CREW TOLD ME THAT 3 TIMES ON THE WAY TO MAUI FROM MOLOKAI THE GENERATORS WENT OFF LINE, BUT THEY RESET EACH TIME. HE GNDED THE PLANE WHEN HE LANDED IN MAUI AND CALLED FOR A MECH. THE MECH REPLACED THE R GENERATOR, AND THE PLANE FLEW A MIDNIGHT FLT TO MAUI (SAME CREW THAT HAD THE PLANE IN THE AFTERNOON). THE NEXT DAY, MAR/SUN/95, I WAS ASSIGNED THE PLANE FOR MY AFTERNOON SCHEDULE. MY FO WAS ON A DOUBLE SCHEDULE (MORNING AND AFTERNOON) AND SHE HAD BEEN FLYING THIS ACFT SINCE SHE STARTED. ALL DAY OUR FLTS WERE UNEVENTFUL. MY 7TH LEG OF THE DAY WAS FROM KAHALUI, MAUI TO LANAI. I HAD JUST RETURNED FROM HANA, MAUI AND I LEFT MY R ENG RUNNING WHILE ON THE GND IN MAUI. I STARTED MY L ENG BY USE OF BATTERY PWR. IT WAS MY FO'S LEG. ON THE TKOF ROLL, THE AUTOFEATHER ARM LIGHT DID NOT ARM AND I CALLED THAT OUT. WE TOOK OFF, AND SHUT OFF THE AUTO FEATHER IN THE POST TKOF CHKLIST. I DECIDED THAT I WOULD CONTINUE THE FLT TO LANAI AND HAVE THE AUTOFEATHER MEL'ED OVER THE PHONE. ABOUT 5 MI S OF THE FIELD I THOUGHT I SAW OUR GPWS INOP LIGHT FLASH ON. I WASN'T SURE IF IT LIT UP OR THE SUN JUST HIT IT, AND IT APPEARED THAT WAY. A LITTLE WHILE LATER I THOUGHT I SAW IT LIGHT UP AGAIN. BY THIS TIME WE WERE ABOUT 1/2 WAY TO LANAI. WE STARTED OUR DSCNT AND APPROX 12 MI FROM THE FIELD WE HAD A VISUAL. WE CANCELED IFR AND RECEIVED A FREQ CHANGE TO CTAF. I MADE A RADIO CALL TO LANAI, STATING OUR POS, AND WE COMPLETED THE PRELNDG CHKLIST. AT 6.8 DME, I MADE ANOTHER RADIO CALL TO CTAF. MY FO CALLED FOR 10 DEGS OF FLAPS ABOUT 3 MINS FROM THE FIELD. AS I WAS REACHING UP TO EXTEND THE FLAPS, I ATTEMPTED TO MAKE ANOTHER CALL TO CTAF TO RPT L BASE. I HAD NO SIDE TONE ON MY EXTERNAL XMISSION. AT NO TIME DID ANY OF MY CAUTION LIGHTS ON MY CAUTION LIGHT PANEL ILLUMINATE. MY COM/NAV WAS BLANK. THE DME HAD RED DASHES THROUGH IT. THE CDI NEEDLES WERE JUMPING BACK AND FORTH, INOP FLAGS WERE FLASHING ON AND OFF, AND THE GYROS WERE SPINNING. I WAS GETTING A LOUD CRACKLING SOUND IN MY HEADSETS AND THE NAV/COM LIGHTS WERE FLICKERING. WE WERE GETTING CLOSE TO THE ARPT. WE USED HAND SIGNALS TO COMMUNICATE FOR THE REST OF THE FLAPS. DURING THIS TIME, MANY THINGS FLASHED THROUGH MY MIND. FIRST, I THOUGHT I HAD AN ELECTRICAL SHORT THAT WAS ONLY AFFECTING MY INST PANEL IN FRONT OF ME. NO CAUTION LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED. SECOND, I THOUGHT OF SHUTTING OFF THE MASTER AVIONICS SWITCH BECAUSE I THOUGHT IF THERE WAS A SHORT THE WIRES MIGHT CATCH FIRE. I OPTED NOT TO SINCE THE INSTS WERE FLICKERING ON AND OFF. I WAS HOPING MY RADIOS MIGHT COME BACK ON IF I NEEDED TO MAKE A RADIO CALL. I ALSO THOUGHT ABOUT SWITCHING ON MY EMER AVIONICS, BUT THOUGHT IF I HAD A SHORT THAT WOULDN'T HELP AND BESIDES, BOTH OF THE LAST ACTIONS WOULD REQUIRE ME TO LOSE OUTSIDE VISIBILITY. I WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT SCANNING THE AREA OF LANAI ARPT FOR TFC. I KNEW THAT A DC9 WAS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE ABOUT THE SAME TIME MY FLT WAS. ALSO, LANAI ARPT IS VERY BUSY AT TIMES. I WAS SCANNING THE SKY, THE RWY, AND THE RAMP TRYING TO SEE THAT NO ACFT ON THE GND HAD STARTED UP THEIR ENGS. ALL OF THIS WAS OCCURRING WITHIN A MIN OR TWO. WE TOUCHED DOWN UNEVENTFULLY. AS I TAXIED INTO THE RAMP, I SAW MY GND CREW WAVING ME IN. NEXT TO OUR STOP WAS A JET THAT WAS PARKED. I TURNED TO PARK WELL R OF THE JET, AND AS I DID, THE DOORS BTWN THE COCKPIT AND THE CABIN SLID OPEN A LITTLE BIT AND I SAW TOTAL DARKNESS IN THE BACK. THIS WAS MY FIRST INDICATION OF A MORE SERIOUS ELECTRICAL PROB. JUST ABOUT THE SAME TIME, I SHUT DOWN MY L ENG AND MY ACFT STARTED TURNING STRONGLY TO THE L. THIS IS WHEN I NOTICED I HAD LOST HYDS AND MY NOSEWHEEL WAS TURNING ON ITS OWN, ALL THE WAY TO THE L. I SHUT DOWN BOTH ENGS RIGHT WHERE I WAS. THE ACFT WAS STOPPED. THE VOLTAGE WAS READING 16 VOLTS ON THE BATTERY. I RESET MY PARKING BRAKE AND RETRACTED THE FLAPS. I THEN LOST ALL PWR AGAIN AND MY HYDS WERE INDICATING '0.' I THEN WROTE UP IN THE MAINT LOG, TOTAL ELECTRICAL FAILURE AND TOTAL HYD FAILURE, BECAUSE THIS IS WHAT I HAD WHEN I FINALLY LEFT THE PLANE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: UNOFFICIALLY, THE CAPT STATES THAT MAINT HAD BEEN PERFORMED INCORRECTLY ON THIS PARTICULAR DASH 6 PRIOR TO CAPT'S ORIGINAL FLT. WHEN THE WING WAS REPLACED AN ELECTRICAL HARNESS WAS MISMATCHED, CAUSING AN ELECTRICAL SHORT. THE RPTR CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN CHASTISED BY MGMNT FOR HAVING WRITTEN 'TOTAL ELECTRICAL FAILURE AND TOTAL HYD FAILURE' IN THE MAINT LOG. RPTR STATES THAT THIS WRITE-UP INVOLVED TOTAL FRUSTRATION AND 'INDEED, THAT WAS WHAT I HAD WHEN I LEFT THE PLANE.' THE ELECTRICAL FAILURE DID NOT ACTIVATE THE CAUTION ANNUNCIATOR PANEL (IE, 'GENERATOR FAIL') BECAUSE THE RELAY WAS NO LONGER CLOSED DUE TO THE ELECTRICAL FAILURE. RPTR STATES THAT THE COMPANY EXERCISES THE OPTION OF REMOVING THE ACFT'S STANDBY BATTERY SO TIME ON BATTERY PWR, ALONE, WAS FURTHER LIMITED, UNNECESSARILY. THE HYDS THAT WERE REMAINING AFTER LNDG AND TAXI WERE ACCUMULATOR ONLY. (THE HYD PUMPS ARE ELECTRICAL.) THE RPTR'S MAIN CONCERN IS THAT, HAD THE MAIN SYS PRESSURE DEPLETED ANY FASTER, THE FLC WOULD HAVE LOST STEERING CTL OF THE ACFT DURING LNDG. THE CAPT QUESTIONS WHY THERE IS NOT A BACKUP CTRING MECHANISM TO CTL NOSEWHEEL STEERING IN THE EVENT OF HYD MAIN SYS DEPLETION. RPTR IS CONSULTING WITH UNION ATTORNEYS AND IS NO LONGER BOTHERED BY MGMNT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.