Narrative:

I was called at home by crew scheduling informing me that my original trip was canceled and that I was to ferry an aircraft to ord. Crew scheduler did not know the reason for the ferry. At bos operations I pulled paperwork and called dispatch about the low arrival fuel at ord. Informed at that time that the aircraft had a maintenance problem requiring a spot message. Fueler came into operational area to discuss confusion over the fuel load. While awaiting for a ride to the north ramp where the aircraft was located - a maintenance tech briefly outlined the rudder limiter system problem (weak coils and pull rod assembly for me. As we were running late, 30 mins to takeoff) I elected to proceed to the aircraft and resolve the fuel load there. I was preoccupied with finding out about the rudder problem and any operational considerations that applied. Under the time constraints of the departure time I did not fully explore all the ramifications of the ballast fuel that finally was loaded aboard the aircraft. The first officer and I discussed the fuel burn situation after he had to input the fuel load into the ACARS second time. We then revisited the rudder problem once more before towing the aircraft out for taxi. The flight proceeded normally until we realized that we had neglected to stop the center tank fuel burn at 5000 pounds as we had discussed. The center tank had burned down to approximately 350 pounds at that point. As we were in the initial portion of descent to ord I elected to hold at pivot intersection in order to contact tech support through dfw dispatch. After holding for approximately 20 mins I was given several recommendations for our landing. We followed the recommendations and landed the aircraft on runway 22R without further incident. Had I not been so preoccupied with the rudder problem and the departure time and reviewed the ballast fuel procedures this situation may have been avoided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CG LIMITS EXCEEDED FOR LNDG.

Narrative: I WAS CALLED AT HOME BY CREW SCHEDULING INFORMING ME THAT MY ORIGINAL TRIP WAS CANCELED AND THAT I WAS TO FERRY AN ACFT TO ORD. CREW SCHEDULER DID NOT KNOW THE REASON FOR THE FERRY. AT BOS OPS I PULLED PAPERWORK AND CALLED DISPATCH ABOUT THE LOW ARR FUEL AT ORD. INFORMED AT THAT TIME THAT THE ACFT HAD A MAINT PROB REQUIRING A SPOT MESSAGE. FUELER CAME INTO OPERATIONAL AREA TO DISCUSS CONFUSION OVER THE FUEL LOAD. WHILE AWAITING FOR A RIDE TO THE N RAMP WHERE THE ACFT WAS LOCATED - A MAINT TECH BRIEFLY OUTLINED THE RUDDER LIMITER SYS PROB (WEAK COILS AND PULL ROD ASSEMBLY FOR ME. AS WE WERE RUNNING LATE, 30 MINS TO TKOF) I ELECTED TO PROCEED TO THE ACFT AND RESOLVE THE FUEL LOAD THERE. I WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH FINDING OUT ABOUT THE RUDDER PROB AND ANY OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT APPLIED. UNDER THE TIME CONSTRAINTS OF THE DEP TIME I DID NOT FULLY EXPLORE ALL THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE BALLAST FUEL THAT FINALLY WAS LOADED ABOARD THE ACFT. THE FO AND I DISCUSSED THE FUEL BURN SIT AFTER HE HAD TO INPUT THE FUEL LOAD INTO THE ACARS SECOND TIME. WE THEN REVISITED THE RUDDER PROB ONCE MORE BEFORE TOWING THE ACFT OUT FOR TAXI. THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY UNTIL WE REALIZED THAT WE HAD NEGLECTED TO STOP THE CTR TANK FUEL BURN AT 5000 LBS AS WE HAD DISCUSSED. THE CTR TANK HAD BURNED DOWN TO APPROX 350 LBS AT THAT POINT. AS WE WERE IN THE INITIAL PORTION OF DSCNT TO ORD I ELECTED TO HOLD AT PIVOT INTXN IN ORDER TO CONTACT TECH SUPPORT THROUGH DFW DISPATCH. AFTER HOLDING FOR APPROX 20 MINS I WAS GIVEN SEVERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OUR LNDG. WE FOLLOWED THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND LANDED THE ACFT ON RWY 22R WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. HAD I NOT BEEN SO PREOCCUPIED WITH THE RUDDER PROB AND THE DEP TIME AND REVIEWED THE BALLAST FUEL PROCS THIS SIT MAY HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.