Narrative:

Operations were normal until we began approaching the brussels airport. Descending through 5000 ft with the WX reported better than 1000-3, the captain began a detailed briefing of the approach plate. He had to stop several times in the briefing to answer radio calls and set new altitudes, finishing the brief when we were positioned on a dogleg to base at 240 KTS 10 mi from the field descending through 2300 ft on the center altimeter. One of the calls cleared us for the approach, an ILS 25L at ebbr, to which the PF selected approach mode. Noticing his own altimeter leveling at 2000 ft, which was assigned, captain reached up and set 4500 ft in the altitude window in the AFDS panel. Sitting on the right jumpseat, I have a very poor view of the captain's flight director mode display indications and could not see until after a few seconds of straining that we had never been in altitude capture mode. Still in flight level change, the autothrottles came up to attempt to climb us to the selected altitude of 4500 ft. I announced, 'we are still in flight level change.' the PF clicked off the autothrottles. At about the same time, he realized we were lined up well right of the final course, as shown by the LNAV line on his HSI, even though he had a localizer capture indication. He clicked off the autoplt and began a left turn at the same time the GS armed indication turned to green. The crux of the problem is that the green GS indication had a faint red and yellow line through it and the white GS armed indication was still showing above. This is the capture of ILS 25R warned about in the paper work. Seeing the GS green capture mode indication, captain saw that the vbars were showing a very steep dive profile. Obviously, believing the flight directors to be incorrect, he clicked the flight director switches off and back on, reselecting approach and approximately 900 ft down in vertical speed mode to recatch up to where he thought the GS was. The vbars looked normal, so the PF began to follow them. Thinking we were probably getting back on track, I looked outside where the ground and runway were visible, but we were much too close to the ground. All 4 of the VASI indicators were red. We were approximately 4 mi outside the marker, 7 mi from touchdown when I saw 900 ft afl on the captain's altimeter. At this point, I called out, 'we're at 1000 ft,' in a loud voice. The captain directed, 'climb!' at the same time brussels approach asked us what our altitude was, to which the captain responded '1000 ft, correcting.' we proceeded well above the GS as we slowed down from 220 KTS clean. The VASI's were all white now. A rapid selection of the gear and flaps enabled us to continue back down, making it to the slot position at 300 ft afl, from which landing was uneventful. The 3 recommendations I can make are to: 1) brief any approachs in accordance with flight manual part I, merely state the approach and runway to be used when WX is reported good. Briefing the approachs at length as low and close to the airport as we were must be considered a significant distraction. One other problem with 'magic' airplanes is that once the PF began the descent, we were VFR the entire time, except when we pulled it up rapidly to correct our glide path, momentarily re- entering the clouds. I was the only one looking outside. 2) another thing that should receive serious consideration is the quality of the center altimeter. The near standard response I hear when asking for this item on the landing checklist is 'out of limits as usual.' by the time the aircraft is parked at the gate, it usually is within tolerance, making a write-up pointless. Mechanics have shown little propensity for being able to fix something that 'checks good on ground.' this attribute makes for typically marginal inclusion in an instrument scan, even though it is the only MSL instrument on the dash after descending through 10000 ft domestic and most importantly, the transition altitude on european and south american destinations. 3) the false capture problem in brussels should be investigated and corrected. Until this happens, a useful technique that seems to help avoid this problem is to delay selecting approach mode, using heading select until on the extended centerline (magenta line) and then selecting localizer, when the ADI's localizer looks stable. Waiting until the GS starts to come down and looks stable before selecting approach has helped me avoid the false capture problem. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter flies the B-767-300ER for a major united stated air carrier that has many flts to europe. He states that the problem with the ebbr ILS 25L is widely known. His air carrier publishes a warning on the dispatch release for all flts going to ebbr to remind the crews that there may be a problem with acquiring the runway 25R localizer instead of the runway 25L localizer. The first officer flying this day was new to ebbr and the captain was distracted with his approach briefing and failed to include this warning. The reporter will send more reports and is now aware of the FAA safety hot line.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE AUTOPLT ATTEMPTED TO FLY THE GS AND LOC FOR RWY 25R VICE THE ILS RWY 25L THAT WAS SELECTED.

Narrative: OPS WERE NORMAL UNTIL WE BEGAN APCHING THE BRUSSELS ARPT. DSNDING THROUGH 5000 FT WITH THE WX RPTED BETTER THAN 1000-3, THE CAPT BEGAN A DETAILED BRIEFING OF THE APCH PLATE. HE HAD TO STOP SEVERAL TIMES IN THE BRIEFING TO ANSWER RADIO CALLS AND SET NEW ALTS, FINISHING THE BRIEF WHEN WE WERE POSITIONED ON A DOGLEG TO BASE AT 240 KTS 10 MI FROM THE FIELD DSNDING THROUGH 2300 FT ON THE CTR ALTIMETER. ONE OF THE CALLS CLRED US FOR THE APCH, AN ILS 25L AT EBBR, TO WHICH THE PF SELECTED APCH MODE. NOTICING HIS OWN ALTIMETER LEVELING AT 2000 FT, WHICH WAS ASSIGNED, CAPT REACHED UP AND SET 4500 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW IN THE AFDS PANEL. SITTING ON THE R JUMPSEAT, I HAVE A VERY POOR VIEW OF THE CAPT'S FLT DIRECTOR MODE DISPLAY INDICATIONS AND COULD NOT SEE UNTIL AFTER A FEW SECONDS OF STRAINING THAT WE HAD NEVER BEEN IN ALT CAPTURE MODE. STILL IN FLT LEVEL CHANGE, THE AUTOTHROTTLES CAME UP TO ATTEMPT TO CLB US TO THE SELECTED ALT OF 4500 FT. I ANNOUNCED, 'WE ARE STILL IN FLT LEVEL CHANGE.' THE PF CLICKED OFF THE AUTOTHROTTLES. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, HE REALIZED WE WERE LINED UP WELL R OF THE FINAL COURSE, AS SHOWN BY THE LNAV LINE ON HIS HSI, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD A LOC CAPTURE INDICATION. HE CLICKED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND BEGAN A L TURN AT THE SAME TIME THE GS ARMED INDICATION TURNED TO GREEN. THE CRUX OF THE PROB IS THAT THE GREEN GS INDICATION HAD A FAINT RED AND YELLOW LINE THROUGH IT AND THE WHITE GS ARMED INDICATION WAS STILL SHOWING ABOVE. THIS IS THE CAPTURE OF ILS 25R WARNED ABOUT IN THE PAPER WORK. SEEING THE GS GREEN CAPTURE MODE INDICATION, CAPT SAW THAT THE VBARS WERE SHOWING A VERY STEEP DIVE PROFILE. OBVIOUSLY, BELIEVING THE FLT DIRECTORS TO BE INCORRECT, HE CLICKED THE FLT DIRECTOR SWITCHES OFF AND BACK ON, RESELECTING APCH AND APPROX 900 FT DOWN IN VERT SPD MODE TO RECATCH UP TO WHERE HE THOUGHT THE GS WAS. THE VBARS LOOKED NORMAL, SO THE PF BEGAN TO FOLLOW THEM. THINKING WE WERE PROBABLY GETTING BACK ON TRACK, I LOOKED OUTSIDE WHERE THE GND AND RWY WERE VISIBLE, BUT WE WERE MUCH TOO CLOSE TO THE GND. ALL 4 OF THE VASI INDICATORS WERE RED. WE WERE APPROX 4 MI OUTSIDE THE MARKER, 7 MI FROM TOUCHDOWN WHEN I SAW 900 FT AFL ON THE CAPT'S ALTIMETER. AT THIS POINT, I CALLED OUT, 'WE'RE AT 1000 FT,' IN A LOUD VOICE. THE CAPT DIRECTED, 'CLB!' AT THE SAME TIME BRUSSELS APCH ASKED US WHAT OUR ALT WAS, TO WHICH THE CAPT RESPONDED '1000 FT, CORRECTING.' WE PROCEEDED WELL ABOVE THE GS AS WE SLOWED DOWN FROM 220 KTS CLEAN. THE VASI'S WERE ALL WHITE NOW. A RAPID SELECTION OF THE GEAR AND FLAPS ENABLED US TO CONTINUE BACK DOWN, MAKING IT TO THE SLOT POS AT 300 FT AFL, FROM WHICH LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE 3 RECOMMENDATIONS I CAN MAKE ARE TO: 1) BRIEF ANY APCHS IN ACCORDANCE WITH FLT MANUAL PART I, MERELY STATE THE APCH AND RWY TO BE USED WHEN WX IS RPTED GOOD. BRIEFING THE APCHS AT LENGTH AS LOW AND CLOSE TO THE ARPT AS WE WERE MUST BE CONSIDERED A SIGNIFICANT DISTR. ONE OTHER PROB WITH 'MAGIC' AIRPLANES IS THAT ONCE THE PF BEGAN THE DSCNT, WE WERE VFR THE ENTIRE TIME, EXCEPT WHEN WE PULLED IT UP RAPIDLY TO CORRECT OUR GLIDE PATH, MOMENTARILY RE- ENTERING THE CLOUDS. I WAS THE ONLY ONE LOOKING OUTSIDE. 2) ANOTHER THING THAT SHOULD RECEIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IS THE QUALITY OF THE CTR ALTIMETER. THE NEAR STANDARD RESPONSE I HEAR WHEN ASKING FOR THIS ITEM ON THE LNDG CHKLIST IS 'OUT OF LIMITS AS USUAL.' BY THE TIME THE ACFT IS PARKED AT THE GATE, IT USUALLY IS WITHIN TOLERANCE, MAKING A WRITE-UP POINTLESS. MECHS HAVE SHOWN LITTLE PROPENSITY FOR BEING ABLE TO FIX SOMETHING THAT 'CHKS GOOD ON GND.' THIS ATTRIBUTE MAKES FOR TYPICALLY MARGINAL INCLUSION IN AN INST SCAN, EVEN THOUGH IT IS THE ONLY MSL INST ON THE DASH AFTER DSNDING THROUGH 10000 FT DOMESTIC AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE TRANSITION ALT ON EUROPEAN AND SOUTH AMERICAN DESTS. 3) THE FALSE CAPTURE PROB IN BRUSSELS SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED AND CORRECTED. UNTIL THIS HAPPENS, A USEFUL TECHNIQUE THAT SEEMS TO HELP AVOID THIS PROB IS TO DELAY SELECTING APCH MODE, USING HDG SELECT UNTIL ON THE EXTENDED CTRLINE (MAGENTA LINE) AND THEN SELECTING LOC, WHEN THE ADI'S LOC LOOKS STABLE. WAITING UNTIL THE GS STARTS TO COME DOWN AND LOOKS STABLE BEFORE SELECTING APCH HAS HELPED ME AVOID THE FALSE CAPTURE PROB. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLIES THE B-767-300ER FOR A MAJOR UNITED STATED ACR THAT HAS MANY FLTS TO EUROPE. HE STATES THAT THE PROB WITH THE EBBR ILS 25L IS WIDELY KNOWN. HIS ACR PUBLISHES A WARNING ON THE DISPATCH RELEASE FOR ALL FLTS GOING TO EBBR TO REMIND THE CREWS THAT THERE MAY BE A PROB WITH ACQUIRING THE RWY 25R LOC INSTEAD OF THE RWY 25L LOC. THE FO FLYING THIS DAY WAS NEW TO EBBR AND THE CAPT WAS DISTRACTED WITH HIS APCH BRIEFING AND FAILED TO INCLUDE THIS WARNING. THE RPTR WILL SEND MORE RPTS AND IS NOW AWARE OF THE FAA SAFETY HOT LINE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.