Narrative:

Upon completing 2 1/2 days of recurrent ground school, the crew was asked to volunteer to deadhead to lit to ferry a bae 3201 to bna. The aircraft had undergone some 'heavy' maintenance and had waited 3 days to be returned to home base. During the 'after-start' checklist, we noted the right HSI and left RMI both had red flags, denoting a single compass failure. We also had a flight data recorder light which indicates it was inoperative. We reset the circuit breakers for all discrepancies, but failed to correct the abnormalities. I elected to continue since it was a clear VFR night and all other system checked good. We asked for an ILS to runway 22L with a missed approach and reenter for a visual to runway 18. Approach control recommended a circle from runway 22L to runway 36. We agreed and the controllers in both 'approach' and 'tower' were very cooperative. I descended to the MDA (880 ft MSL) on the ILS and over runway 22L turned slightly left for a right downwind for runway 36. I nor the first officer had positively idented runway 36, but we could easily distinguish runway 4L- 22R and the thresholds were adjacent. This was the first time the first officer had been to lit and my second. Tower cleared us to circle and land on runway 36. I asked the first officer to help by calling the base turn. He acknowledged and called my attention to some antennas. In the confusion of several distracting factors: an inoperative gyroscope on the first officer's side, and the perceived greater intensity of the runway 4L-22R lights: we both misidented runway 4L as runway 36. When I realized the error I was out of position to make a safe, stabilized approach to runway 36, therefore elected to go around. Tower advised to enter a left base for runway 18, but again I was not in a position to make a safe approach as I had raised the gear and flaps. Tower asked us to turn to 220 degrees for a subsequent vector for a visual to runway 18. There were several contributing factors to the cause which I believe was lack of position identify of the runway to which we were circling. We were tired, we had a gyroscope compass inoperative on the first officer side, the first officer was new to the airport, and the tower controller was attempting to meld us into other traffic which was landing in the opposite direction. Had we been more familiar with the airport, and had it been daylight rather than dark, the confusion and misident should not have occurred. I believe my decision to go around after misidenting the runway was correct. To prevent a recurrence will require greater attention to detail than we gave the 'circle to land' on runway 36 from the ILS to runway 22L. We did discuss it, but it just did not look that difficult.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR ORIENTS ACFT FOR THE WRONG RWY.

Narrative: UPON COMPLETING 2 1/2 DAYS OF RECURRENT GND SCHOOL, THE CREW WAS ASKED TO VOLUNTEER TO DEADHEAD TO LIT TO FERRY A BAE 3201 TO BNA. THE ACFT HAD UNDERGONE SOME 'HEAVY' MAINT AND HAD WAITED 3 DAYS TO BE RETURNED TO HOME BASE. DURING THE 'AFTER-START' CHKLIST, WE NOTED THE R HSI AND L RMI BOTH HAD RED FLAGS, DENOTING A SINGLE COMPASS FAILURE. WE ALSO HAD A FLT DATA RECORDER LIGHT WHICH INDICATES IT WAS INOP. WE RESET THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR ALL DISCREPANCIES, BUT FAILED TO CORRECT THE ABNORMALITIES. I ELECTED TO CONTINUE SINCE IT WAS A CLR VFR NIGHT AND ALL OTHER SYS CHKED GOOD. WE ASKED FOR AN ILS TO RWY 22L WITH A MISSED APCH AND REENTER FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 18. APCH CTL RECOMMENDED A CIRCLE FROM RWY 22L TO RWY 36. WE AGREED AND THE CTLRS IN BOTH 'APCH' AND 'TWR' WERE VERY COOPERATIVE. I DSNDED TO THE MDA (880 FT MSL) ON THE ILS AND OVER RWY 22L TURNED SLIGHTLY L FOR A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 36. I NOR THE FO HAD POSITIVELY IDENTED RWY 36, BUT WE COULD EASILY DISTINGUISH RWY 4L- 22R AND THE THRESHOLDS WERE ADJACENT. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE FO HAD BEEN TO LIT AND MY SECOND. TWR CLRED US TO CIRCLE AND LAND ON RWY 36. I ASKED THE FO TO HELP BY CALLING THE BASE TURN. HE ACKNOWLEDGED AND CALLED MY ATTN TO SOME ANTENNAS. IN THE CONFUSION OF SEVERAL DISTRACTING FACTORS: AN INOP GYROSCOPE ON THE FO'S SIDE, AND THE PERCEIVED GREATER INTENSITY OF THE RWY 4L-22R LIGHTS: WE BOTH MISIDENTED RWY 4L AS RWY 36. WHEN I REALIZED THE ERROR I WAS OUT OF POS TO MAKE A SAFE, STABILIZED APCH TO RWY 36, THEREFORE ELECTED TO GAR. TWR ADVISED TO ENTER A L BASE FOR RWY 18, BUT AGAIN I WAS NOT IN A POS TO MAKE A SAFE APCH AS I HAD RAISED THE GEAR AND FLAPS. TWR ASKED US TO TURN TO 220 DEGS FOR A SUBSEQUENT VECTOR FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 18. THERE WERE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE CAUSE WHICH I BELIEVE WAS LACK OF POS IDENT OF THE RWY TO WHICH WE WERE CIRCLING. WE WERE TIRED, WE HAD A GYROSCOPE COMPASS INOP ON THE FO SIDE, THE FO WAS NEW TO THE ARPT, AND THE TWR CTLR WAS ATTEMPTING TO MELD US INTO OTHER TFC WHICH WAS LNDG IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. HAD WE BEEN MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT, AND HAD IT BEEN DAYLIGHT RATHER THAN DARK, THE CONFUSION AND MISIDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. I BELIEVE MY DECISION TO GAR AFTER MISIDENTING THE RWY WAS CORRECT. TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE WILL REQUIRE GREATER ATTN TO DETAIL THAN WE GAVE THE 'CIRCLE TO LAND' ON RWY 36 FROM THE ILS TO RWY 22L. WE DID DISCUSS IT, BUT IT JUST DID NOT LOOK THAT DIFFICULT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.