Narrative:

After completing all checklist, captain aligned aircraft with runway and copilot began takeoff roll at about 60 KTS first officer stated he had no rudder steering and no brakes. Throttles were brought to idle and captain controled roll to next taxiway. Tower offered a 180 degree on runway to back taxi. First officer then realized rudder pedals adjustment knob had not retracted into place properly. After resetting, all controls were normal, we accepted another takeoff and did not return to gate. Flight was normal and all captain's controls were normal. First officer rechked controls from first officer side of cockpit. All were normal during back-taxi and takeoff. Supplemental information from acn 296980: procedural checklist calls for the captain to check the rudders and first officer to check aileron and elevator controls prior to takeoff. We did that. However in making a rolling takeoff I was not aware my rudder pedals were not functioning until the beginning of the takeoff roll. They moved in and out but provided no rudder movement. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the first officer recognized the lack of control after he took over at approximately 60 KTS at which time the takeoff was aborted. The rudder pedals voluntarily reengaged soon after abort. The push/pull knob had not slipped back into any detent to lock the rudder pedals in place. The rudder pedals are spring- loaded to the full extended or out position but then have to be pushed and held in another position until they are locked by the pushing in the knob! He further stated that when he discussed this matter with company operational control, it was indicated that this has happened on several occasions. He stated that the checklist has not been changed to include a first officer rudder check. The main emphasis has been toward keeping the first officer off the rudder pedals during the captain's check in order to prevent physical injury to the first officer's shins. However, he believes that it would be helpful after this incident to include a rudder check by the first officer since it may be not only necessary for the first officer to have control for his aircraft control but to be able to backup the captain in case of the captain loosing control or needing assistance on the brakes or rudder.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD82 FO RUDDER PEDALS NOT LOCKED IN PLACE ON TKOF ROLL RESULTING IN ABORTED TKOF.

Narrative: AFTER COMPLETING ALL CHKLIST, CAPT ALIGNED ACFT WITH RWY AND COPLT BEGAN TKOF ROLL AT ABOUT 60 KTS FO STATED HE HAD NO RUDDER STEERING AND NO BRAKES. THROTTLES WERE BROUGHT TO IDLE AND CAPT CTLED ROLL TO NEXT TXWY. TWR OFFERED A 180 DEG ON RWY TO BACK TAXI. FO THEN REALIZED RUDDER PEDALS ADJUSTMENT KNOB HAD NOT RETRACTED INTO PLACE PROPERLY. AFTER RESETTING, ALL CTLS WERE NORMAL, WE ACCEPTED ANOTHER TKOF AND DID NOT RETURN TO GATE. FLT WAS NORMAL AND ALL CAPT'S CTLS WERE NORMAL. FO RECHKED CTLS FROM FO SIDE OF COCKPIT. ALL WERE NORMAL DURING BACK-TAXI AND TKOF. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 296980: PROCEDURAL CHKLIST CALLS FOR THE CAPT TO CHK THE RUDDERS AND FO TO CHK AILERON AND ELEVATOR CTLS PRIOR TO TKOF. WE DID THAT. HOWEVER IN MAKING A ROLLING TKOF I WAS NOT AWARE MY RUDDER PEDALS WERE NOT FUNCTIONING UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF THE TKOF ROLL. THEY MOVED IN AND OUT BUT PROVIDED NO RUDDER MOVEMENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE FO RECOGNIZED THE LACK OF CTL AFTER HE TOOK OVER AT APPROX 60 KTS AT WHICH TIME THE TKOF WAS ABORTED. THE RUDDER PEDALS VOLUNTARILY REENGAGED SOON AFTER ABORT. THE PUSH/PULL KNOB HAD NOT SLIPPED BACK INTO ANY DETENT TO LOCK THE RUDDER PEDALS IN PLACE. THE RUDDER PEDALS ARE SPRING- LOADED TO THE FULL EXTENDED OR OUT POS BUT THEN HAVE TO BE PUSHED AND HELD IN ANOTHER POS UNTIL THEY ARE LOCKED BY THE PUSHING IN THE KNOB! HE FURTHER STATED THAT WHEN HE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH COMPANY OPERATIONAL CTL, IT WAS INDICATED THAT THIS HAS HAPPENED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. HE STATED THAT THE CHKLIST HAS NOT BEEN CHANGED TO INCLUDE A FO RUDDER CHK. THE MAIN EMPHASIS HAS BEEN TOWARD KEEPING THE FO OFF THE RUDDER PEDALS DURING THE CAPT'S CHK IN ORDER TO PREVENT PHYSICAL INJURY TO THE FO'S SHINS. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL AFTER THIS INCIDENT TO INCLUDE A RUDDER CHK BY THE FO SINCE IT MAY BE NOT ONLY NECESSARY FOR THE FO TO HAVE CTL FOR HIS ACFT CTL BUT TO BE ABLE TO BACKUP THE CAPT IN CASE OF THE CAPT LOOSING CTL OR NEEDING ASSISTANCE ON THE BRAKES OR RUDDER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.