Narrative:

After a lengthy boarding process due to the fact that the airplane was loaded over zero fuel weight, and the ensuing chaos to get that rectified, we finally began moving toward runway 22L for takeoff. While the airplane was on taxiway M approaching runway 22L, the first officer was told by the captain to get in touch with dispatch and amend the taxi fuel to reflect the added amount that had been used while sitting at the gate with 1 engine turning. This caused the first officer to lose track of where the airplane was going at the time, and thus did not notice that the airplane was heading toward the runway at taxiway S6. When this was pointed out to the crew as takeoff clearance was received, the captain elected to continue the takeoff despite the fact we did not have performance data for this runway taking off from this intersection. The runway length was more than adequate, and the takeoff was uneventful. Contributing to this incident was probably the fact that we had a jumpseat rider on this flight, and thus the reluctance to 'lose face' by admitting a mistake in front of one's peers. The choice by the captain to order the first officer to perform an, in reality, unnecessary administrative task during a very busy part of the operation was also poor crew management.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH TKOF PROC INTXN TKOF.

Narrative: AFTER A LENGTHY BOARDING PROCESS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS LOADED OVER ZERO FUEL WT, AND THE ENSUING CHAOS TO GET THAT RECTIFIED, WE FINALLY BEGAN MOVING TOWARD RWY 22L FOR TKOF. WHILE THE AIRPLANE WAS ON TXWY M APCHING RWY 22L, THE FO WAS TOLD BY THE CAPT TO GET IN TOUCH WITH DISPATCH AND AMEND THE TAXI FUEL TO REFLECT THE ADDED AMOUNT THAT HAD BEEN USED WHILE SITTING AT THE GATE WITH 1 ENG TURNING. THIS CAUSED THE FO TO LOSE TRACK OF WHERE THE AIRPLANE WAS GOING AT THE TIME, AND THUS DID NOT NOTICE THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS HEADING TOWARD THE RWY AT TXWY S6. WHEN THIS WAS POINTED OUT TO THE CREW AS TKOF CLRNC WAS RECEIVED, THE CAPT ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE TKOF DESPITE THE FACT WE DID NOT HAVE PERFORMANCE DATA FOR THIS RWY TAKING OFF FROM THIS INTXN. THE RWY LENGTH WAS MORE THAN ADEQUATE, AND THE TKOF WAS UNEVENTFUL. CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT WAS PROBABLY THE FACT THAT WE HAD A JUMPSEAT RIDER ON THIS FLT, AND THUS THE RELUCTANCE TO 'LOSE FACE' BY ADMITTING A MISTAKE IN FRONT OF ONE'S PEERS. THE CHOICE BY THE CAPT TO ORDER THE FO TO PERFORM AN, IN REALITY, UNNECESSARY ADMINISTRATIVE TASK DURING A VERY BUSY PART OF THE OP WAS ALSO POOR CREW MGMNT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.