Narrative:

The captain was flying an autoplt coupled CAT ii ILS to runway 10R, pdx in marginal WX. At approximately 200 ft AGL the captain uncoupled the autoplt and hand flew the aircraft to touchdown. After uncoupling, the aircraft began to slide below the GS. The electronic voice warning alerted with a GS warning. I felt very close to the ground and uncomfortable at this point and started calling out 'power, power' to the captain. The GS alert voice began alerting now in rapid succession. Prior to touchdown the first officer also called out 'power, power' and 'we're going to land on the approach lights!' no significant addition of power was ever initiated. Seconds later we touched down on what appeared to me to be the overrun area on top of the lead-in lights, prior to the runway threshold, well short of the touchdown zone. On the postflt inspection I discovered a large gash on the left inboard main mount, 5-6 cords deep. No other damage was found. I feel this incident could have been avoided if the captain had added sufficient power at the onset of setting below GS. The best reaction would have been to initiate a go around! Supplemental information from acn 296044: I felt aircraft was badly out of trim, nose down. As I attempted to trim I noticed slow stabilizer trim wheel rotation. The confusion of all these things resulted in going below the GS. When I looked up I was blinded by the approach lights, GPWS warning on GS, heavy blowing snow. As I pulled nose up, both first officer and flight engineer called for power. The landing was extremely short, the braking appeared normal for snow on runway, but no txwys were clear. The flight engineer said he thought we landed short, I felt that the landing while shorter than I wanted, was on the runway, but I felt I might have taxied off taxiway. I recommend no CAT ii approach with phase iv autoplt with extremely strong (25 plus 45) headwinds and gusts. Close the field when taxiing is unsafe. (No txwys, lines, etc.) abandon the approach if autoplt is not smooth. Supplemental information from acn 296195: as briefed, the captain went about 1 DOT below GS. We went well below GS and touched down early. I did not yell go around, but on retrospect, should have.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TOUCHED DOWN SHORT OF THE RWY.

Narrative: THE CAPT WAS FLYING AN AUTOPLT COUPLED CAT II ILS TO RWY 10R, PDX IN MARGINAL WX. AT APPROX 200 FT AGL THE CAPT UNCOUPLED THE AUTOPLT AND HAND FLEW THE ACFT TO TOUCHDOWN. AFTER UNCOUPLING, THE ACFT BEGAN TO SLIDE BELOW THE GS. THE ELECTRONIC VOICE WARNING ALERTED WITH A GS WARNING. I FELT VERY CLOSE TO THE GND AND UNCOMFORTABLE AT THIS POINT AND STARTED CALLING OUT 'PWR, PWR' TO THE CAPT. THE GS ALERT VOICE BEGAN ALERTING NOW IN RAPID SUCCESSION. PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN THE FO ALSO CALLED OUT 'PWR, PWR' AND 'WE'RE GOING TO LAND ON THE APCH LIGHTS!' NO SIGNIFICANT ADDITION OF PWR WAS EVER INITIATED. SECONDS LATER WE TOUCHED DOWN ON WHAT APPEARED TO ME TO BE THE OVERRUN AREA ON TOP OF THE LEAD-IN LIGHTS, PRIOR TO THE RWY THRESHOLD, WELL SHORT OF THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. ON THE POSTFLT INSPECTION I DISCOVERED A LARGE GASH ON THE L INBOARD MAIN MOUNT, 5-6 CORDS DEEP. NO OTHER DAMAGE WAS FOUND. I FEEL THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THE CAPT HAD ADDED SUFFICIENT PWR AT THE ONSET OF SETTING BELOW GS. THE BEST REACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO INITIATE A GAR! SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 296044: I FELT ACFT WAS BADLY OUT OF TRIM, NOSE DOWN. AS I ATTEMPTED TO TRIM I NOTICED SLOW STABILIZER TRIM WHEEL ROTATION. THE CONFUSION OF ALL THESE THINGS RESULTED IN GOING BELOW THE GS. WHEN I LOOKED UP I WAS BLINDED BY THE APCH LIGHTS, GPWS WARNING ON GS, HVY BLOWING SNOW. AS I PULLED NOSE UP, BOTH FO AND FE CALLED FOR PWR. THE LNDG WAS EXTREMELY SHORT, THE BRAKING APPEARED NORMAL FOR SNOW ON RWY, BUT NO TXWYS WERE CLR. THE FE SAID HE THOUGHT WE LANDED SHORT, I FELT THAT THE LNDG WHILE SHORTER THAN I WANTED, WAS ON THE RWY, BUT I FELT I MIGHT HAVE TAXIED OFF TXWY. I RECOMMEND NO CAT II APCH WITH PHASE IV AUTOPLT WITH EXTREMELY STRONG (25 PLUS 45) HEADWINDS AND GUSTS. CLOSE THE FIELD WHEN TAXIING IS UNSAFE. (NO TXWYS, LINES, ETC.) ABANDON THE APCH IF AUTOPLT IS NOT SMOOTH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 296195: AS BRIEFED, THE CAPT WENT ABOUT 1 DOT BELOW GS. WE WENT WELL BELOW GS AND TOUCHED DOWN EARLY. I DID NOT YELL GAR, BUT ON RETROSPECT, SHOULD HAVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.