Narrative:

We were on the ILS runway 25R to lvk, and were instructed to contact livermore tower by sck TRACON. We contacted tower and were told to report the LOM and leaving 1500 ft. Livermore's wind was out of the east and therefore the approach was opposite direction to the departing traffic. We passed the LOM and were unable to report due to frequency congestion until we were about 3/4 of a mi past the marker. We were unable to report leaving 1500 ft until we were at about 1100 ft, again due to frequency congestion. The visibility was reported as 4 with haze, however , the sun was straight in our face, and our forward visibility was not more than 1 1/2 - 2 mi. The controller cleared numerous aircraft for takeoff opposite direction to us, and the one we almost hit was cleared for takeoff off from runway 07R, prior to us reporting leaving 1500 ft, but after we had left 1500 ft. We could not commence the circle maneuver until getting the airport in sight, which did not happen until 1 1/2 mi final due to the position of the sun. When the controller noticed the conflict, he instructed us to turn right immediately (contrary to published circling restrs) and maintain VFR (even though we were on an IFR flight plan). We were never in danger of colliding with the other aircraft as I had been keeping track of the other airplane since he had been cleared to takeoff. This wasn't what I would classify as an incident. However, there were several routine practices in progress that were potentially hazardous. First, the controller was using position updating techniques that were not exceptionally precise. The marker and 1500 ft reports work fine when there's one airplane on frequency, but when there's significant frequency usage, those reports can be unreliable. Second, the conduct of low-visibility, opposite direction traffic operations in a non- radar tower is a delicate thing. They should almost expect these near misses to occur. I am not abdicating my see- and-avoid responsibility, nor am I suggesting that anything the controller did was inconsistent with his 7110.65 manual. What I am suggesting is that controllers be aware of the limitations of the system of aircraft tracking usage in an effort to reduce our risks of coronary difficulties.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FREQ CONGESTION, LATE POS RPTS AND HEAD ON ARRS TO DEPS CAUSES NMAC.

Narrative: WE WERE ON THE ILS RWY 25R TO LVK, AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LIVERMORE TWR BY SCK TRACON. WE CONTACTED TWR AND WERE TOLD TO RPT THE LOM AND LEAVING 1500 FT. LIVERMORE'S WIND WAS OUT OF THE E AND THEREFORE THE APCH WAS OPPOSITE DIRECTION TO THE DEPARTING TFC. WE PASSED THE LOM AND WERE UNABLE TO RPT DUE TO FREQ CONGESTION UNTIL WE WERE ABOUT 3/4 OF A MI PAST THE MARKER. WE WERE UNABLE TO RPT LEAVING 1500 FT UNTIL WE WERE AT ABOUT 1100 FT, AGAIN DUE TO FREQ CONGESTION. THE VISIBILITY WAS RPTED AS 4 WITH HAZE, HOWEVER , THE SUN WAS STRAIGHT IN OUR FACE, AND OUR FORWARD VISIBILITY WAS NOT MORE THAN 1 1/2 - 2 MI. THE CTLR CLRED NUMEROUS ACFT FOR TKOF OPPOSITE DIRECTION TO US, AND THE ONE WE ALMOST HIT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF OFF FROM RWY 07R, PRIOR TO US RPTING LEAVING 1500 FT, BUT AFTER WE HAD LEFT 1500 FT. WE COULD NOT COMMENCE THE CIRCLE MANEUVER UNTIL GETTING THE ARPT IN SIGHT, WHICH DID NOT HAPPEN UNTIL 1 1/2 MI FINAL DUE TO THE POS OF THE SUN. WHEN THE CTLR NOTICED THE CONFLICT, HE INSTRUCTED US TO TURN R IMMEDIATELY (CONTRARY TO PUBLISHED CIRCLING RESTRS) AND MAINTAIN VFR (EVEN THOUGH WE WERE ON AN IFR FLT PLAN). WE WERE NEVER IN DANGER OF COLLIDING WITH THE OTHER ACFT AS I HAD BEEN KEEPING TRACK OF THE OTHER AIRPLANE SINCE HE HAD BEEN CLRED TO TKOF. THIS WASN'T WHAT I WOULD CLASSIFY AS AN INCIDENT. HOWEVER, THERE WERE SEVERAL ROUTINE PRACTICES IN PROGRESS THAT WERE POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS. FIRST, THE CTLR WAS USING POS UPDATING TECHNIQUES THAT WERE NOT EXCEPTIONALLY PRECISE. THE MARKER AND 1500 FT RPTS WORK FINE WHEN THERE'S ONE AIRPLANE ON FREQ, BUT WHEN THERE'S SIGNIFICANT FREQ USAGE, THOSE RPTS CAN BE UNRELIABLE. SECOND, THE CONDUCT OF LOW-VISIBILITY, OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC OPS IN A NON- RADAR TWR IS A DELICATE THING. THEY SHOULD ALMOST EXPECT THESE NEAR MISSES TO OCCUR. I AM NOT ABDICATING MY SEE- AND-AVOID RESPONSIBILITY, NOR AM I SUGGESTING THAT ANYTHING THE CTLR DID WAS INCONSISTENT WITH HIS 7110.65 MANUAL. WHAT I AM SUGGESTING IS THAT CTLRS BE AWARE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF THE SYS OF ACFT TRACKING USAGE IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE OUR RISKS OF CORONARY DIFFICULTIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.