Narrative:

Aircraft: lear 35. Captain on duty at BB00Z, first officer, myself on duty at AA00Z. On jan/xx/95 at approximately CC00Z a pop-up charter was received at our phx base to fly phx-yum-cybl-phx. Mission completed at DD00Z jan/yy/95. On approach descent into cybl (campbell river, back course, vancouver island). At approximately FF00Z, jan/yy/95, the runway report as obtained from cybl FSS was 100 percent covered 1/4 inch snow over rain. Reported WX at cybl permitted either a straight in localizer back course approach to runway 29 landing uphill, or a course reversal at an OM which was inoperative for an ILS runway 11 approach landing downhill. First officer suggested localizer runway 29 uphill because of runway condition, no braking action reports available. Captain insisted of vectors from comox to ILS runway 11 downhill. Comox radar cleared aircraft to 2800 ft MSL on downwind to base vector, first officer advised captain to remain at 4200 ft MSL published altitude, however, captain descended to 3200 ft MSL. Aircraft now received base to final vector of 160 degrees cleared for ILS runway 11 approach, descend to 2300 ft MSL. On base vector, captain descended to 2800 ft MSL, still not on published approach segment and 10 mi from airport where published altitude is 4200 ft MSL for maneuvering and 2600 ft MSL when established inbound. Captain intercepted localizer inbound 2 dots low and continued approach to landing. However, no conflicts occurred. I, myself, operate within the parameters of the regulations. I study them and am 135 tested on them. I feel they are basic guidelines for standards of safety. Part 91 has no limit to flight or duty time and excessive long flight operations are permitted because rest period is undefined. Company applies pressure on pilots to get the mission done or be layed off. As captain I still conduct operations within the regulations. The captain in the above incident and I always have open communication, however, his perception of the mission requirement may be different. Therefore a crew argument and cockpit tension must be avoided, as in my opinion it is serious to safety. I will further review these items, and thank you for the reporting system, ASRS does help.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALLEGED ALTDEV.

Narrative: ACFT: LEAR 35. CAPT ON DUTY AT BB00Z, FO, MYSELF ON DUTY AT AA00Z. ON JAN/XX/95 AT APPROX CC00Z A POP-UP CHARTER WAS RECEIVED AT OUR PHX BASE TO FLY PHX-YUM-CYBL-PHX. MISSION COMPLETED AT DD00Z JAN/YY/95. ON APCH DSCNT INTO CYBL (CAMPBELL RIVER, BC, VANCOUVER ISLAND). AT APPROX FF00Z, JAN/YY/95, THE RWY RPT AS OBTAINED FROM CYBL FSS WAS 100 PERCENT COVERED 1/4 INCH SNOW OVER RAIN. RPTED WX AT CYBL PERMITTED EITHER A STRAIGHT IN LOC BACK COURSE APCH TO RWY 29 LNDG UPHILL, OR A COURSE REVERSAL AT AN OM WHICH WAS INOP FOR AN ILS RWY 11 APCH LNDG DOWNHILL. FO SUGGESTED LOC RWY 29 UPHILL BECAUSE OF RWY CONDITION, NO BRAKING ACTION RPTS AVAILABLE. CAPT INSISTED OF VECTORS FROM COMOX TO ILS RWY 11 DOWNHILL. COMOX RADAR CLRED ACFT TO 2800 FT MSL ON DOWNWIND TO BASE VECTOR, FO ADVISED CAPT TO REMAIN AT 4200 FT MSL PUBLISHED ALT, HOWEVER, CAPT DSNDED TO 3200 FT MSL. ACFT NOW RECEIVED BASE TO FINAL VECTOR OF 160 DEGS CLRED FOR ILS RWY 11 APCH, DSND TO 2300 FT MSL. ON BASE VECTOR, CAPT DSNDED TO 2800 FT MSL, STILL NOT ON PUBLISHED APCH SEGMENT AND 10 MI FROM ARPT WHERE PUBLISHED ALT IS 4200 FT MSL FOR MANEUVERING AND 2600 FT MSL WHEN ESTABLISHED INBOUND. CAPT INTERCEPTED LOC INBOUND 2 DOTS LOW AND CONTINUED APCH TO LNDG. HOWEVER, NO CONFLICTS OCCURRED. I, MYSELF, OPERATE WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF THE REGS. I STUDY THEM AND AM 135 TESTED ON THEM. I FEEL THEY ARE BASIC GUIDELINES FOR STANDARDS OF SAFETY. PART 91 HAS NO LIMIT TO FLT OR DUTY TIME AND EXCESSIVE LONG FLT OPS ARE PERMITTED BECAUSE REST PERIOD IS UNDEFINED. COMPANY APPLIES PRESSURE ON PLTS TO GET THE MISSION DONE OR BE LAYED OFF. AS CAPT I STILL CONDUCT OPS WITHIN THE REGS. THE CAPT IN THE ABOVE INCIDENT AND I ALWAYS HAVE OPEN COM, HOWEVER, HIS PERCEPTION OF THE MISSION REQUIREMENT MAY BE DIFFERENT. THEREFORE A CREW ARGUMENT AND COCKPIT TENSION MUST BE AVOIDED, AS IN MY OPINION IT IS SERIOUS TO SAFETY. I WILL FURTHER REVIEW THESE ITEMS, AND THANK YOU FOR THE RPTING SYS, ASRS DOES HELP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.