Narrative:

During preflight of flight lga-dtw on dec/xx/94 in an A320, my first officer and I noticed our fueling was being done incorrectly. When brought to the fueler's attention (fueling company is contracted out to fuel company), he seemed confused as to how much fuel was needed and how to load it correctly. After working with the fueler and one of our company mechanics for some time, we were in a situation where we had a nonstandard fuel load with 1000 pounds more fuel than our dispatch release. We radioed our dispatcher to see if we could depart with this confign and were told we could not. After lengthy delay and with defueling, ground fuel transfer, and subsequent refueling, we were able to depart only to find out that besides our fueler having problems with quantity and load distribution, our dispatch had given us incorrect information as to what our gross weight/fuel load would have to be, and that we ended up defueling the aircraft unnecessarily. Also, before departure it was obvious that the fueler and our mechanic were having difficulty understanding what fuel documentation (fuel slips) we needed to verify exactly how much fuel we had on board. After much discussion on this topic we finally had the proper paper work in place and subsequently departed for dtw.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT HAS FUELING PROB, FORCED TO DEFUEL THEN TROUBLE GETTING PROPER DOCUMENTATION.

Narrative: DURING PREFLT OF FLT LGA-DTW ON DEC/XX/94 IN AN A320, MY FO AND I NOTICED OUR FUELING WAS BEING DONE INCORRECTLY. WHEN BROUGHT TO THE FUELER'S ATTN (FUELING COMPANY IS CONTRACTED OUT TO FUEL COMPANY), HE SEEMED CONFUSED AS TO HOW MUCH FUEL WAS NEEDED AND HOW TO LOAD IT CORRECTLY. AFTER WORKING WITH THE FUELER AND ONE OF OUR COMPANY MECHS FOR SOME TIME, WE WERE IN A SIT WHERE WE HAD A NONSTANDARD FUEL LOAD WITH 1000 LBS MORE FUEL THAN OUR DISPATCH RELEASE. WE RADIOED OUR DISPATCHER TO SEE IF WE COULD DEPART WITH THIS CONFIGN AND WERE TOLD WE COULD NOT. AFTER LENGTHY DELAY AND WITH DEFUELING, GND FUEL TRANSFER, AND SUBSEQUENT REFUELING, WE WERE ABLE TO DEPART ONLY TO FIND OUT THAT BESIDES OUR FUELER HAVING PROBS WITH QUANTITY AND LOAD DISTRIBUTION, OUR DISPATCH HAD GIVEN US INCORRECT INFO AS TO WHAT OUR GROSS WT/FUEL LOAD WOULD HAVE TO BE, AND THAT WE ENDED UP DEFUELING THE ACFT UNNECESSARILY. ALSO, BEFORE DEP IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE FUELER AND OUR MECH WERE HAVING DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING WHAT FUEL DOCUMENTATION (FUEL SLIPS) WE NEEDED TO VERIFY EXACTLY HOW MUCH FUEL WE HAD ON BOARD. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION ON THIS TOPIC WE FINALLY HAD THE PROPER PAPER WORK IN PLACE AND SUBSEQUENTLY DEPARTED FOR DTW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.