Narrative:

On the takeoff roll from runway 29 at intersection romeo at ewr, the first officer began rotating the control wheel at the 'V1, rotate' call. The nosewheel was not coming off the ground and the control wheel felt nose heavy. At this point, the PF continued to apply back pressure and rolled in nose up trim to lighten control forces. The control forces remained heavy. The nosewheel still stayed on the ground, and the takeoff confign warning horn sounded. We both called for an abort, and we brought the aircraft to a stop. We narrowly avoided running off the end of the runway. As of this writing, no problems have been found with the aircraft loading or with the elevator or trim system. Although we stopped the aircraft on the runway, we could have improved our safety margin by the following: 1) not using an intersection for takeoff, 2) not taking off downwind, 3) extra allowance for a wet runway. We met all applicable criteria for takeoff, even downwind at an intersection on a wet runway. In particular, intersection takeoffs are encouraged at our company to save money. We decided on this takeoff to avoid a delay of approximately 1 hour to use runway 4L, which would have given an additional 4000 ft of runway and no tailwind. In hindsight, we cut our safety margins one bit at a time until we had very little left. I also believe the policies that allowed us to make this attempted takeoff under these circumstances should be evaluated. Supplemental information from acn 290983: form a judgement point of view, in future, I would probably elect to accept the delay and accept a longer runway for takeoff. Also, the decision to abort after V1 is not natural, i.e., it is ingrained in us from training that after V1 call you continue, however, in this situation, the aircraft did not want to lift off. The decision to abort therefore may have been called 1-2 seconds later. In training, I have experienced a pitch jam immediately after being airborne, but never the situation we experienced. I would like to point out that our weight and balance was calculated correctly and we were loaded forward center of gravity but within normal takeoff limits.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF ABORTED WHEN DHC-8-I FO UNABLE TO ROTATE ACFT DURING TKOF PROC.

Narrative: ON THE TKOF ROLL FROM RWY 29 AT INTXN ROMEO AT EWR, THE FO BEGAN ROTATING THE CTL WHEEL AT THE 'V1, ROTATE' CALL. THE NOSEWHEEL WAS NOT COMING OFF THE GND AND THE CTL WHEEL FELT NOSE HVY. AT THIS POINT, THE PF CONTINUED TO APPLY BACK PRESSURE AND ROLLED IN NOSE UP TRIM TO LIGHTEN CTL FORCES. THE CTL FORCES REMAINED HVY. THE NOSEWHEEL STILL STAYED ON THE GND, AND THE TKOF CONFIGN WARNING HORN SOUNDED. WE BOTH CALLED FOR AN ABORT, AND WE BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A STOP. WE NARROWLY AVOIDED RUNNING OFF THE END OF THE RWY. AS OF THIS WRITING, NO PROBS HAVE BEEN FOUND WITH THE ACFT LOADING OR WITH THE ELEVATOR OR TRIM SYS. ALTHOUGH WE STOPPED THE ACFT ON THE RWY, WE COULD HAVE IMPROVED OUR SAFETY MARGIN BY THE FOLLOWING: 1) NOT USING AN INTXN FOR TKOF, 2) NOT TAKING OFF DOWNWIND, 3) EXTRA ALLOWANCE FOR A WET RWY. WE MET ALL APPLICABLE CRITERIA FOR TKOF, EVEN DOWNWIND AT AN INTXN ON A WET RWY. IN PARTICULAR, INTXN TKOFS ARE ENCOURAGED AT OUR COMPANY TO SAVE MONEY. WE DECIDED ON THIS TKOF TO AVOID A DELAY OF APPROX 1 HR TO USE RWY 4L, WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN AN ADDITIONAL 4000 FT OF RWY AND NO TAILWIND. IN HINDSIGHT, WE CUT OUR SAFETY MARGINS ONE BIT AT A TIME UNTIL WE HAD VERY LITTLE LEFT. I ALSO BELIEVE THE POLICIES THAT ALLOWED US TO MAKE THIS ATTEMPTED TKOF UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD BE EVALUATED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 290983: FORM A JUDGEMENT POINT OF VIEW, IN FUTURE, I WOULD PROBABLY ELECT TO ACCEPT THE DELAY AND ACCEPT A LONGER RWY FOR TKOF. ALSO, THE DECISION TO ABORT AFTER V1 IS NOT NATURAL, I.E., IT IS INGRAINED IN US FROM TRAINING THAT AFTER V1 CALL YOU CONTINUE, HOWEVER, IN THIS SIT, THE ACFT DID NOT WANT TO LIFT OFF. THE DECISION TO ABORT THEREFORE MAY HAVE BEEN CALLED 1-2 SECONDS LATER. IN TRAINING, I HAVE EXPERIENCED A PITCH JAM IMMEDIATELY AFTER BEING AIRBORNE, BUT NEVER THE SIT WE EXPERIENCED. I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT OUR WT AND BAL WAS CALCULATED CORRECTLY AND WE WERE LOADED FORWARD CTR OF GRAVITY BUT WITHIN NORMAL TKOF LIMITS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.