Narrative:

In-flight we received an ACARS message assigning us gate xaa. After landing as we approached the gate we noticed there was no tug awaiting us on the ramp. This is a new gate and it was my understanding that we would shut down off gate and be towed to the gate. When we asked operations where the tug was, we were told 'the tug is broken and the only way to get to that gate would be to taxi in.' I then told operations that it was my understanding that this was a tow in gate. Operations replied again that the tug was broken and in this case a taxi in would be ok. I waited until we had a marshaller and wing walkers and proceeded to the gate without the incident. The next morning I called the chief pilot to explain the problem with the tug. The chief pilot then told me that operations should not have told me to proceed to the gate and, regardless of what operations told me, I should not have taxied in, the problem with that gate is there is a parking lot directly behind the aircraft and there is no blast fence. Contributing to this problem are the failure of the company to make the operations people aware of the reasons for tow in at this gate, and also the push to be on time or less late. Hindsight tells me that I should have insisted on a tow in and I could have accomplished this by simply shutting down both engines and blocking the ramp to inbound and outbound aircraft thereby forcing them to find an operable tug.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OPS ERRONEOUSLY TOLD CAPT IT WAS ALRIGHT TO PWR IN TO THE GATE AS THE TUG WAS BROKEN AND THERE WAS NO OTHER WAY.

Narrative: INFLT WE RECEIVED AN ACARS MESSAGE ASSIGNING US GATE XAA. AFTER LNDG AS WE APCHED THE GATE WE NOTICED THERE WAS NO TUG AWAITING US ON THE RAMP. THIS IS A NEW GATE AND IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WOULD SHUT DOWN OFF GATE AND BE TOWED TO THE GATE. WHEN WE ASKED OPS WHERE THE TUG WAS, WE WERE TOLD 'THE TUG IS BROKEN AND THE ONLY WAY TO GET TO THAT GATE WOULD BE TO TAXI IN.' I THEN TOLD OPS THAT IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS WAS A TOW IN GATE. OPS REPLIED AGAIN THAT THE TUG WAS BROKEN AND IN THIS CASE A TAXI IN WOULD BE OK. I WAITED UNTIL WE HAD A MARSHALLER AND WING WALKERS AND PROCEEDED TO THE GATE WITHOUT THE INCIDENT. THE NEXT MORNING I CALLED THE CHIEF PLT TO EXPLAIN THE PROB WITH THE TUG. THE CHIEF PLT THEN TOLD ME THAT OPS SHOULD NOT HAVE TOLD ME TO PROCEED TO THE GATE AND, REGARDLESS OF WHAT OPS TOLD ME, I SHOULD NOT HAVE TAXIED IN, THE PROB WITH THAT GATE IS THERE IS A PARKING LOT DIRECTLY BEHIND THE ACFT AND THERE IS NO BLAST FENCE. CONTRIBUTING TO THIS PROB ARE THE FAILURE OF THE COMPANY TO MAKE THE OPS PEOPLE AWARE OF THE REASONS FOR TOW IN AT THIS GATE, AND ALSO THE PUSH TO BE ON TIME OR LESS LATE. HINDSIGHT TELLS ME THAT I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED ON A TOW IN AND I COULD HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THIS BY SIMPLY SHUTTING DOWN BOTH ENGS AND BLOCKING THE RAMP TO INBOUND AND OUTBOUND ACFT THEREBY FORCING THEM TO FIND AN OPERABLE TUG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.