Narrative:

I was being route checked by an FAA inspector from sfo to mry and back to sfo. Upon landing in mry, I noticed the emergency hydraulic pressure gauge was inoperative. I called our maintenance control and it was deferred under 29-1 of our MEL. As I was putting the deferral sticker next to the gauge, the inspector asked what was being deferred. I told him and handed him the MEL. He questioned whether this gauge could be deferred. I offered to call maintenance control again to verify it, he said no. Since he wasn't sure, he didn't want to delay the flight. We talked some more and I again offered to call maintenance. He again said no. The flight departed. On our way to sfo the inspector continued to look through the MEL. When we arrived, he showed me a different section and it showed the gauge was not deferrable. We talked a little longer about other aspects of the flight. Before he left, the inspector said that no one would get in trouble, he just wanted this to be a learning experience for everyone. I thanked him for his input and he departed. If I had to do it again, I would have gone back to make sure the item was deferrable. His questioning and my knowledge of the FARS should have raised a red flag in my brain. However, since he twice said not to call I decided to let the flight continue. Supplemental information from acn 287612: the workload in maintenance control was extremely heavy. I was notified by sfo maintenance that they weren't sure of the deferral. We then looked under MEL 32 and were unable to identify a justifiable deferral. The aircraft's emergency hydraulic pressure indication was repaired. At no time did I intentionally or deliberately defer this system knowing it was incorrect.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAULTY LOGBOOK, SIGNOFF.

Narrative: I WAS BEING RTE CHKED BY AN FAA INSPECTOR FROM SFO TO MRY AND BACK TO SFO. UPON LNDG IN MRY, I NOTICED THE EMER HYD PRESSURE GAUGE WAS INOP. I CALLED OUR MAINT CTL AND IT WAS DEFERRED UNDER 29-1 OF OUR MEL. AS I WAS PUTTING THE DEFERRAL STICKER NEXT TO THE GAUGE, THE INSPECTOR ASKED WHAT WAS BEING DEFERRED. I TOLD HIM AND HANDED HIM THE MEL. HE QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS GAUGE COULD BE DEFERRED. I OFFERED TO CALL MAINT CTL AGAIN TO VERIFY IT, HE SAID NO. SINCE HE WASN'T SURE, HE DIDN'T WANT TO DELAY THE FLT. WE TALKED SOME MORE AND I AGAIN OFFERED TO CALL MAINT. HE AGAIN SAID NO. THE FLT DEPARTED. ON OUR WAY TO SFO THE INSPECTOR CONTINUED TO LOOK THROUGH THE MEL. WHEN WE ARRIVED, HE SHOWED ME A DIFFERENT SECTION AND IT SHOWED THE GAUGE WAS NOT DEFERRABLE. WE TALKED A LITTLE LONGER ABOUT OTHER ASPECTS OF THE FLT. BEFORE HE LEFT, THE INSPECTOR SAID THAT NO ONE WOULD GET IN TROUBLE, HE JUST WANTED THIS TO BE A LEARNING EXPERIENCE FOR EVERYONE. I THANKED HIM FOR HIS INPUT AND HE DEPARTED. IF I HAD TO DO IT AGAIN, I WOULD HAVE GONE BACK TO MAKE SURE THE ITEM WAS DEFERRABLE. HIS QUESTIONING AND MY KNOWLEDGE OF THE FARS SHOULD HAVE RAISED A RED FLAG IN MY BRAIN. HOWEVER, SINCE HE TWICE SAID NOT TO CALL I DECIDED TO LET THE FLT CONTINUE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 287612: THE WORKLOAD IN MAINT CTL WAS EXTREMELY HVY. I WAS NOTIFIED BY SFO MAINT THAT THEY WEREN'T SURE OF THE DEFERRAL. WE THEN LOOKED UNDER MEL 32 AND WERE UNABLE TO IDENT A JUSTIFIABLE DEFERRAL. THE ACFT'S EMER HYD PRESSURE INDICATION WAS REPAIRED. AT NO TIME DID I INTENTIONALLY OR DELIBERATELY DEFER THIS SYS KNOWING IT WAS INCORRECT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.