Narrative:

After departing sfo en route to fat, with aircraft climbing through 12000 ft, crew obtained a door warning indication 'light illumination' for the passenger door. Crew accomplished emergency procedures (reduced cabin differential pressure, turned on seat belt sign and visually inspected door for proper closure). Crew confirmed internal door alignment (shoot pin) indicators and door handle were in the proper (locked) position. Following accomplishment of emergency procedures, crew elected to divert to mod for precautionary purposes. Aircraft landed without incident at mod. After landing, the crew contacted company maintenance control department by telephone. I was the maintenance controller on duty at the time. The captain reported to me the problem with the door warning system and explained that the system operated normally on the ground at mod and that he visually verified that all door locking shoot pin alignment marks were aligned to the locked position. I asked if there had been any abnormalities noted with the pressurization system during the door warning indication. The captain responded that he experienced no problems with the pressurization system. The captain asked if he should enter a discrepancy in the act flight logbook. I told him that a logbook entry was required. Since we do not have company maintenance personnel at mod, I indicated to the captain that we would defer his door warning system per the MEL so as he could continue his flight to fat. At this time the captain said he did not understand why a dmi would be necessary since he was unable to duplicate the problem on the ground and had verified positive closure of the door. In an effort to dispatch the aircraft, I agreed to allow the captain to sign-off the discrepancy in the flight logbook using my name and certificate number with the captain countersigning the log page. This procedure is in contradiction to the policy and procedure contained with the company's manuals and the FARS. In retrospect, I should not have allowed the flight crew member to convince me to return the aircraft to service in this manner. Taking the time to follow proper deferral procedures or arrange for the inspection of the door warning system by contract maintenance, even if additional delays are required would be far better than incorrectly returning an aircraft to service.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAULTY LOGBOOK SIGNOFF. DOOR WARNING ACTIVATED.

Narrative: AFTER DEPARTING SFO ENRTE TO FAT, WITH ACFT CLBING THROUGH 12000 FT, CREW OBTAINED A DOOR WARNING INDICATION 'LIGHT ILLUMINATION' FOR THE PAX DOOR. CREW ACCOMPLISHED EMER PROCS (REDUCED CABIN DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE, TURNED ON SEAT BELT SIGN AND VISUALLY INSPECTED DOOR FOR PROPER CLOSURE). CREW CONFIRMED INTERNAL DOOR ALIGNMENT (SHOOT PIN) INDICATORS AND DOOR HANDLE WERE IN THE PROPER (LOCKED) POS. FOLLOWING ACCOMPLISHMENT OF EMER PROCS, CREW ELECTED TO DIVERT TO MOD FOR PRECAUTIONARY PURPOSES. ACFT LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AT MOD. AFTER LNDG, THE CREW CONTACTED COMPANY MAINT CTL DEPT BY TELEPHONE. I WAS THE MAINT CTLR ON DUTY AT THE TIME. THE CAPT RPTED TO ME THE PROB WITH THE DOOR WARNING SYS AND EXPLAINED THAT THE SYS OPERATED NORMALLY ON THE GND AT MOD AND THAT HE VISUALLY VERIFIED THAT ALL DOOR LOCKING SHOOT PIN ALIGNMENT MARKS WERE ALIGNED TO THE LOCKED POS. I ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY ABNORMALITIES NOTED WITH THE PRESSURIZATION SYS DURING THE DOOR WARNING INDICATION. THE CAPT RESPONDED THAT HE EXPERIENCED NO PROBS WITH THE PRESSURIZATION SYS. THE CAPT ASKED IF HE SHOULD ENTER A DISCREPANCY IN THE ACT FLT LOGBOOK. I TOLD HIM THAT A LOGBOOK ENTRY WAS REQUIRED. SINCE WE DO NOT HAVE COMPANY MAINT PERSONNEL AT MOD, I INDICATED TO THE CAPT THAT WE WOULD DEFER HIS DOOR WARNING SYS PER THE MEL SO AS HE COULD CONTINUE HIS FLT TO FAT. AT THIS TIME THE CAPT SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY A DMI WOULD BE NECESSARY SINCE HE WAS UNABLE TO DUPLICATE THE PROB ON THE GND AND HAD VERIFIED POSITIVE CLOSURE OF THE DOOR. IN AN EFFORT TO DISPATCH THE ACFT, I AGREED TO ALLOW THE CAPT TO SIGN-OFF THE DISCREPANCY IN THE FLT LOGBOOK USING MY NAME AND CERTIFICATE NUMBER WITH THE CAPT COUNTERSIGNING THE LOG PAGE. THIS PROC IS IN CONTRADICTION TO THE POLICY AND PROC CONTAINED WITH THE COMPANY'S MANUALS AND THE FARS. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED THE FLT CREW MEMBER TO CONVINCE ME TO RETURN THE ACFT TO SVC IN THIS MANNER. TAKING THE TIME TO FOLLOW PROPER DEFERRAL PROCS OR ARRANGE FOR THE INSPECTION OF THE DOOR WARNING SYS BY CONTRACT MAINT, EVEN IF ADDITIONAL DELAYS ARE REQUIRED WOULD BE FAR BETTER THAN INCORRECTLY RETURNING AN ACFT TO SVC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.