Narrative:

Our taxi clearance was to taxi to runway 25 at which involved a taxiway which crossed runway 25. This clearance required us to hold short of runway 25. This clearance required us to hold short of runway 25 regardless if we were told to hold short or not. I was the PNF, and was in the process of running the taxi -- before -- takeoff checklist. My attention was on the checklist and not outside of the aircraft and our taxi progress. I realized we had crossed the hold short of runway 25 and immediately alerted ground control. No aircraft were in the process of landing and no conflict was created. The chain-of-events leading up to this incident is almost predictable. I had recently upgraded to captain and had accrued 75 hours in the aircraft. The first officer had been on line for 3 days and was of marginal performance for those 3 days. While running the checklist I had to double check each response of his to ensure his accuracy and this increased my workload which was already high. Our operations manual specifically states that a high minimum captain and a high minimum first officer (less than 100 hours type) will not be paired together if possible. In this case the company found a possible way to do this. The cause of this incident was my inability to divide my attention outside of the cockpit due to my high individual workload inside. Fortunately, no conflict was created and a polite reminder from ground control was all that was issued.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION.

Narrative: OUR TAXI CLRNC WAS TO TAXI TO RWY 25 AT WHICH INVOLVED A TXWY WHICH CROSSED RWY 25. THIS CLRNC REQUIRED US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 25. THIS CLRNC REQUIRED US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 25 REGARDLESS IF WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OR NOT. I WAS THE PNF, AND WAS IN THE PROCESS OF RUNNING THE TAXI -- BEFORE -- TKOF CHKLIST. MY ATTN WAS ON THE CHKLIST AND NOT OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT AND OUR TAXI PROGRESS. I REALIZED WE HAD CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT OF RWY 25 AND IMMEDIATELY ALERTED GND CTL. NO ACFT WERE IN THE PROCESS OF LNDG AND NO CONFLICT WAS CREATED. THE CHAIN-OF-EVENTS LEADING UP TO THIS INCIDENT IS ALMOST PREDICTABLE. I HAD RECENTLY UPGRADED TO CAPT AND HAD ACCRUED 75 HRS IN THE ACFT. THE FO HAD BEEN ON LINE FOR 3 DAYS AND WAS OF MARGINAL PERFORMANCE FOR THOSE 3 DAYS. WHILE RUNNING THE CHKLIST I HAD TO DOUBLE CHK EACH RESPONSE OF HIS TO ENSURE HIS ACCURACY AND THIS INCREASED MY WORKLOAD WHICH WAS ALREADY HIGH. OUR OPS MANUAL SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT A HIGH MINIMUM CAPT AND A HIGH MINIMUM FO (LESS THAN 100 HRS TYPE) WILL NOT BE PAIRED TOGETHER IF POSSIBLE. IN THIS CASE THE COMPANY FOUND A POSSIBLE WAY TO DO THIS. THE CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT WAS MY INABILITY TO DIVIDE MY ATTN OUTSIDE OF THE COCKPIT DUE TO MY HIGH INDIVIDUAL WORKLOAD INSIDE. FORTUNATELY, NO CONFLICT WAS CREATED AND A POLITE REMINDER FROM GND CTL WAS ALL THAT WAS ISSUED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.