Narrative:

We had been cleared for the visual approach to runway 05 at orf. I was looking outside when my first officer said that there was something wrong with the engines. We determined that the #2 engine was still producing 50 percent torque when we had the power levers back to flight idle. We looked at the emergency procedure and could not find any procedure that addressed our current situation. We turned off the #2 ecu (electronic control unit) to see if this would correct the problem. This did not seem to correct it. He then decided to shutdown the engine. We shut down the engine, but decided to put the #2 condition lever to start/feather to see if we had control of the propeller control unit instead of moving it to fuel off. With the engine fluctuations, it was difficult to determine exactly what was wrong. We then secured the engine and proceeded to land. With all this happening, we declared an emergency, talked to the passenger and to the control tower. I felt I did not have the time or, in the interest of safety, need to contact our company. On landing, I felt it was safe to taxi clear of the runway, but felt we needed to be towed to our gate. Even though there were no problems, we should have had a company representative come to our plane or provide support. Also, we had to wait for a long time on the taxiway because our company did not have a tow bar or a way of getting the people off of the airplane.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN.

Narrative: WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 05 AT ORF. I WAS LOOKING OUTSIDE WHEN MY FO SAID THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING WRONG WITH THE ENGS. WE DETERMINED THAT THE #2 ENG WAS STILL PRODUCING 50 PERCENT TORQUE WHEN WE HAD THE PWR LEVERS BACK TO FLT IDLE. WE LOOKED AT THE EMER PROC AND COULD NOT FIND ANY PROC THAT ADDRESSED OUR CURRENT SIT. WE TURNED OFF THE #2 ECU (ELECTRONIC CTL UNIT) TO SEE IF THIS WOULD CORRECT THE PROB. THIS DID NOT SEEM TO CORRECT IT. HE THEN DECIDED TO SHUTDOWN THE ENG. WE SHUT DOWN THE ENG, BUT DECIDED TO PUT THE #2 CONDITION LEVER TO START/FEATHER TO SEE IF WE HAD CTL OF THE PROP CTL UNIT INSTEAD OF MOVING IT TO FUEL OFF. WITH THE ENG FLUCTUATIONS, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE EXACTLY WHAT WAS WRONG. WE THEN SECURED THE ENG AND PROCEEDED TO LAND. WITH ALL THIS HAPPENING, WE DECLARED AN EMER, TALKED TO THE PAX AND TO THE CTL TWR. I FELT I DID NOT HAVE THE TIME OR, IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY, NEED TO CONTACT OUR COMPANY. ON LNDG, I FELT IT WAS SAFE TO TAXI CLR OF THE RWY, BUT FELT WE NEEDED TO BE TOWED TO OUR GATE. EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE NO PROBS, WE SHOULD HAVE HAD A COMPANY REPRESENTATIVE COME TO OUR PLANE OR PROVIDE SUPPORT. ALSO, WE HAD TO WAIT FOR A LONG TIME ON THE TXWY BECAUSE OUR COMPANY DID NOT HAVE A TOW BAR OR A WAY OF GETTING THE PEOPLE OFF OF THE AIRPLANE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.