Narrative:

I am writing this ASRS report to relay an ongoing problem at bur airport, as experienced by the controllers at this facility and the affected pilots. This problem has been ongoing and the FAA has been unable to resolve the problem, therefore this report. A specific incident occurred this week which I shall relay to illustrate the general problem. On an evening earlier this week, air carrier X, an MD83, was on approach into the bur airport, using the ILS runway 8 approach (the primary instrument approach used 99 percent of the time at this field). Approximately 8 mi out on file, he contacted the tower descending to the interim altitude of 3000 ft waiting for GS intercept, which occurs just outside budde, the OM. I observed traffic operating in the vny pattern underneath X, climbing on the upwind out of 2000 ft. I issued a TA to X who was in the process of intercepting the GS and initiating a descent. The upwind traffic at vny climbed to approximately 2800 ft, while X passed above him at 3000 ft after effecting a climb to avoid the traffic. The point of conflict between X and the traffic at vny airport is similar to another point of conflict between bur's ILS traffic and the east downwind at vny, where aircraft routinely fly at 1800 ft MSL (the pattern altitude). At this point, traffic in the vny pattern are climbing out of crosswind, and leveling off at 1800 ft, although a great many fail to level off at pattern altitude, and inadvertently climb to as high as 2300 ft or higher. The GS altitude for the ILS approach at bur places these aircraft in extremely close vertical proximity to each other -- a majority of aircraft on the approach at bur conflict with traffic on vny's downwind underneath them, many of which necessitate evasive action, or a leveling off on approach. The advent of TCASII, while alerting more pilots to the aircraft underneath them has made the situation more difficult for controllers as the resulting RA's occasionally cause the air carrier aircraft to climb higher than the GS and into traffic higher than them. Similarly, as the vny traffic pattern is full of student pilots, a large number of conflicting aircraft fail to turn their xponders on, and TCASII fails to see these conflictsaltogether. What aggravates the danger of this situation is that the routine point for transfer of communications between bur approach and bur tower is at this point of conflict with the traffic at vny airport (being controled by a third separate facility). When TA's are required, aircraft are frequently not on tower's frequency, or in the process of just switching over. The root cause of this problem is simple: the GS for bur is not protected by class C airspace. While a class C airspace area was constructed for bur, a cut-out was created for vny. However, the GS for bur exits the outer area of class C airspace, and penetrates airspace delegated for vny airport, resulting in turbojet aircraft flying through unprotected airspace over the OM, in an area of extraordinarily frequent traffic conflicts. The airspace which is the site of the conflict is not the sole domain of 1 facility, but instead is 'shared' between bur approach and vny tower -- effected by an LOA which states that bur approach may use vny airspace for these aircraft on approach to burbank. However, van nuys airport owns and uses this airspace regularly, and is not required to provide class C separation between its pattern aircraft and bur's localizer. Vny, believing they are only required to provide class D separation, routinely fails to provide safe separation between their pattern aircraft and the turbojet aircraft on approach into bur. Indeed, they do not generally restrict their aircraft to altitudes which would put them a safe vertical altitude below the ILS, but routinely rely on 'see and avoid' as the rationale for not taking more positive control. Further, on the east side of the vny pattern, vny owns and uses up to 3000 ft MSL, while the localizer descends to around 2300-2400 ft through their airspace. What makes this situation more precarious is that when an overcast condition exists over the area, pattern work at vny continues although it is clear that the aircraft are not 500 ft below the overcast as required by VFR flight rules. We know this to be true as we issue numerous TA's to pilots for traffic at their 12 O'clock, less than a mi, 200-300 ft below them,while the turbojet aircraft is still IMC. Again, safe separation between vny's traffic and bur's ILS fails to exist. Also, a GA pilot arriving into vny airport for the first time will receive no notification of this conflict, either from ATIS, the airport facilities directory, or from the TCA charts. Similarly, no arriving turbojet aircraft approaching bur receives advance warning of this conflict, either in the form of a notation in the airport facilities directory, on the ATIS, or even a simple not eon an approach plate warning of the close proximity of traffic underneath the ILS approach. Efforts towards resolving this conflict have been fruitless at the FAA's level. Vny airport feels that they are not required or able to provide greater separation than they currently support, and indeed class D airspace is in fact 'see and avoid' airspace. While they claim to try to advise aircraft in their pattern to the presence of ILS turbojets, in practice they are too busy to do so, and these traffic calls are rarely issued. While vny uses the eastern portion of their airspace almost exclusively for pattern work, they have resisted any efforts to vertically limit their aircraft below bur's GS through the amendment of airspace allocations. The GS for the ILS approach apparently cannot be raised further to help alleviate the conflict as it is already at 3 degrees and a steeper approach seems to create additional problems. This situation can be rectified by 1 of the following means: 1) the harshest way to correct the problem would be to place vertical limits on vny airport, (reducing the vertical limits of their airspace to 2000 or 2500 ft over and west of the field, and taking away all airspace to the east of their runway complex). This would be the most effective way of eliminating this traffic conflict, and I suspect that in the event of an actual air carrier/GA collision, that will be the result. While vny would lose their practice traffic pattern and thus their traffic count (which is why they would resist this move), it would not substantially impact arriving/departing aircraft -- only the practice pattern. 2) a less harsh variant, but not as effective would be to force vny aircraft operating east of the field to an altitude of 1800 ft (pattern altitude) and no higher. This could be accomplished by adjusting the class C airspace boundary to include a shelf from 1900 ft and up over the eastern portion of their airspace. 3) the acrs operating in and out of bur have suggested that class C airspace be extended to include vny, or even class B be created in this area to provide greater separation. Vny would have to learn how to provide radar separation, and would be forced in this situation to provide 500 ft vertical separation between their pattern and the bur GS which they do not now currently provide. Again, they may resist this move as it would result in a possible downgrade of their facility as they again may not be able to count their traffic pattern operations. 4) finally, at the very least, additions should be made to the airport facility directory and other government pubs to indicate the problem at these fields and alert the pilots to this problem. Vny should make an inclusion on their ATIS warning pilots approaching their field of the intense turbojet activity directly above them, and warn them to stay as low as possible. Also, the FAA should further investigate the matter, and take enforcement actions against 'scud-running' VFR operations in the vny pattern when appropriate, and investigate other possible resolutions to this situation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: atx at vny tower stated traffic patterns cannot be lowered because of noise and helicopter rtes. Coordination between bur tower and vny tower is for B757 and heavy jets so wake turbulence advisory can be issued.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X HAD NMAC WITH VFR Y OVER VNY. SEE AND VOID CONCEPT. RWY 8 ILS DROPS OUT OF ARSA FOR 200 FT AT BUDDE.

Narrative: I AM WRITING THIS ASRS RPT TO RELAY AN ONGOING PROB AT BUR ARPT, AS EXPERIENCED BY THE CTLRS AT THIS FACILITY AND THE AFFECTED PLTS. THIS PROB HAS BEEN ONGOING AND THE FAA HAS BEEN UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE PROB, THEREFORE THIS RPT. A SPECIFIC INCIDENT OCCURRED THIS WK WHICH I SHALL RELAY TO ILLUSTRATE THE GENERAL PROB. ON AN EVENING EARLIER THIS WK, ACR X, AN MD83, WAS ON APCH INTO THE BUR ARPT, USING THE ILS RWY 8 APCH (THE PRIMARY INST APCH USED 99 PERCENT OF THE TIME AT THIS FIELD). APPROX 8 MI OUT ON FILE, HE CONTACTED THE TWR DSNDING TO THE INTERIM ALT OF 3000 FT WAITING FOR GS INTERCEPT, WHICH OCCURS JUST OUTSIDE BUDDE, THE OM. I OBSERVED TFC OPERATING IN THE VNY PATTERN UNDERNEATH X, CLBING ON THE UPWIND OUT OF 2000 FT. I ISSUED A TA TO X WHO WAS IN THE PROCESS OF INTERCEPTING THE GS AND INITIATING A DSCNT. THE UPWIND TFC AT VNY CLBED TO APPROX 2800 FT, WHILE X PASSED ABOVE HIM AT 3000 FT AFTER EFFECTING A CLB TO AVOID THE TFC. THE POINT OF CONFLICT BTWN X AND THE TFC AT VNY ARPT IS SIMILAR TO ANOTHER POINT OF CONFLICT BTWN BUR'S ILS TFC AND THE E DOWNWIND AT VNY, WHERE ACFT ROUTINELY FLY AT 1800 FT MSL (THE PATTERN ALT). AT THIS POINT, TFC IN THE VNY PATTERN ARE CLBING OUT OF XWIND, AND LEVELING OFF AT 1800 FT, ALTHOUGH A GREAT MANY FAIL TO LEVEL OFF AT PATTERN ALT, AND INADVERTENTLY CLB TO AS HIGH AS 2300 FT OR HIGHER. THE GS ALT FOR THE ILS APCH AT BUR PLACES THESE ACFT IN EXTREMELY CLOSE VERT PROX TO EACH OTHER -- A MAJORITY OF ACFT ON THE APCH AT BUR CONFLICT WITH TFC ON VNY'S DOWNWIND UNDERNEATH THEM, MANY OF WHICH NECESSITATE EVASIVE ACTION, OR A LEVELING OFF ON APCH. THE ADVENT OF TCASII, WHILE ALERTING MORE PLTS TO THE ACFT UNDERNEATH THEM HAS MADE THE SIT MORE DIFFICULT FOR CTLRS AS THE RESULTING RA'S OCCASIONALLY CAUSE THE ACR ACFT TO CLB HIGHER THAN THE GS AND INTO TFC HIGHER THAN THEM. SIMILARLY, AS THE VNY TFC PATTERN IS FULL OF STUDENT PLTS, A LARGE NUMBER OF CONFLICTING ACFT FAIL TO TURN THEIR XPONDERS ON, AND TCASII FAILS TO SEE THESE CONFLICTSALTOGETHER. WHAT AGGRAVATES THE DANGER OF THIS SIT IS THAT THE ROUTINE POINT FOR TRANSFER OF COMS BTWN BUR APCH AND BUR TWR IS AT THIS POINT OF CONFLICT WITH THE TFC AT VNY ARPT (BEING CTLED BY A THIRD SEPARATE FACILITY). WHEN TA'S ARE REQUIRED, ACFT ARE FREQUENTLY NOT ON TWR'S FREQ, OR IN THE PROCESS OF JUST SWITCHING OVER. THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS PROB IS SIMPLE: THE GS FOR BUR IS NOT PROTECTED BY CLASS C AIRSPACE. WHILE A CLASS C AIRSPACE AREA WAS CONSTRUCTED FOR BUR, A CUT-OUT WAS CREATED FOR VNY. HOWEVER, THE GS FOR BUR EXITS THE OUTER AREA OF CLASS C AIRSPACE, AND PENETRATES AIRSPACE DELEGATED FOR VNY ARPT, RESULTING IN TURBOJET ACFT FLYING THROUGH UNPROTECTED AIRSPACE OVER THE OM, IN AN AREA OF EXTRAORDINARILY FREQUENT TFC CONFLICTS. THE AIRSPACE WHICH IS THE SITE OF THE CONFLICT IS NOT THE SOLE DOMAIN OF 1 FACILITY, BUT INSTEAD IS 'SHARED' BTWN BUR APCH AND VNY TWR -- EFFECTED BY AN LOA WHICH STATES THAT BUR APCH MAY USE VNY AIRSPACE FOR THESE ACFT ON APCH TO BURBANK. HOWEVER, VAN NUYS ARPT OWNS AND USES THIS AIRSPACE REGULARLY, AND IS NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE CLASS C SEPARATION BTWN ITS PATTERN ACFT AND BUR'S LOC. VNY, BELIEVING THEY ARE ONLY REQUIRED TO PROVIDE CLASS D SEPARATION, ROUTINELY FAILS TO PROVIDE SAFE SEPARATION BTWN THEIR PATTERN ACFT AND THE TURBOJET ACFT ON APCH INTO BUR. INDEED, THEY DO NOT GENERALLY RESTRICT THEIR ACFT TO ALTS WHICH WOULD PUT THEM A SAFE VERT ALT BELOW THE ILS, BUT ROUTINELY RELY ON 'SEE AND AVOID' AS THE RATIONALE FOR NOT TAKING MORE POSITIVE CTL. FURTHER, ON THE E SIDE OF THE VNY PATTERN, VNY OWNS AND USES UP TO 3000 FT MSL, WHILE THE LOC DSNDS TO AROUND 2300-2400 FT THROUGH THEIR AIRSPACE. WHAT MAKES THIS SIT MORE PRECARIOUS IS THAT WHEN AN OVCST CONDITION EXISTS OVER THE AREA, PATTERN WORK AT VNY CONTINUES ALTHOUGH IT IS CLR THAT THE ACFT ARE NOT 500 FT BELOW THE OVCST AS REQUIRED BY VFR FLT RULES. WE KNOW THIS TO BE TRUE AS WE ISSUE NUMEROUS TA'S TO PLTS FOR TFC AT THEIR 12 O'CLOCK, LESS THAN A MI, 200-300 FT BELOW THEM,WHILE THE TURBOJET ACFT IS STILL IMC. AGAIN, SAFE SEPARATION BTWN VNY'S TFC AND BUR'S ILS FAILS TO EXIST. ALSO, A GA PLT ARRIVING INTO VNY ARPT FOR THE FIRST TIME WILL RECEIVE NO NOTIFICATION OF THIS CONFLICT, EITHER FROM ATIS, THE ARPT FACILITIES DIRECTORY, OR FROM THE TCA CHARTS. SIMILARLY, NO ARRIVING TURBOJET ACFT APCHING BUR RECEIVES ADVANCE WARNING OF THIS CONFLICT, EITHER IN THE FORM OF A NOTATION IN THE ARPT FACILITIES DIRECTORY, ON THE ATIS, OR EVEN A SIMPLE NOT EON AN APCH PLATE WARNING OF THE CLOSE PROX OF TFC UNDERNEATH THE ILS APCH. EFFORTS TOWARDS RESOLVING THIS CONFLICT HAVE BEEN FRUITLESS AT THE FAA'S LEVEL. VNY ARPT FEELS THAT THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED OR ABLE TO PROVIDE GREATER SEPARATION THAN THEY CURRENTLY SUPPORT, AND INDEED CLASS D AIRSPACE IS IN FACT 'SEE AND AVOID' AIRSPACE. WHILE THEY CLAIM TO TRY TO ADVISE ACFT IN THEIR PATTERN TO THE PRESENCE OF ILS TURBOJETS, IN PRACTICE THEY ARE TOO BUSY TO DO SO, AND THESE TFC CALLS ARE RARELY ISSUED. WHILE VNY USES THE EASTERN PORTION OF THEIR AIRSPACE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR PATTERN WORK, THEY HAVE RESISTED ANY EFFORTS TO VERTLY LIMIT THEIR ACFT BELOW BUR'S GS THROUGH THE AMENDMENT OF AIRSPACE ALLOCATIONS. THE GS FOR THE ILS APCH APPARENTLY CANNOT BE RAISED FURTHER TO HELP ALLEVIATE THE CONFLICT AS IT IS ALREADY AT 3 DEGS AND A STEEPER APCH SEEMS TO CREATE ADDITIONAL PROBS. THIS SIT CAN BE RECTIFIED BY 1 OF THE FOLLOWING MEANS: 1) THE HARSHEST WAY TO CORRECT THE PROB WOULD BE TO PLACE VERT LIMITS ON VNY ARPT, (REDUCING THE VERT LIMITS OF THEIR AIRSPACE TO 2000 OR 2500 FT OVER AND W OF THE FIELD, AND TAKING AWAY ALL AIRSPACE TO THE E OF THEIR RWY COMPLEX). THIS WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF ELIMINATING THIS TFC CONFLICT, AND I SUSPECT THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN ACTUAL ACR/GA COLLISION, THAT WILL BE THE RESULT. WHILE VNY WOULD LOSE THEIR PRACTICE TFC PATTERN AND THUS THEIR TFC COUNT (WHICH IS WHY THEY WOULD RESIST THIS MOVE), IT WOULD NOT SUBSTANTIALLY IMPACT ARRIVING/DEPARTING ACFT -- ONLY THE PRACTICE PATTERN. 2) A LESS HARSH VARIANT, BUT NOT AS EFFECTIVE WOULD BE TO FORCE VNY ACFT OPERATING E OF THE FIELD TO AN ALT OF 1800 FT (PATTERN ALT) AND NO HIGHER. THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY ADJUSTING THE CLASS C AIRSPACE BOUNDARY TO INCLUDE A SHELF FROM 1900 FT AND UP OVER THE EASTERN PORTION OF THEIR AIRSPACE. 3) THE ACRS OPERATING IN AND OUT OF BUR HAVE SUGGESTED THAT CLASS C AIRSPACE BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE VNY, OR EVEN CLASS B BE CREATED IN THIS AREA TO PROVIDE GREATER SEPARATION. VNY WOULD HAVE TO LEARN HOW TO PROVIDE RADAR SEPARATION, AND WOULD BE FORCED IN THIS SIT TO PROVIDE 500 FT VERT SEPARATION BTWN THEIR PATTERN AND THE BUR GS WHICH THEY DO NOT NOW CURRENTLY PROVIDE. AGAIN, THEY MAY RESIST THIS MOVE AS IT WOULD RESULT IN A POSSIBLE DOWNGRADE OF THEIR FACILITY AS THEY AGAIN MAY NOT BE ABLE TO COUNT THEIR TFC PATTERN OPS. 4) FINALLY, AT THE VERY LEAST, ADDITIONS SHOULD BE MADE TO THE ARPT FACILITY DIRECTORY AND OTHER GOV PUBS TO INDICATE THE PROB AT THESE FIELDS AND ALERT THE PLTS TO THIS PROB. VNY SHOULD MAKE AN INCLUSION ON THEIR ATIS WARNING PLTS APCHING THEIR FIELD OF THE INTENSE TURBOJET ACTIVITY DIRECTLY ABOVE THEM, AND WARN THEM TO STAY AS LOW AS POSSIBLE. ALSO, THE FAA SHOULD FURTHER INVESTIGATE THE MATTER, AND TAKE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST 'SCUD-RUNNING' VFR OPS IN THE VNY PATTERN WHEN APPROPRIATE, AND INVESTIGATE OTHER POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS TO THIS SIT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ATX AT VNY TWR STATED TFC PATTERNS CANNOT BE LOWERED BECAUSE OF NOISE AND HELI RTES. COORD BTWN BUR TWR AND VNY TWR IS FOR B757 AND HVY JETS SO WAKE TURB ADVISORY CAN BE ISSUED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.