Narrative:

Captain and I were on a trip to aid (anderson, ind). We were being radar vectored by ZID. Initially, the vectors were numerous for traffic avoidance. We called aid in sight. ZID acknowledged and kept us on vectors for traffic. We were soon given a final heading and cleared for the visual and told to contact tower (aid). The final vector appeared to align us within 30 degrees of runway 30 at aid, then we contacted aid tower and were cleared to land. In reality we had mistaken muncie airport (mie) for aid and were descending in on approach. On approximately a 1/4 mi final, the captain and I recognized that the airport runway environment was incorrect for aid (ie, runway 32 versus 30). Upon this discovery, we executed a go around. Aid tower then contacted us on the start of climb out from mie that mie tower had us in their area. We then contacted ZID and requested radar vectors to aid. En route to aid the captain contacted mie tower to inquire for safety reasons and was told that everything was ok. We continued and made a normal landing at aid. Several factors contributed to this event. This crew was not familiar with either airport and visibility was limiting (although VFR) with haze. The proximity and similar layout of aid and mie further added to confusion. The final vector given by ZID appeared to line us up with ramp 30. Clearance to land by aid tower upon initial contact also was important. Areas such as these should be double verified by approach control (center) and pilots in haze conditions. Supplemental information from acn 274696: the first officer and I decided the navigational and visual cues did not match that of aid. Aid tower had cleared us to land runway 30 just before we abandoned the approach. We assumed aid tower had us in sight when we were cleared to land. Continued acceptance of the visual after vectors for traffic was my error. Should have confirmed the airport location with ZID.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WRONG ARPT APCH DURING VISUAL APCH IN HAZY CONDITIONS. VISIBILITY REDUCED.

Narrative: CAPT AND I WERE ON A TRIP TO AID (ANDERSON, IND). WE WERE BEING RADAR VECTORED BY ZID. INITIALLY, THE VECTORS WERE NUMEROUS FOR TFC AVOIDANCE. WE CALLED AID IN SIGHT. ZID ACKNOWLEDGED AND KEPT US ON VECTORS FOR TFC. WE WERE SOON GIVEN A FINAL HDG AND CLRED FOR THE VISUAL AND TOLD TO CONTACT TWR (AID). THE FINAL VECTOR APPEARED TO ALIGN US WITHIN 30 DEGS OF RWY 30 AT AID, THEN WE CONTACTED AID TWR AND WERE CLRED TO LAND. IN REALITY WE HAD MISTAKEN MUNCIE ARPT (MIE) FOR AID AND WERE DSNDING IN ON APCH. ON APPROX A 1/4 MI FINAL, THE CAPT AND I RECOGNIZED THAT THE ARPT RWY ENVIRONMENT WAS INCORRECT FOR AID (IE, RWY 32 VERSUS 30). UPON THIS DISCOVERY, WE EXECUTED A GAR. AID TWR THEN CONTACTED US ON THE START OF CLBOUT FROM MIE THAT MIE TWR HAD US IN THEIR AREA. WE THEN CONTACTED ZID AND REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS TO AID. ENRTE TO AID THE CAPT CONTACTED MIE TWR TO INQUIRE FOR SAFETY REASONS AND WAS TOLD THAT EVERYTHING WAS OK. WE CONTINUED AND MADE A NORMAL LNDG AT AID. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT. THIS CREW WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH EITHER ARPT AND VISIBILITY WAS LIMITING (ALTHOUGH VFR) WITH HAZE. THE PROX AND SIMILAR LAYOUT OF AID AND MIE FURTHER ADDED TO CONFUSION. THE FINAL VECTOR GIVEN BY ZID APPEARED TO LINE US UP WITH RAMP 30. CLRNC TO LAND BY AID TWR UPON INITIAL CONTACT ALSO WAS IMPORTANT. AREAS SUCH AS THESE SHOULD BE DOUBLE VERIFIED BY APCH CTL (CTR) AND PLTS IN HAZE CONDITIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 274696: THE FO AND I DECIDED THE NAVIGATIONAL AND VISUAL CUES DID NOT MATCH THAT OF AID. AID TWR HAD CLRED US TO LAND RWY 30 JUST BEFORE WE ABANDONED THE APCH. WE ASSUMED AID TWR HAD US IN SIGHT WHEN WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. CONTINUED ACCEPTANCE OF THE VISUAL AFTER VECTORS FOR TFC WAS MY ERROR. SHOULD HAVE CONFIRMED THE ARPT LOCATION WITH ZID.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.