Narrative:

We were north of san juan, pr, off the coast, talking to approach, on a 180 degree heading vector, descending to 3000 ft for the lagoon visual approach to runway 8. My first time into san juan, the captain second (although I was basically familiar with the area, having flown into roosevelt roedo, pr, a number of times in navy C-98's). I was flying, the captain handling the radios. Descent and approach checklists had been completed. I had briefed the lagoon visual approach to land runway 7, set up the localizer/ILS, and tuned it to the frequency and inbound course of 109.7 and 101 degrees for runway 10, the correct frequency and course for the approach. My understanding was that we were on a vector to sequence behind traffic and turn inbound to the airport on the localizer for the approach. The captain understood the clearance just to maintain the 180 degree heading at 3000 ft for further vectors. I said I don't think that's what they want, but he was sure the heading was just for traffic. After flying through the localizer, heading 180 degrees at 3000 ft in clear VFR conditions and still hearing nothing from approach, I queried him again to check what they wanted us to do. He still thought we were on a heading for traffic. It was clear forever and I wasn't concerned about our safety, but we were heading towards rising terrain and I would have to climb soon. As we proceeded south towards the middle of the island, I had to tell the captain again, 'this isn't right, we're going the wrong way, check what the man now or I'm climbing out of here.' frequency was busy, he was taking too long, not being assertive, so I initiated the call myself. 'San juan this is XXXX at 3000 ft heading 180 degrees, is this where you want us?' their reply, 'where are you?' I said 'in the middle of the island.' they said climb immediately to 5000 ft, which I was in the process of already starting to do knowing already the MSA was 5100 ft and the terrain was rising up towards us. The captain then started getting more interested in talking, discovered he'd also somehow switched the frequency selector back to center frequency and we couldn't hear anything from approach because he'd switched off frequency inadvertently. We switched back to approach, turned right, re-intercepted to localizer and made an uneventful landing. P.south. I also discovered, after turning back around, that without telling me, the captain had changed my 109.7 frequency to 110.3 for runway 7. I asked why'd you do that? He thought 110.3 was correct because we were landing on runway 7 and was correcting what he thought was a wrong frequency. I had to point out to him that you fly inbound of the runway 10 localizer to land VFR of runway 8. Summary: my concern is the situational awareness of the situation, and flying towards rising terrain without question. All problems could have been alleviated by simply picking up the microphone and asking 'is this what you really want us to do?'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A NEAR CFIT-CFTT INCIDENT. MSA.

Narrative: WE WERE N OF SAN JUAN, PR, OFF THE COAST, TALKING TO APCH, ON A 180 DEG HDG VECTOR, DSNDING TO 3000 FT FOR THE LAGOON VISUAL APCH TO RWY 8. MY FIRST TIME INTO SAN JUAN, THE CAPT SECOND (ALTHOUGH I WAS BASICALLY FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA, HAVING FLOWN INTO ROOSEVELT ROEDO, PR, A NUMBER OF TIMES IN NAVY C-98'S). I WAS FLYING, THE CAPT HANDLING THE RADIOS. DSCNT AND APCH CHKLISTS HAD BEEN COMPLETED. I HAD BRIEFED THE LAGOON VISUAL APCH TO LAND RWY 7, SET UP THE LOC/ILS, AND TUNED IT TO THE FREQ AND INBOUND COURSE OF 109.7 AND 101 DEGS FOR RWY 10, THE CORRECT FREQ AND COURSE FOR THE APCH. MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT WE WERE ON A VECTOR TO SEQUENCE BEHIND TFC AND TURN INBOUND TO THE ARPT ON THE LOC FOR THE APCH. THE CAPT UNDERSTOOD THE CLRNC JUST TO MAINTAIN THE 180 DEG HDG AT 3000 FT FOR FURTHER VECTORS. I SAID I DON'T THINK THAT'S WHAT THEY WANT, BUT HE WAS SURE THE HDG WAS JUST FOR TFC. AFTER FLYING THROUGH THE LOC, HDG 180 DEGS AT 3000 FT IN CLR VFR CONDITIONS AND STILL HEARING NOTHING FROM APCH, I QUERIED HIM AGAIN TO CHK WHAT THEY WANTED US TO DO. HE STILL THOUGHT WE WERE ON A HDG FOR TFC. IT WAS CLR FOREVER AND I WASN'T CONCERNED ABOUT OUR SAFETY, BUT WE WERE HDG TOWARDS RISING TERRAIN AND I WOULD HAVE TO CLB SOON. AS WE PROCEEDED S TOWARDS THE MIDDLE OF THE ISLAND, I HAD TO TELL THE CAPT AGAIN, 'THIS ISN'T RIGHT, WE'RE GOING THE WRONG WAY, CHK WHAT THE MAN NOW OR I'M CLBING OUT OF HERE.' FREQ WAS BUSY, HE WAS TAKING TOO LONG, NOT BEING ASSERTIVE, SO I INITIATED THE CALL MYSELF. 'SAN JUAN THIS IS XXXX AT 3000 FT HDG 180 DEGS, IS THIS WHERE YOU WANT US?' THEIR REPLY, 'WHERE ARE YOU?' I SAID 'IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ISLAND.' THEY SAID CLB IMMEDIATELY TO 5000 FT, WHICH I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF ALREADY STARTING TO DO KNOWING ALREADY THE MSA WAS 5100 FT AND THE TERRAIN WAS RISING UP TOWARDS US. THE CAPT THEN STARTED GETTING MORE INTERESTED IN TALKING, DISCOVERED HE'D ALSO SOMEHOW SWITCHED THE FREQ SELECTOR BACK TO CTR FREQ AND WE COULDN'T HEAR ANYTHING FROM APCH BECAUSE HE'D SWITCHED OFF FREQ INADVERTENTLY. WE SWITCHED BACK TO APCH, TURNED R, RE-INTERCEPTED TO LOC AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. P.S. I ALSO DISCOVERED, AFTER TURNING BACK AROUND, THAT WITHOUT TELLING ME, THE CAPT HAD CHANGED MY 109.7 FREQ TO 110.3 FOR RWY 7. I ASKED WHY'D YOU DO THAT? HE THOUGHT 110.3 WAS CORRECT BECAUSE WE WERE LNDG ON RWY 7 AND WAS CORRECTING WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS A WRONG FREQ. I HAD TO POINT OUT TO HIM THAT YOU FLY INBOUND OF THE RWY 10 LOC TO LAND VFR OF RWY 8. SUMMARY: MY CONCERN IS THE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF THE SIT, AND FLYING TOWARDS RISING TERRAIN WITHOUT QUESTION. ALL PROBS COULD HAVE BEEN ALLEVIATED BY SIMPLY PICKING UP THE MICROPHONE AND ASKING 'IS THIS WHAT YOU REALLY WANT US TO DO?'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.