Narrative:

I was the first officer on this flight. Our day started at providence, ri, as flight departing at a:15, as our weight and balance radio closeout was completed by myself with providence operations, the captain took over the radio communications with providence operations, and stated we would be returning to providence later that same afternoon, and he requested that the agent coordination the ground crew, so that our later flight would depart the gate 10 mins early. His reason was that he wanted to taxi out early, so he could catch a flight home to albany, after we ended our day at kennedy airport, which he explained on company frequency to the agent. The agent responded that our flight could not taxi out 10 mins early, that it was against company policy, due to possible late passenger gate chkins. The captain responded by saying he would taxi out 5 mins early, and would return to the gate in the event of a late chkin. The gate agent inside agreed. Upon arrival at providence the second time, all 3 crew members, including myself went inside the terminal to use the restroom. The captain expressed in an anxious voice to both myself and the flight attendant, 'let's go.' normally this particular captain is not in a hurry, but he was this day, and spoke all day about how he would get home, and how his flight to albany looked full, and did not know if he was going to make it onboard. After engine start, the checklists were completed, and as a normal procedure, the first officer handles all ground communications. We left the gate. I called ground and received a taxi clearance to runway 16. As the captain taxied out, I verbally briefed the captain that I would be off frequency to advise the flight attendant that we were #1 for departure, and she should be seated. The captain acknowledged my statement, and I left ground control to him. As I returned to the frequency, I verbally stated I was back on frequency, he acknowledged, and he had switched to tower frequency on his own while I was briefing the flight attendant. When I had returned from briefing the cabin, the captain had already crossed the hold short line, and was calling for the before takeoff checklist. I assumed he had received his clearance, and executed his command with the appropriate checklist. Several seconds later, providence tower called us and told us he never gave us a clearance to taxi onto the runway, and the controller expressed confusion in his voice, but then cleared us for takeoff. At this point, the captain replied that I was off frequency, and did not hear the communications. The captain was the PF, and after lift-off we were handed off to departure control. The captain took over the radio again, and replied that he was sorry for any confusion, called departure and requested a shortcut to expedite our flight. Our flight was scheduled into jfk at XA30, his flight to albany was scheduled to departure jfk at XB29, so he was obviously pressed with time, the captain was unusually quiet the entire flight back to jfk, and never discussed his mistake. When we arrived back at jfk, I called providence tower and spoke to the supervisor on duty, and he happened to be the ground tower controller that handled our flight. He explained to me that the captain never called the tower, just taxied out onto the runway, and the controller had a brasilia on a 2 mi final at the time, which leads me to believe the captain did not clear the final approach area before entering an active runway, and did not wait for my response of clear right. I have flown with this captain for 4 days, and we always clear left/right verbally before entering a closed/open runway, but this did not occur this day, since I was on the PA system, but I visually looked outside the right side, and a cherokee was just rolling out on the runway after landing. The following morning, the captain spoke to me, and said he thought the ATC cleared him onto the runway, but maybe he did not, and told me that he had get-homeitis, and admitted he could have been at error. The lesson I learned as a first officer, is that if I don't hear a clearance relating to the runway, I will apply the brakes myself and stop the aircraft, and request the tower to read back the clearance. The captain was not using the crew concept, and disobeyed sops in switching frequencys when it was obvious that I was not ready for departure, and not on frequency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER ACFT ENTERS RWY WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO ON THIS FLT. OUR DAY STARTED AT PROVIDENCE, RI, AS FLT DEPARTING AT A:15, AS OUR WT AND BAL RADIO CLOSEOUT WAS COMPLETED BY MYSELF WITH PROVIDENCE OPS, THE CAPT TOOK OVER THE RADIO COMS WITH PROVIDENCE OPS, AND STATED WE WOULD BE RETURNING TO PROVIDENCE LATER THAT SAME AFTERNOON, AND HE REQUESTED THAT THE AGENT COORD THE GND CREW, SO THAT OUR LATER FLT WOULD DEPART THE GATE 10 MINS EARLY. HIS REASON WAS THAT HE WANTED TO TAXI OUT EARLY, SO HE COULD CATCH A FLT HOME TO ALBANY, AFTER WE ENDED OUR DAY AT KENNEDY ARPT, WHICH HE EXPLAINED ON COMPANY FREQ TO THE AGENT. THE AGENT RESPONDED THAT OUR FLT COULD NOT TAXI OUT 10 MINS EARLY, THAT IT WAS AGAINST COMPANY POLICY, DUE TO POSSIBLE LATE PAX GATE CHKINS. THE CAPT RESPONDED BY SAYING HE WOULD TAXI OUT 5 MINS EARLY, AND WOULD RETURN TO THE GATE IN THE EVENT OF A LATE CHKIN. THE GATE AGENT INSIDE AGREED. UPON ARR AT PROVIDENCE THE SECOND TIME, ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS, INCLUDING MYSELF WENT INSIDE THE TERMINAL TO USE THE RESTROOM. THE CAPT EXPRESSED IN AN ANXIOUS VOICE TO BOTH MYSELF AND THE FLT ATTENDANT, 'LET'S GO.' NORMALLY THIS PARTICULAR CAPT IS NOT IN A HURRY, BUT HE WAS THIS DAY, AND SPOKE ALL DAY ABOUT HOW HE WOULD GET HOME, AND HOW HIS FLT TO ALBANY LOOKED FULL, AND DID NOT KNOW IF HE WAS GOING TO MAKE IT ONBOARD. AFTER ENG START, THE CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED, AND AS A NORMAL PROC, THE FO HANDLES ALL GND COMS. WE LEFT THE GATE. I CALLED GND AND RECEIVED A TAXI CLRNC TO RWY 16. AS THE CAPT TAXIED OUT, I VERBALLY BRIEFED THE CAPT THAT I WOULD BE OFF FREQ TO ADVISE THE FLT ATTENDANT THAT WE WERE #1 FOR DEP, AND SHE SHOULD BE SEATED. THE CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED MY STATEMENT, AND I LEFT GND CTL TO HIM. AS I RETURNED TO THE FREQ, I VERBALLY STATED I WAS BACK ON FREQ, HE ACKNOWLEDGED, AND HE HAD SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ ON HIS OWN WHILE I WAS BRIEFING THE FLT ATTENDANT. WHEN I HAD RETURNED FROM BRIEFING THE CABIN, THE CAPT HAD ALREADY CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE, AND WAS CALLING FOR THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. I ASSUMED HE HAD RECEIVED HIS CLRNC, AND EXECUTED HIS COMMAND WITH THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST. SEVERAL SECONDS LATER, PROVIDENCE TWR CALLED US AND TOLD US HE NEVER GAVE US A CLRNC TO TAXI ONTO THE RWY, AND THE CTLR EXPRESSED CONFUSION IN HIS VOICE, BUT THEN CLRED US FOR TKOF. AT THIS POINT, THE CAPT REPLIED THAT I WAS OFF FREQ, AND DID NOT HEAR THE COMS. THE CAPT WAS THE PF, AND AFTER LIFT-OFF WE WERE HANDED OFF TO DEP CTL. THE CAPT TOOK OVER THE RADIO AGAIN, AND REPLIED THAT HE WAS SORRY FOR ANY CONFUSION, CALLED DEP AND REQUESTED A SHORTCUT TO EXPEDITE OUR FLT. OUR FLT WAS SCHEDULED INTO JFK AT XA30, HIS FLT TO ALBANY WAS SCHEDULED TO DEP JFK AT XB29, SO HE WAS OBVIOUSLY PRESSED WITH TIME, THE CAPT WAS UNUSUALLY QUIET THE ENTIRE FLT BACK TO JFK, AND NEVER DISCUSSED HIS MISTAKE. WHEN WE ARRIVED BACK AT JFK, I CALLED PROVIDENCE TWR AND SPOKE TO THE SUPVR ON DUTY, AND HE HAPPENED TO BE THE GND TWR CTLR THAT HANDLED OUR FLT. HE EXPLAINED TO ME THAT THE CAPT NEVER CALLED THE TWR, JUST TAXIED OUT ONTO THE RWY, AND THE CTLR HAD A BRASILIA ON A 2 MI FINAL AT THE TIME, WHICH LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THE CAPT DID NOT CLR THE FINAL APCH AREA BEFORE ENTERING AN ACTIVE RWY, AND DID NOT WAIT FOR MY RESPONSE OF CLR R. I HAVE FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT FOR 4 DAYS, AND WE ALWAYS CLR L/R VERBALLY BEFORE ENTERING A CLOSED/OPEN RWY, BUT THIS DID NOT OCCUR THIS DAY, SINCE I WAS ON THE PA SYS, BUT I VISUALLY LOOKED OUTSIDE THE R SIDE, AND A CHEROKEE WAS JUST ROLLING OUT ON THE RWY AFTER LNDG. THE FOLLOWING MORNING, THE CAPT SPOKE TO ME, AND SAID HE THOUGHT THE ATC CLRED HIM ONTO THE RWY, BUT MAYBE HE DID NOT, AND TOLD ME THAT HE HAD GET-HOMEITIS, AND ADMITTED HE COULD HAVE BEEN AT ERROR. THE LESSON I LEARNED AS A FO, IS THAT IF I DON'T HEAR A CLRNC RELATING TO THE RWY, I WILL APPLY THE BRAKES MYSELF AND STOP THE ACFT, AND REQUEST THE TWR TO READ BACK THE CLRNC. THE CAPT WAS NOT USING THE CREW CONCEPT, AND DISOBEYED SOPS IN SWITCHING FREQS WHEN IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT I WAS NOT READY FOR DEP, AND NOT ON FREQ.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.