Narrative:

On several unsuccessful attempts to execute a simulated engine-out procedure, the owner pilot of the aircraft in the left seat would have landed far short of the runway and was not following the checklist properly. Finally, after a rather hard landing in which we were at cross purposes in controling the aircraft, I suggested that I demonstrate the procedure while he read off the checklist items. Throughout the approach I was having to ask repeatedly, 'what should we be doing next?,' emphasizing the need to respond more quickly in an emergency situation like this. Instead of getting through the checklist, the owner was too engrossed in looking at the airspeed indicator and watching to see that we were going to reach the runway. He kept calling out that we were still at best glide. As we crossed the threshold, he put down the checklist and said 'you did it.' we had not reached the checklist item to put the landing gear down and heard metal scraping before we realized it. On a previous landing, while I was demonstrating a soft-field landing, the right seat had suddenly slipped back (a problem which had also occurred during the runup at dulles). At the last moment during this gear-up landing, I was preoccupied with the thought of being ready in case the seat slipped, which pushed out of mind thoughts of the landing gear. The green gear lights are not visible from the right seat without leaning into the left seat. Whenever the owner was landing, I routinely leaned over to check the lights and call out 3 green. On this occasion, while intent on making the runway and the techniques of the procedure, I was 'maxed out' and failed to double check.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA LANDS GEAR UP.

Narrative: ON SEVERAL UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO EXECUTE A SIMULATED ENG-OUT PROC, THE OWNER PLT OF THE ACFT IN THE L SEAT WOULD HAVE LANDED FAR SHORT OF THE RWY AND WAS NOT FOLLOWING THE CHKLIST PROPERLY. FINALLY, AFTER A RATHER HARD LNDG IN WHICH WE WERE AT CROSS PURPOSES IN CTLING THE ACFT, I SUGGESTED THAT I DEMONSTRATE THE PROC WHILE HE READ OFF THE CHKLIST ITEMS. THROUGHOUT THE APCH I WAS HAVING TO ASK REPEATEDLY, 'WHAT SHOULD WE BE DOING NEXT?,' EMPHASIZING THE NEED TO RESPOND MORE QUICKLY IN AN EMER SIT LIKE THIS. INSTEAD OF GETTING THROUGH THE CHKLIST, THE OWNER WAS TOO ENGROSSED IN LOOKING AT THE AIRSPD INDICATOR AND WATCHING TO SEE THAT WE WERE GOING TO REACH THE RWY. HE KEPT CALLING OUT THAT WE WERE STILL AT BEST GLIDE. AS WE CROSSED THE THRESHOLD, HE PUT DOWN THE CHKLIST AND SAID 'YOU DID IT.' WE HAD NOT REACHED THE CHKLIST ITEM TO PUT THE LNDG GEAR DOWN AND HEARD METAL SCRAPING BEFORE WE REALIZED IT. ON A PREVIOUS LNDG, WHILE I WAS DEMONSTRATING A SOFT-FIELD LNDG, THE R SEAT HAD SUDDENLY SLIPPED BACK (A PROB WHICH HAD ALSO OCCURRED DURING THE RUNUP AT DULLES). AT THE LAST MOMENT DURING THIS GEAR-UP LNDG, I WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE THOUGHT OF BEING READY IN CASE THE SEAT SLIPPED, WHICH PUSHED OUT OF MIND THOUGHTS OF THE LNDG GEAR. THE GREEN GEAR LIGHTS ARE NOT VISIBLE FROM THE R SEAT WITHOUT LEANING INTO THE L SEAT. WHENEVER THE OWNER WAS LNDG, I ROUTINELY LEANED OVER TO CHK THE LIGHTS AND CALL OUT 3 GREEN. ON THIS OCCASION, WHILE INTENT ON MAKING THE RWY AND THE TECHNIQUES OF THE PROC, I WAS 'MAXED OUT' AND FAILED TO DOUBLE CHK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.