Narrative:

Event occurred after departure of flight from paducah, ky, to memphis, tn, on a saab fairchild 340 a model. On takeoff, when tried to retract the gear in a normal climb confign, it wouldn't fully retract. This was indicated by the gear in transit light illuminated and the hydraulic pump continuing to run. We recycled the gear, but problem persisted. We then extended the gear and only had the nose gear and right main gear locked down and safe lights illuminated. The left main gear light was not lit and the gear unsafe/in transit light remained on. We proceeded with the gear up and unsafe, and gear down and unsafe abnormal checklists, and the emergency landing checklists. The left main gear down and locked light remained out with the gear unsafe light on. We declared an emergency, asked for crash/fire/rescue, and decided to return to paducah as per our gear unsafe emergency checklist ('land at nearest suitable airport'). We did several passes by the tower for them to observe if the gear at least appeared down and aligned, or if anything appeared to be obstructing the extension of the gear. The tower observed nothing abnormal. We proceeded to hold to burn off excess fuel. The flight attendant and passenger were briefed on the situation. We landed without incident and taxied off the runway. We then evacuate/evacuationed the passenger over the right wing. We were still uncertain of the integrity of the left main. When maintenance examined the gear, they found the overctr brace was not fully locked down. I felt the entire crew performed exceptionally well. When troubleshooting, we contacted our director of operations by phone to inquire if we needed to shut down the engines and fire the fire bottles if the gear held (according to our checklists, this is part of the procedure). He said not to and also told us ok to proceed to paducah. Our chief pilot then contacted us and told us to return to memphis. We told him our director of operations had ok'ed us back to paducah. He later said he questioned our judgement. I feel there should be only 1 person in charge in a situation such as this, without getting conflicting orders. Also, we would have liked to proceed to memphis, as the maintenance facilities are better, the passenger would have preferred it, and by doing this, the safety of flight would not have been affected. However, the checklist said to return to nearest suitable airport. I also believe the checklist should have said only 'suitable airport' in a situation such as this so that the pilots can use their own discretion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ON CLBOUT, LTT HAS GEAR IN TRANSIT REMAIN ON AFTER GEAR RETRACTION. HYD PUMP CONTINUED TO RUN.

Narrative: EVENT OCCURRED AFTER DEP OF FLT FROM PADUCAH, KY, TO MEMPHIS, TN, ON A SAAB FAIRCHILD 340 A MODEL. ON TKOF, WHEN TRIED TO RETRACT THE GEAR IN A NORMAL CLB CONFIGN, IT WOULDN'T FULLY RETRACT. THIS WAS INDICATED BY THE GEAR IN TRANSIT LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND THE HYD PUMP CONTINUING TO RUN. WE RECYCLED THE GEAR, BUT PROB PERSISTED. WE THEN EXTENDED THE GEAR AND ONLY HAD THE NOSE GEAR AND R MAIN GEAR LOCKED DOWN AND SAFE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. THE L MAIN GEAR LIGHT WAS NOT LIT AND THE GEAR UNSAFE/IN TRANSIT LIGHT REMAINED ON. WE PROCEEDED WITH THE GEAR UP AND UNSAFE, AND GEAR DOWN AND UNSAFE ABNORMAL CHKLISTS, AND THE EMER LNDG CHKLISTS. THE L MAIN GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED LIGHT REMAINED OUT WITH THE GEAR UNSAFE LIGHT ON. WE DECLARED AN EMER, ASKED FOR CRASH/FIRE/RESCUE, AND DECIDED TO RETURN TO PADUCAH AS PER OUR GEAR UNSAFE EMER CHKLIST ('LAND AT NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT'). WE DID SEVERAL PASSES BY THE TWR FOR THEM TO OBSERVE IF THE GEAR AT LEAST APPEARED DOWN AND ALIGNED, OR IF ANYTHING APPEARED TO BE OBSTRUCTING THE EXTENSION OF THE GEAR. THE TWR OBSERVED NOTHING ABNORMAL. WE PROCEEDED TO HOLD TO BURN OFF EXCESS FUEL. THE FLT ATTENDANT AND PAX WERE BRIEFED ON THE SIT. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND TAXIED OFF THE RWY. WE THEN EVACED THE PAX OVER THE R WING. WE WERE STILL UNCERTAIN OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE L MAIN. WHEN MAINT EXAMINED THE GEAR, THEY FOUND THE OVERCTR BRACE WAS NOT FULLY LOCKED DOWN. I FELT THE ENTIRE CREW PERFORMED EXCEPTIONALLY WELL. WHEN TROUBLESHOOTING, WE CONTACTED OUR DIRECTOR OF OPS BY PHONE TO INQUIRE IF WE NEEDED TO SHUT DOWN THE ENGS AND FIRE THE FIRE BOTTLES IF THE GEAR HELD (ACCORDING TO OUR CHKLISTS, THIS IS PART OF THE PROC). HE SAID NOT TO AND ALSO TOLD US OK TO PROCEED TO PADUCAH. OUR CHIEF PLT THEN CONTACTED US AND TOLD US TO RETURN TO MEMPHIS. WE TOLD HIM OUR DIRECTOR OF OPS HAD OK'ED US BACK TO PADUCAH. HE LATER SAID HE QUESTIONED OUR JUDGEMENT. I FEEL THERE SHOULD BE ONLY 1 PERSON IN CHARGE IN A SIT SUCH AS THIS, WITHOUT GETTING CONFLICTING ORDERS. ALSO, WE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO PROCEED TO MEMPHIS, AS THE MAINT FACILITIES ARE BETTER, THE PAX WOULD HAVE PREFERRED IT, AND BY DOING THIS, THE SAFETY OF FLT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AFFECTED. HOWEVER, THE CHKLIST SAID TO RETURN TO NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. I ALSO BELIEVE THE CHKLIST SHOULD HAVE SAID ONLY 'SUITABLE ARPT' IN A SIT SUCH AS THIS SO THAT THE PLTS CAN USE THEIR OWN DISCRETION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.