Narrative:

Over jfk, at FL330 captain stated he noticed 0 oil pressure on #2 engine. ATC was contacted and emergency declared. Flight diverted to lga. Once on ground in lga, captain called me and stated he was never on single engine. I was later informed by company maintenance manager that the aircraft had landed in lga with only 700 pounds of fuel. It was discovered that the aircraft never received fuel in dca, and had actually departed with its original arrival fuel, which was 6400 pounds. Cockpit crew had failed to properly perform checklist or lack of minimum fuel as outlined on dispatch release would have been noticed. Supplemental information from acn 264150: we landed at lga, the closest, most feasible airport. Because of an unusual radio communication distraction during a high workload period, there was an unintentional oversight of the checklist item. There are no other backup procedures for fuel awareness. To prevent the recurrence, I would like to have the previous procedure return which includes 4 checks of fuel awareness before the aircraft is airborne. The checks included: 1) the fuel slip to the cockpit, 2) 2 places on the checklist, before start and before takeoff, 3) the gate agent confirm the fuel load before gate departure. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporting first officer had come home from a hearing in ny just last night where an FAA judge revoked her licenses for 1 yr, as well as the captain's. The captain was charged with 22 counts under emergency procedures, the first officer with 19. The subject of ASRS immunity was brought up at the hearing, but does not apply, according to the FAA judge, because of the deliberate lie about the oil pressure problem. The first officer's union attorney is filing an appeal. The first officer believes that her air carrier will reinstate the crew after the suspension. The air carrier has already changed its refueling procedures so that the crew will enter fuel on board into the ACARS during cockpit preflight rather than fuel listed on the dispatch. This will give one more set of eyes to look at the fuel situation before the aircraft takes off. The captain put the fuel problem into the logbook which made the cover-up very easy to spot.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B-737 FAILED TO GET FUELED BEFORE FLT.

Narrative: OVER JFK, AT FL330 CAPT STATED HE NOTICED 0 OIL PRESSURE ON #2 ENG. ATC WAS CONTACTED AND EMER DECLARED. FLT DIVERTED TO LGA. ONCE ON GND IN LGA, CAPT CALLED ME AND STATED HE WAS NEVER ON SINGLE ENG. I WAS LATER INFORMED BY COMPANY MAINT MGR THAT THE ACFT HAD LANDED IN LGA WITH ONLY 700 LBS OF FUEL. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE ACFT NEVER RECEIVED FUEL IN DCA, AND HAD ACTUALLY DEPARTED WITH ITS ORIGINAL ARR FUEL, WHICH WAS 6400 LBS. COCKPIT CREW HAD FAILED TO PROPERLY PERFORM CHKLIST OR LACK OF MINIMUM FUEL AS OUTLINED ON DISPATCH RELEASE WOULD HAVE BEEN NOTICED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 264150: WE LANDED AT LGA, THE CLOSEST, MOST FEASIBLE ARPT. BECAUSE OF AN UNUSUAL RADIO COM DISTR DURING A HIGH WORKLOAD PERIOD, THERE WAS AN UNINTENTIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE CHKLIST ITEM. THERE ARE NO OTHER BACKUP PROCS FOR FUEL AWARENESS. TO PREVENT THE RECURRENCE, I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE PREVIOUS PROC RETURN WHICH INCLUDES 4 CHKS OF FUEL AWARENESS BEFORE THE ACFT IS AIRBORNE. THE CHKS INCLUDED: 1) THE FUEL SLIP TO THE COCKPIT, 2) 2 PLACES ON THE CHKLIST, BEFORE START AND BEFORE TKOF, 3) THE GATE AGENT CONFIRM THE FUEL LOAD BEFORE GATE DEP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTING FO HAD COME HOME FROM A HEARING IN NY JUST LAST NIGHT WHERE AN FAA JUDGE REVOKED HER LICENSES FOR 1 YR, AS WELL AS THE CAPT'S. THE CAPT WAS CHARGED WITH 22 COUNTS UNDER EMER PROCS, THE FO WITH 19. THE SUBJECT OF ASRS IMMUNITY WAS BROUGHT UP AT THE HEARING, BUT DOES NOT APPLY, ACCORDING TO THE FAA JUDGE, BECAUSE OF THE DELIBERATE LIE ABOUT THE OIL PRESSURE PROB. THE FO'S UNION ATTORNEY IS FILING AN APPEAL. THE FO BELIEVES THAT HER ACR WILL REINSTATE THE CREW AFTER THE SUSPENSION. THE ACR HAS ALREADY CHANGED ITS REFUELING PROCS SO THAT THE CREW WILL ENTER FUEL ON BOARD INTO THE ACARS DURING COCKPIT PREFLT RATHER THAN FUEL LISTED ON THE DISPATCH. THIS WILL GIVE ONE MORE SET OF EYES TO LOOK AT THE FUEL SIT BEFORE THE ACFT TAKES OFF. THE CAPT PUT THE FUEL PROB INTO THE LOGBOOK WHICH MADE THE COVER-UP VERY EASY TO SPOT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.