Narrative:

I was the final controller for a T37 to runway 18 at sjt. The radar approach control has only been open since nov/wed/93. This is one of a few remote operations in the southwest region, and we work the approach from midland (maf). The T37 had been sequenced fairly tight behind a VFR arrival and I was concerned that it would not clear the runway when I was given an 'option' clearance by sjt tower. The T37 had called the airport in sight and questioned the runway clearance at short final. I responded that all I knew was tower had said it would work and restated the clearance for the option. The pilot then advised going around left side, aircraft on the runway. The T37 was departing IFR with climb out runway heading to 12000 ft. I advised the departure controller the T37 on the go and gave the frequency back to him. I next observed an E110 air taxi tag off the departure end of the airport right along with the T37. The E110 assigned runway heading to 9000 ft. I advised the supervisor in charge we had lost standard separation and reported an operational error. The supervisor was working the maf radar position and asked if anybody had squawked. My shift ended and I left with no investigation or notification per FAA orders being completed. The next day, jan/sat/94, I advised my immediate supervisor of the events, and that I believed the supervisor from the night before was not going to report the error. This appears to be a simple error by the tower controller who should have sent the T37 around and advised departure to turn the airplane. However, the tower controller had never seen an ASR approach or even talked about it in training. The controllers at both facilities feel the opening was rushed due to the political fighting over the site of the TRACON. A similar incident could be alleviated with additional training at both facilities.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MTR ON A GAR AT SATELLITE ARPT HAS AN ACR DEPART FROM ARPT AND TARGETS WERE IN CLOSE PROX.

Narrative: I WAS THE FINAL CTLR FOR A T37 TO RWY 18 AT SJT. THE RADAR APCH CTL HAS ONLY BEEN OPEN SINCE NOV/WED/93. THIS IS ONE OF A FEW REMOTE OPS IN THE SW REGION, AND WE WORK THE APCH FROM MIDLAND (MAF). THE T37 HAD BEEN SEQUENCED FAIRLY TIGHT BEHIND A VFR ARR AND I WAS CONCERNED THAT IT WOULD NOT CLR THE RWY WHEN I WAS GIVEN AN 'OPTION' CLRNC BY SJT TWR. THE T37 HAD CALLED THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND QUESTIONED THE RWY CLRNC AT SHORT FINAL. I RESPONDED THAT ALL I KNEW WAS TWR HAD SAID IT WOULD WORK AND RESTATED THE CLRNC FOR THE OPTION. THE PLT THEN ADVISED GOING AROUND L SIDE, ACFT ON THE RWY. THE T37 WAS DEPARTING IFR WITH CLBOUT RWY HDG TO 12000 FT. I ADVISED THE DEP CTLR THE T37 ON THE GO AND GAVE THE FREQ BACK TO HIM. I NEXT OBSERVED AN E110 AIR TAXI TAG OFF THE DEP END OF THE ARPT RIGHT ALONG WITH THE T37. THE E110 ASSIGNED RWY HDG TO 9000 FT. I ADVISED THE SUPVR IN CHARGE WE HAD LOST STANDARD SEPARATION AND RPTED AN OPERROR. THE SUPVR WAS WORKING THE MAF RADAR POS AND ASKED IF ANYBODY HAD SQUAWKED. MY SHIFT ENDED AND I LEFT WITH NO INVESTIGATION OR NOTIFICATION PER FAA ORDERS BEING COMPLETED. THE NEXT DAY, JAN/SAT/94, I ADVISED MY IMMEDIATE SUPVR OF THE EVENTS, AND THAT I BELIEVED THE SUPVR FROM THE NIGHT BEFORE WAS NOT GOING TO RPT THE ERROR. THIS APPEARS TO BE A SIMPLE ERROR BY THE TWR CTLR WHO SHOULD HAVE SENT THE T37 AROUND AND ADVISED DEP TO TURN THE AIRPLANE. HOWEVER, THE TWR CTLR HAD NEVER SEEN AN ASR APCH OR EVEN TALKED ABOUT IT IN TRAINING. THE CTLRS AT BOTH FACILITIES FEEL THE OPENING WAS RUSHED DUE TO THE POLITICAL FIGHTING OVER THE SITE OF THE TRACON. A SIMILAR INCIDENT COULD BE ALLEVIATED WITH ADDITIONAL TRAINING AT BOTH FACILITIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.