Narrative:

This is a report of 3 incidents within a 10 min period. I was not assigned to radar position, however, I was assigned to sequencer/supervisor position combined. The occurrence was on nov/xx/93. I was not aware of this situation until dec/xx/93 when it was brought to my attention. Kennedy airport was landing runway 13L via the ILS 13L. WX was IFR with winds reported at 3000 ft to be 200 degrees at 65 KTS. Incident #1: radar controller vectored air carrier Y behind air carrier X on the ILS 13L with less than standard separation. Closest proximity was 300 ft vertical and 1.36 mi lateral while on final. Incident #2: involved 3 aircraft. Radar controller vectored air carrier yy behind air carrier xx with less than standard separation. Closest proximity was 1.6 lateral mi at same altitude on final. Air carrier yy again behind (resequenced) air carrier zz on final. Closest proximity 100 ft vertical and 2.93 mi lateral separation. Incident #3: air carrier XXX on final and air carrier YYY on base leg for final. Closest proximity was 200 ft vertical and 2.41 mi lateral separation. Controller had approximately 11 aircraft on frequency at time of occurrences. I was assisting controller with taking handoffs and providing required coordination. Preliminary investigation states that I, the supervisor, allowed things to go too far allowing controller to be overloaded. I have been idented as primary factor for operrors and controller as contributory. These events were investigated because of an anonymous phone call made to FAA hotline 1 day after the incidents. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter stated he did not know about the 3 system errors until after the fact. No less than standard separation were reported on the day of the incident and were brought to light by the call to the FAA hotline. Reporter stated historical traffic on sunday mornings and facility break policy was the reason controllers were not available to staff position. Reporter has been on administrative duties since incident. Supplemental information from acn 258245: on the morning of nov/xx/93, I was staffing the jfk flight data position. All radar and associated handoff position were combined to rober. Mr. X. Was area supervisor in charge. I began to post an increasing number of flight progress strips in the strip bays for the rober position indicating a building traffic scenario. At a certain point I heard controller ask for a handoff man and another position to be opened. I asked supervisor if I could open camrn/final radar to help smooth out this flow of traffic and relieve some of the workload and split the traffic up. Supervisor denied my request stating 'everything is fine, controller has it under control.' at this time supervisor sat with controller and worked his handoff. I continued to post more flight progress strips and departure strips and observed a large volume of traffic in the area. Due to the WX and the fact that all radar position were combined, I again asked supervisor if he wanted me to open another position. He responded 'no.' I asked supervisor at least 3 times if I could open another position to relieve the excessive volume of traffic that he was allowing to build up, but he continually denied my request. After a period of time, supervisor finally asked me to open the final vector position. I got my headset and plugged in and advised rober controller to start handing off aircraft to me and put them on my frequency. I called jfk tower to advise them to look for my data tags on final, but I could barely hear them. At the same time the first aircraft checked onto my frequency and I had trouble hearing them also. I called out for someone to quickly get me a handset because I was starting to get more aircraft. Finally someone gave me a handset, but I don't know who. I adopted an out of control situation that was dangerous. This situation should have never gotten so far out of hand. If I was allowed to open a position sooner I have no doubt that the incidents we had would not have occurred. Supplemental information from acn 258105: on the morning of nov/xx/93 I observed what appeared to be several operrors on final for jfk ILS 13L approach. The sector was overloaded with traffic due to the unwillingness of a supervisor to decombine several approach position. A final vector position was opened much too late to salvage the operation and an incident resulted.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FACILITY BREAK POLICY COMBINED POS OF OP LED TO 3 INCIDENTS OF ACR LTSS. MULTIPLE SYS ERRORS.

Narrative: THIS IS A RPT OF 3 INCIDENTS WITHIN A 10 MIN PERIOD. I WAS NOT ASSIGNED TO RADAR POS, HOWEVER, I WAS ASSIGNED TO SEQUENCER/SUPVR POS COMBINED. THE OCCURRENCE WAS ON NOV/XX/93. I WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS SIT UNTIL DEC/XX/93 WHEN IT WAS BROUGHT TO MY ATTN. KENNEDY ARPT WAS LNDG RWY 13L VIA THE ILS 13L. WX WAS IFR WITH WINDS RPTED AT 3000 FT TO BE 200 DEGS AT 65 KTS. INCIDENT #1: RADAR CTLR VECTORED ACR Y BEHIND ACR X ON THE ILS 13L WITH LTSS. CLOSEST PROX WAS 300 FT VERT AND 1.36 MI LATERAL WHILE ON FINAL. INCIDENT #2: INVOLVED 3 ACFT. RADAR CTLR VECTORED ACR YY BEHIND ACR XX WITH LTSS. CLOSEST PROX WAS 1.6 LATERAL MI AT SAME ALT ON FINAL. ACR YY AGAIN BEHIND (RESEQUENCED) ACR ZZ ON FINAL. CLOSEST PROX 100 FT VERT AND 2.93 MI LATERAL SEPARATION. INCIDENT #3: ACR XXX ON FINAL AND ACR YYY ON BASE LEG FOR FINAL. CLOSEST PROX WAS 200 FT VERT AND 2.41 MI LATERAL SEPARATION. CTLR HAD APPROX 11 ACFT ON FREQ AT TIME OF OCCURRENCES. I WAS ASSISTING CTLR WITH TAKING HDOFS AND PROVIDING REQUIRED COORD. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION STATES THAT I, THE SUPVR, ALLOWED THINGS TO GO TOO FAR ALLOWING CTLR TO BE OVERLOADED. I HAVE BEEN IDENTED AS PRIMARY FACTOR FOR OPERRORS AND CTLR AS CONTRIBUTORY. THESE EVENTS WERE INVESTIGATED BECAUSE OF AN ANONYMOUS PHONE CALL MADE TO FAA HOTLINE 1 DAY AFTER THE INCIDENTS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR STATED HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE 3 SYS ERRORS UNTIL AFTER THE FACT. NO LTSS WERE RPTED ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT AND WERE BROUGHT TO LIGHT BY THE CALL TO THE FAA HOTLINE. RPTR STATED HISTORICAL TFC ON SUNDAY MORNINGS AND FACILITY BREAK POLICY WAS THE REASON CTLRS WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO STAFF POS. RPTR HAS BEEN ON ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES SINCE INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 258245: ON THE MORNING OF NOV/XX/93, I WAS STAFFING THE JFK FLT DATA POS. ALL RADAR AND ASSOCIATED HDOF POS WERE COMBINED TO ROBER. MR. X. WAS AREA SUPVR IN CHARGE. I BEGAN TO POST AN INCREASING NUMBER OF FLT PROGRESS STRIPS IN THE STRIP BAYS FOR THE ROBER POS INDICATING A BUILDING TFC SCENARIO. AT A CERTAIN POINT I HEARD CTLR ASK FOR A HDOF MAN AND ANOTHER POS TO BE OPENED. I ASKED SUPVR IF I COULD OPEN CAMRN/FINAL RADAR TO HELP SMOOTH OUT THIS FLOW OF TFC AND RELIEVE SOME OF THE WORKLOAD AND SPLIT THE TFC UP. SUPVR DENIED MY REQUEST STATING 'EVERYTHING IS FINE, CTLR HAS IT UNDER CTL.' AT THIS TIME SUPVR SAT WITH CTLR AND WORKED HIS HDOF. I CONTINUED TO POST MORE FLT PROGRESS STRIPS AND DEP STRIPS AND OBSERVED A LARGE VOLUME OF TFC IN THE AREA. DUE TO THE WX AND THE FACT THAT ALL RADAR POS WERE COMBINED, I AGAIN ASKED SUPVR IF HE WANTED ME TO OPEN ANOTHER POS. HE RESPONDED 'NO.' I ASKED SUPVR AT LEAST 3 TIMES IF I COULD OPEN ANOTHER POS TO RELIEVE THE EXCESSIVE VOLUME OF TFC THAT HE WAS ALLOWING TO BUILD UP, BUT HE CONTINUALLY DENIED MY REQUEST. AFTER A PERIOD OF TIME, SUPVR FINALLY ASKED ME TO OPEN THE FINAL VECTOR POS. I GOT MY HEADSET AND PLUGGED IN AND ADVISED ROBER CTLR TO START HANDING OFF ACFT TO ME AND PUT THEM ON MY FREQ. I CALLED JFK TWR TO ADVISE THEM TO LOOK FOR MY DATA TAGS ON FINAL, BUT I COULD BARELY HEAR THEM. AT THE SAME TIME THE FIRST ACFT CHKED ONTO MY FREQ AND I HAD TROUBLE HEARING THEM ALSO. I CALLED OUT FOR SOMEONE TO QUICKLY GET ME A HANDSET BECAUSE I WAS STARTING TO GET MORE ACFT. FINALLY SOMEONE GAVE ME A HANDSET, BUT I DON'T KNOW WHO. I ADOPTED AN OUT OF CTL SIT THAT WAS DANGEROUS. THIS SIT SHOULD HAVE NEVER GOTTEN SO FAR OUT OF HAND. IF I WAS ALLOWED TO OPEN A POS SOONER I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE INCIDENTS WE HAD WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 258105: ON THE MORNING OF NOV/XX/93 I OBSERVED WHAT APPEARED TO BE SEVERAL OPERRORS ON FINAL FOR JFK ILS 13L APCH. THE SECTOR WAS OVERLOADED WITH TFC DUE TO THE UNWILLINGNESS OF A SUPVR TO DECOMBINE SEVERAL APCH POS. A FINAL VECTOR POS WAS OPENED MUCH TOO LATE TO SALVAGE THE OP AND AN INCIDENT RESULTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.