Narrative:

After engine start and salute, we were cleared from milan ground control to runway 17L. As we maneuvered through the ramp area, ground control issued our clearance. Our request for a different SID was denied so we loaded the 'banko 5 hotel' into the FMC as cleared. As we exited the ramp area, ground control cleared us to 'line up and takeoff' on runway 17L. We replied that we were not ready, and that the flight attendants had not completed the safety demonstration tape. Ground control advised that if we did not takeoff immediately on reaching the runway, we would be delayed 30 mins. Before taxi we had remained on the ramp for a number of mins after the doors were closed and with the passenger seated in order to load baggage, approximately 7 mins. With that added preparation time, I directed the relief pilot to call the chief purser and ask if they could be ready for an immediate takeoff. The relief pilot reported her reply that 'it would not be a problem.' with that information, I continued a slow taxi toward the runway while monitoring the audio channel of the demonstration tape. As it ended, I directed the relief pilot to announce: 'flight attendants prepare for an immediate takeoff.' we then lined up with the runway and commenced the takeoff roll. The first officer made a very smooth takeoff in calm air and clear skies. The climb out was smooth and uneventful. After leaving FL180, I made a courtesy call to the chief purser to thank her for the good work and verify all had gone well. It had not. Numerous flight attendants had been caught unaware in the aisles. Many did not get to their assigned seats. The immediacy of the situation had not found its way through the cabin. While there was much concern among the flight attendants, there did not appear to be any injuries. However, 1 flight attendant who ended up seated on her suitcase, had recently returned from an occupational back injury. She was a little concerned that she might have twinged it again. I spoke with her later in the flight and she said it was ok. She did work the entire flight as normal. In retrospect, there were a number of factors that contributed to this event. It would have helped if we had advised the purser that it might be a fairly short taxi. We had discussed it, but none of us had relayed this to the cabin crew. We were occupied with a maximum effort takeoff, at maximum gross weight, requiring a climb in a holding pattern to clear the alps. The milan control environment is very different. You do not get your airway clearance until you taxi, and when it is not what you had planned you must quickly reorganize. We were cleared for takeoff while still on the ramp by ground control, and there was a great deal of pressure from the controllers to make an immediate takeoff. Most critically, it was not a good idea to filter crucial information to the chief purser through a third party, the relief pilot. This was required because I was extremely busy on the radio. While I was exact in my directives to him, something was lost in the comprehension of the chief purser. As a result, the immediacy of the pending takeoff and the requirement to pass the word was not executed. When she replied that an immediate takeoff at the end of the safety demonstration tape would not be a problem, it convinced me the cabin was ready. It was on this basis that I commenced the takeoff. Also if importance, my relief pilot later admitted he did not use the emphatic term 'immediate' when he announced the takeoff over the PA. This was a crucial omission because it would have warned the entire cabin of what was happening. Finally, the experience of the crew, and particularly the chief purser, was limited. All were young and eager, but none had more than a yr or 2 of experience. As a result, the sixth sense of awareness that comes from experience was not there. While it would have been advantageous to use the delay at the ramp in preparing the cabin, this was put off until taxi. The depth of my concern and chagrin over this event was total and complete. A great deal of time was spent the remainder of the flight reviewing what had happened and trying to understand the breakdown in communication and comprehension. It was a very sobering experience.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB HAS RUSHED DEP AND MAKES TKOF WITH CABIN ATTENDANTS NOT SEATED.

Narrative: AFTER ENG START AND SALUTE, WE WERE CLRED FROM MILAN GND CTL TO RWY 17L. AS WE MANEUVERED THROUGH THE RAMP AREA, GND CTL ISSUED OUR CLRNC. OUR REQUEST FOR A DIFFERENT SID WAS DENIED SO WE LOADED THE 'BANKO 5 HOTEL' INTO THE FMC AS CLRED. AS WE EXITED THE RAMP AREA, GND CTL CLRED US TO 'LINE UP AND TKOF' ON RWY 17L. WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE NOT READY, AND THAT THE FLT ATTENDANTS HAD NOT COMPLETED THE SAFETY DEMO TAPE. GND CTL ADVISED THAT IF WE DID NOT TKOF IMMEDIATELY ON REACHING THE RWY, WE WOULD BE DELAYED 30 MINS. BEFORE TAXI WE HAD REMAINED ON THE RAMP FOR A NUMBER OF MINS AFTER THE DOORS WERE CLOSED AND WITH THE PAX SEATED IN ORDER TO LOAD BAGGAGE, APPROX 7 MINS. WITH THAT ADDED PREPARATION TIME, I DIRECTED THE RELIEF PLT TO CALL THE CHIEF PURSER AND ASK IF THEY COULD BE READY FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF. THE RELIEF PLT RPTED HER REPLY THAT 'IT WOULD NOT BE A PROB.' WITH THAT INFO, I CONTINUED A SLOW TAXI TOWARD THE RWY WHILE MONITORING THE AUDIO CHANNEL OF THE DEMO TAPE. AS IT ENDED, I DIRECTED THE RELIEF PLT TO ANNOUNCE: 'FLT ATTENDANTS PREPARE FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF.' WE THEN LINED UP WITH THE RWY AND COMMENCED THE TKOF ROLL. THE FO MADE A VERY SMOOTH TKOF IN CALM AIR AND CLR SKIES. THE CLBOUT WAS SMOOTH AND UNEVENTFUL. AFTER LEAVING FL180, I MADE A COURTESY CALL TO THE CHIEF PURSER TO THANK HER FOR THE GOOD WORK AND VERIFY ALL HAD GONE WELL. IT HAD NOT. NUMEROUS FLT ATTENDANTS HAD BEEN CAUGHT UNAWARE IN THE AISLES. MANY DID NOT GET TO THEIR ASSIGNED SEATS. THE IMMEDIACY OF THE SIT HAD NOT FOUND ITS WAY THROUGH THE CABIN. WHILE THERE WAS MUCH CONCERN AMONG THE FLT ATTENDANTS, THERE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY INJURIES. HOWEVER, 1 FLT ATTENDANT WHO ENDED UP SEATED ON HER SUITCASE, HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM AN OCCUPATIONAL BACK INJURY. SHE WAS A LITTLE CONCERNED THAT SHE MIGHT HAVE TWINGED IT AGAIN. I SPOKE WITH HER LATER IN THE FLT AND SHE SAID IT WAS OK. SHE DID WORK THE ENTIRE FLT AS NORMAL. IN RETROSPECT, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT. IT WOULD HAVE HELPED IF WE HAD ADVISED THE PURSER THAT IT MIGHT BE A FAIRLY SHORT TAXI. WE HAD DISCUSSED IT, BUT NONE OF US HAD RELAYED THIS TO THE CABIN CREW. WE WERE OCCUPIED WITH A MAX EFFORT TKOF, AT MAX GROSS WT, REQUIRING A CLB IN A HOLDING PATTERN TO CLR THE ALPS. THE MILAN CTL ENVIRONMENT IS VERY DIFFERENT. YOU DO NOT GET YOUR AIRWAY CLRNC UNTIL YOU TAXI, AND WHEN IT IS NOT WHAT YOU HAD PLANNED YOU MUST QUICKLY REORGANIZE. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF WHILE STILL ON THE RAMP BY GND CTL, AND THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF PRESSURE FROM THE CTLRS TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE TKOF. MOST CRITICALLY, IT WAS NOT A GOOD IDEA TO FILTER CRUCIAL INFO TO THE CHIEF PURSER THROUGH A THIRD PARTY, THE RELIEF PLT. THIS WAS REQUIRED BECAUSE I WAS EXTREMELY BUSY ON THE RADIO. WHILE I WAS EXACT IN MY DIRECTIVES TO HIM, SOMETHING WAS LOST IN THE COMPREHENSION OF THE CHIEF PURSER. AS A RESULT, THE IMMEDIACY OF THE PENDING TKOF AND THE REQUIREMENT TO PASS THE WORD WAS NOT EXECUTED. WHEN SHE REPLIED THAT AN IMMEDIATE TKOF AT THE END OF THE SAFETY DEMO TAPE WOULD NOT BE A PROB, IT CONVINCED ME THE CABIN WAS READY. IT WAS ON THIS BASIS THAT I COMMENCED THE TKOF. ALSO IF IMPORTANCE, MY RELIEF PLT LATER ADMITTED HE DID NOT USE THE EMPHATIC TERM 'IMMEDIATE' WHEN HE ANNOUNCED THE TKOF OVER THE PA. THIS WAS A CRUCIAL OMISSION BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE WARNED THE ENTIRE CABIN OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING. FINALLY, THE EXPERIENCE OF THE CREW, AND PARTICULARLY THE CHIEF PURSER, WAS LIMITED. ALL WERE YOUNG AND EAGER, BUT NONE HAD MORE THAN A YR OR 2 OF EXPERIENCE. AS A RESULT, THE SIXTH SENSE OF AWARENESS THAT COMES FROM EXPERIENCE WAS NOT THERE. WHILE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ADVANTAGEOUS TO USE THE DELAY AT THE RAMP IN PREPARING THE CABIN, THIS WAS PUT OFF UNTIL TAXI. THE DEPTH OF MY CONCERN AND CHAGRIN OVER THIS EVENT WAS TOTAL AND COMPLETE. A GREAT DEAL OF TIME WAS SPENT THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT REVIEWING WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND TRYING TO UNDERSTAND THE BREAKDOWN IN COM AND COMPREHENSION. IT WAS A VERY SOBERING EXPERIENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.