Narrative:

This was the first flight of the day for the crew and was scheduled from hnl to ogg. Aircraft was pushed back from the gate by the tug into the inter-island taxiway area adjacent to the air maintenance hangar. The mechanic was on the headset and brakes were set and towbar disconnected. Mechanic was sitting in a maintenance golf cart on the left side of aircraft and cleared us to start the #2 engine and, shortly thereafter, the #1 engine. After the engine parameters stabilized at idle, I performed the after-start functions (generators, air-conditioning, pressurization, and start switches). At this point in time, myself and the first officer began a discussion concerning the closure of the 2 main runways and whether an intersection departure would be legal. This conversation lasted approximately 30-45 seconds. I then brought my attention back to the outside of the aircraft and, thinking that we were talking to hnl ground, I pushed the #1 VHF button. Seeing no obstructions or mechanics, I released the brakes and began to roll forward. We heard a scraping sound and, within seconds, the mechanic appeared in front of the aircraft signaling us to stop. As we set the brakes, the mechanic plugged the communication cord in and told us we had hit the roof of the golf cart. Engines were shut down and we were towed to the gate to inspect the scratches on the lower right forward section on the aircraft. Shortly thereafter, maintenance released the aircraft and we continued the flight to ogg and, upon returning to hnl, we were replaced and sent for drug testing. Contributing factors: distraction (break-up of normal flow pattern). Prevention -- use extreme vigilance during ground operations and guard against distrs. Turning off flight interphone after distraction (unable to communication with mechanic). Prevention -- be sure the flight interphone monitor button is depressed and always 'hot.' releasing brakes with no visual signal from mechanic (positioned on taxiway with no obstructions in sight. Pushing back from gate and using headsets is a relatively new procedure for our company). Prevention -- strict adherence to pushback procedures and guard against old habit patterns. Golf cart being positioned out of view of cockpit crew (under nose of aircraft). Prevention -- make sure all possible obstructions are in clear view of the cockpit crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER START-UP, ACFT TAXIES AND HITS ROOF OF GOLF CART.

Narrative: THIS WAS THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY FOR THE CREW AND WAS SCHEDULED FROM HNL TO OGG. ACFT WAS PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE BY THE TUG INTO THE INTER-ISLAND TXWY AREA ADJACENT TO THE AIR MAINT HANGAR. THE MECH WAS ON THE HEADSET AND BRAKES WERE SET AND TOWBAR DISCONNECTED. MECH WAS SITTING IN A MAINT GOLF CART ON THE L SIDE OF ACFT AND CLRED US TO START THE #2 ENG AND, SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE #1 ENG. AFTER THE ENG PARAMETERS STABILIZED AT IDLE, I PERFORMED THE AFTER-START FUNCTIONS (GENERATORS, AIR-CONDITIONING, PRESSURIZATION, AND START SWITCHES). AT THIS POINT IN TIME, MYSELF AND THE FO BEGAN A DISCUSSION CONCERNING THE CLOSURE OF THE 2 MAIN RWYS AND WHETHER AN INTXN DEP WOULD BE LEGAL. THIS CONVERSATION LASTED APPROX 30-45 SECONDS. I THEN BROUGHT MY ATTN BACK TO THE OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT AND, THINKING THAT WE WERE TALKING TO HNL GND, I PUSHED THE #1 VHF BUTTON. SEEING NO OBSTRUCTIONS OR MECHS, I RELEASED THE BRAKES AND BEGAN TO ROLL FORWARD. WE HEARD A SCRAPING SOUND AND, WITHIN SECONDS, THE MECH APPEARED IN FRONT OF THE ACFT SIGNALING US TO STOP. AS WE SET THE BRAKES, THE MECH PLUGGED THE COM CORD IN AND TOLD US WE HAD HIT THE ROOF OF THE GOLF CART. ENGS WERE SHUT DOWN AND WE WERE TOWED TO THE GATE TO INSPECT THE SCRATCHES ON THE LOWER R FORWARD SECTION ON THE ACFT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, MAINT RELEASED THE ACFT AND WE CONTINUED THE FLT TO OGG AND, UPON RETURNING TO HNL, WE WERE REPLACED AND SENT FOR DRUG TESTING. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: DISTR (BREAK-UP OF NORMAL FLOW PATTERN). PREVENTION -- USE EXTREME VIGILANCE DURING GND OPS AND GUARD AGAINST DISTRS. TURNING OFF FLT INTERPHONE AFTER DISTR (UNABLE TO COM WITH MECH). PREVENTION -- BE SURE THE FLT INTERPHONE MONITOR BUTTON IS DEPRESSED AND ALWAYS 'HOT.' RELEASING BRAKES WITH NO VISUAL SIGNAL FROM MECH (POSITIONED ON TXWY WITH NO OBSTRUCTIONS IN SIGHT. PUSHING BACK FROM GATE AND USING HEADSETS IS A RELATIVELY NEW PROC FOR OUR COMPANY). PREVENTION -- STRICT ADHERENCE TO PUSHBACK PROCS AND GUARD AGAINST OLD HABIT PATTERNS. GOLF CART BEING POSITIONED OUT OF VIEW OF COCKPIT CREW (UNDER NOSE OF ACFT). PREVENTION -- MAKE SURE ALL POSSIBLE OBSTRUCTIONS ARE IN CLR VIEW OF THE COCKPIT CREW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.