Narrative:

Just prior to V1 at takeoff at spokane, a slight vibration was noticed in the landing gear. No adverse yaw or other indications were noted to indicate any problem other than rough pavement or deflated tire. We left the landing gear down and I asked the tower if they had noticed anything abnormal as we thought we might have a flat tire. They said that they had observed nothing out of the ordinary other than a long takeoff roll. Since we were relatively heavy, at high altitude, 82 degrees F, and using normal-reduced EPR, I did not feel that a long takeoff roll was unusual for these circumstances. We experienced no loss of hydraulic or fuel quantity and no anti-skid warning lights were illuminated. At this point we elected to raise the gear and continue while we conferred without dispatch and maintenance people. Shortly thereafter, departure control advised us that the tower had found 'pieces of rubber and airplane parts' on the runway following a runway check. At this point, I asked the first officer to go back into the cabin to see if any damage could be seen from the windows (wing-fairings etc). I then called our people in spokane to see if they could determine what 'parts' were found on the runway. During this time, dialog was exchanged with the flight attendants to see if they had noticed anything unusual and that we might have to prepare for an evacuate/evacuation upon landing. A company deadheading pilot in the cabin was advised of our situation and offered his assistance. With the discussion of the situation with maintenance and dispatch, we unanimously decided that the best course of action was to continue to sfo where emergency equipment, maintenance, long runways, low altitude, and lower fuel load would be in our favor, should a problem exist. At approximately 35 mins prior to arrival, the a flight attendant came up to the cockpit to review our plan for evacuate/evacuation preparation, tower fly-by and subsequent landing. After this discussion, I made an announcement to the passenger to let them know that we may have lost some rubber on takeoff and that we would be doing a tower fly-by to check and to pay close attention to the flight attendants for a precautionary discussion of evacuate/evacuation. At this time, the flight attendants did our long version of evacuate/evacuation preparation. Since we had several japanese tourists, an interpreter assisted the flight attendants with the announcement instructions. We decided that our deadheading pilot would assist us in the cockpit and could be especially helpful in making PA announcements regarding the fly-by, go around, and brace commands, while the first officer and I flew the airplane. Our dispatchers had arranged to have emergency equipment and personnel standing by at the airport. As we flew over sfo VOR, I asked the first officer to go look through the gear viewports, after I lowered the gear, to see if any damage could be seen prior to the fly-by. No damage could be seen from this perspective. A subsequent fly-by on 28L, tower and ground observers to determine that the #1 main tire (left main) was severely damaged. We returned for a 'normal' landing and exit at taxiway right north 28R. The passenger and flight attendants were bussed to the terminal. Further inspection revealed a section of gear and door damaged on left main. I feel that our airline's training, especially in the area of clear (cockpit leadership resource management) was extremely helpful in this situation. Also coordination between ATC, fire, and emergency teams, and company was extremely good and led to an uneventful end to this situation.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG BLOWS TIRE ON TKOF, PICTURE PERFECT SCENARIO IN CONTINUED FLT TO DEST ARPT, EMER DECLARED LNDG.

Narrative: JUST PRIOR TO V1 AT TKOF AT SPOKANE, A SLIGHT VIBRATION WAS NOTICED IN THE LNDG GEAR. NO ADVERSE YAW OR OTHER INDICATIONS WERE NOTED TO INDICATE ANY PROB OTHER THAN ROUGH PAVEMENT OR DEFLATED TIRE. WE LEFT THE LNDG GEAR DOWN AND I ASKED THE TWR IF THEY HAD NOTICED ANYTHING ABNORMAL AS WE THOUGHT WE MIGHT HAVE A FLAT TIRE. THEY SAID THAT THEY HAD OBSERVED NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY OTHER THAN A LONG TKOF ROLL. SINCE WE WERE RELATIVELY HVY, AT HIGH ALT, 82 DEGS F, AND USING NORMAL-REDUCED EPR, I DID NOT FEEL THAT A LONG TKOF ROLL WAS UNUSUAL FOR THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. WE EXPERIENCED NO LOSS OF HYD OR FUEL QUANTITY AND NO ANTI-SKID WARNING LIGHTS WERE ILLUMINATED. AT THIS POINT WE ELECTED TO RAISE THE GEAR AND CONTINUE WHILE WE CONFERRED WITHOUT DISPATCH AND MAINT PEOPLE. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, DEP CTL ADVISED US THAT THE TWR HAD FOUND 'PIECES OF RUBBER AND AIRPLANE PARTS' ON THE RWY FOLLOWING A RWY CHK. AT THIS POINT, I ASKED THE FO TO GO BACK INTO THE CABIN TO SEE IF ANY DAMAGE COULD BE SEEN FROM THE WINDOWS (WING-FAIRINGS ETC). I THEN CALLED OUR PEOPLE IN SPOKANE TO SEE IF THEY COULD DETERMINE WHAT 'PARTS' WERE FOUND ON THE RWY. DURING THIS TIME, DIALOG WAS EXCHANGED WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO SEE IF THEY HAD NOTICED ANYTHING UNUSUAL AND THAT WE MIGHT HAVE TO PREPARE FOR AN EVAC UPON LNDG. A COMPANY DEADHEADING PLT IN THE CABIN WAS ADVISED OF OUR SIT AND OFFERED HIS ASSISTANCE. WITH THE DISCUSSION OF THE SIT WITH MAINT AND DISPATCH, WE UNANIMOUSLY DECIDED THAT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO CONTINUE TO SFO WHERE EMER EQUIP, MAINT, LONG RWYS, LOW ALT, AND LOWER FUEL LOAD WOULD BE IN OUR FAVOR, SHOULD A PROB EXIST. AT APPROX 35 MINS PRIOR TO ARR, THE A FLT ATTENDANT CAME UP TO THE COCKPIT TO REVIEW OUR PLAN FOR EVAC PREPARATION, TWR FLY-BY AND SUBSEQUENT LNDG. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION, I MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX TO LET THEM KNOW THAT WE MAY HAVE LOST SOME RUBBER ON TKOF AND THAT WE WOULD BE DOING A TWR FLY-BY TO CHK AND TO PAY CLOSE ATTN TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS FOR A PRECAUTIONARY DISCUSSION OF EVAC. AT THIS TIME, THE FLT ATTENDANTS DID OUR LONG VERSION OF EVAC PREPARATION. SINCE WE HAD SEVERAL JAPANESE TOURISTS, AN INTERPRETER ASSISTED THE FLT ATTENDANTS WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT INSTRUCTIONS. WE DECIDED THAT OUR DEADHEADING PLT WOULD ASSIST US IN THE COCKPIT AND COULD BE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL IN MAKING PA ANNOUNCEMENTS REGARDING THE FLY-BY, GAR, AND BRACE COMMANDS, WHILE THE FO AND I FLEW THE AIRPLANE. OUR DISPATCHERS HAD ARRANGED TO HAVE EMER EQUIP AND PERSONNEL STANDING BY AT THE ARPT. AS WE FLEW OVER SFO VOR, I ASKED THE FO TO GO LOOK THROUGH THE GEAR VIEWPORTS, AFTER I LOWERED THE GEAR, TO SEE IF ANY DAMAGE COULD BE SEEN PRIOR TO THE FLY-BY. NO DAMAGE COULD BE SEEN FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE. A SUBSEQUENT FLY-BY ON 28L, TWR AND GND OBSERVERS TO DETERMINE THAT THE #1 MAIN TIRE (L MAIN) WAS SEVERELY DAMAGED. WE RETURNED FOR A 'NORMAL' LNDG AND EXIT AT TXWY R N 28R. THE PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS WERE BUSSED TO THE TERMINAL. FURTHER INSPECTION REVEALED A SECTION OF GEAR AND DOOR DAMAGED ON L MAIN. I FEEL THAT OUR AIRLINE'S TRAINING, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF CLR (COCKPIT LEADERSHIP RESOURCE MGMNT) WAS EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN THIS SIT. ALSO COORD BTWN ATC, FIRE, AND EMER TEAMS, AND COMPANY WAS EXTREMELY GOOD AND LED TO AN UNEVENTFUL END TO THIS SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.