Narrative:

We were conducting an air ambulance flight from idaho falls, identification, to O'hare so patient and 2 flight nurses could catch an international flight to amsterdam. The patient was not critical and they had approximately 2 hours until departure from O'hare. We were receiving vectors and descent clrncs so I tuned in the ILS for runway 14R at O'hare into both my navigation (copilot, right side) and captain's. Captain was flying. Shortly after selecting the frequency we still had navigation flags on both sides. Captain then stated to me that this was one of those ILS frequencys that our radios could not receive. Chicago approach then told us to turn to our last heading for intercepting the localizer course and to contact O'hare tower at the marker. I acknowledged their transmission and remained on their frequency. I asked the captain if we could tell approach we were not receiving the ILS. He said no, that he could conduct the approach using the onboard LORAN. At this point I started becoming extremely concerned. It was very hazy, the airport was nowhere in sight and we really had no idea where the localizer course or the marker were. I tried tuning in the NDB but it was not pointing anywhere close to where the marker was. Shortly thereafter chicago approach (O'hare approach) came back on the radio and advised us that we had flown through the localizer course and to turn right to reintercept. At this point I tried to reason with the captain but he told me to acknowledge their transmission, so I did. Shortly after this, approach came back on the radio and told us that again we had flown through the localizer course and to reintercept. They sounded concerned so they stated that the airport was 5 mi (approximately) ahead. They then said to contact the tower at the marker. Captain advised me he had the airport in sight and to tell approach, which I did. I could not make out the airport, it simply was not in sight from my side. Somewhere between that last transmission and finally sighting the wrong runway, but O'hare nonetheless, the captain restated his ability to shoot the approach using the LORAN. However, when we finally sighted a runway, it was runway 14L. Again we had been cleared for ILS runway 14R. The captain saw runway 14L and started proceeding towards it. I then saw runway 14R and told him to proceed towards it, that he was going towards the wrong runway. When we finally got the runway 14L/right complex in sight we were smack dab in the middle between the 2 ILS courses/extended runway ctrlines. The captain then said 'oh, that's right, lorans go toward the center of the airport, not to a particular runway.' I couldn't believe what I was hearing. We had just flown into the world's busiest airport without a clue as to where we really were. He stated to me on the approach that he didn't want to tell approach that we could not receive the ILS. He didn't want to be put into a hold. He felt that if we had acknowledged our problem that they wouldn't let us land even though we were operating as a lifeguard flight. After landing I stated my objections to what he had just done. He told me that he didn't care. It is obvious that some crew members have almost no regard for safety and they have no idea what crew coordination means. He was endangering the lives of possibly hundreds of people and even after being reminded of that fact, still didn't seem to care.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIR AMBULANCE ACFT MAKES APCH USING LORAN INSTEAD OF VOR AS FLAGS WERE UP. MISSES ILS CTRLINE TWICE. RADAR VECTORS.

Narrative: WE WERE CONDUCTING AN AIR AMBULANCE FLT FROM IDAHO FALLS, ID, TO O'HARE SO PATIENT AND 2 FLT NURSES COULD CATCH AN INTL FLT TO AMSTERDAM. THE PATIENT WAS NOT CRITICAL AND THEY HAD APPROX 2 HRS UNTIL DEP FROM O'HARE. WE WERE RECEIVING VECTORS AND DSCNT CLRNCS SO I TUNED IN THE ILS FOR RWY 14R AT O'HARE INTO BOTH MY NAV (COPLT, R SIDE) AND CAPT'S. CAPT WAS FLYING. SHORTLY AFTER SELECTING THE FREQ WE STILL HAD NAV FLAGS ON BOTH SIDES. CAPT THEN STATED TO ME THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THOSE ILS FREQS THAT OUR RADIOS COULD NOT RECEIVE. CHICAGO APCH THEN TOLD US TO TURN TO OUR LAST HDG FOR INTERCEPTING THE LOC COURSE AND TO CONTACT O'HARE TWR AT THE MARKER. I ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR XMISSION AND REMAINED ON THEIR FREQ. I ASKED THE CAPT IF WE COULD TELL APCH WE WERE NOT RECEIVING THE ILS. HE SAID NO, THAT HE COULD CONDUCT THE APCH USING THE ONBOARD LORAN. AT THIS POINT I STARTED BECOMING EXTREMELY CONCERNED. IT WAS VERY HAZY, THE ARPT WAS NOWHERE IN SIGHT AND WE REALLY HAD NO IDEA WHERE THE LOC COURSE OR THE MARKER WERE. I TRIED TUNING IN THE NDB BUT IT WAS NOT POINTING ANYWHERE CLOSE TO WHERE THE MARKER WAS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER CHICAGO APCH (O'HARE APCH) CAME BACK ON THE RADIO AND ADVISED US THAT WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH THE LOC COURSE AND TO TURN R TO REINTERCEPT. AT THIS POINT I TRIED TO REASON WITH THE CAPT BUT HE TOLD ME TO ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR XMISSION, SO I DID. SHORTLY AFTER THIS, APCH CAME BACK ON THE RADIO AND TOLD US THAT AGAIN WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH THE LOC COURSE AND TO REINTERCEPT. THEY SOUNDED CONCERNED SO THEY STATED THAT THE ARPT WAS 5 MI (APPROX) AHEAD. THEY THEN SAID TO CONTACT THE TWR AT THE MARKER. CAPT ADVISED ME HE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND TO TELL APCH, WHICH I DID. I COULD NOT MAKE OUT THE ARPT, IT SIMPLY WAS NOT IN SIGHT FROM MY SIDE. SOMEWHERE BTWN THAT LAST XMISSION AND FINALLY SIGHTING THE WRONG RWY, BUT O'HARE NONETHELESS, THE CAPT RESTATED HIS ABILITY TO SHOOT THE APCH USING THE LORAN. HOWEVER, WHEN WE FINALLY SIGHTED A RWY, IT WAS RWY 14L. AGAIN WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR ILS RWY 14R. THE CAPT SAW RWY 14L AND STARTED PROCEEDING TOWARDS IT. I THEN SAW RWY 14R AND TOLD HIM TO PROCEED TOWARDS IT, THAT HE WAS GOING TOWARDS THE WRONG RWY. WHEN WE FINALLY GOT THE RWY 14L/R COMPLEX IN SIGHT WE WERE SMACK DAB IN THE MIDDLE BTWN THE 2 ILS COURSES/EXTENDED RWY CTRLINES. THE CAPT THEN SAID 'OH, THAT'S RIGHT, LORANS GO TOWARD THE CTR OF THE ARPT, NOT TO A PARTICULAR RWY.' I COULDN'T BELIEVE WHAT I WAS HEARING. WE HAD JUST FLOWN INTO THE WORLD'S BUSIEST ARPT WITHOUT A CLUE AS TO WHERE WE REALLY WERE. HE STATED TO ME ON THE APCH THAT HE DIDN'T WANT TO TELL APCH THAT WE COULD NOT RECEIVE THE ILS. HE DIDN'T WANT TO BE PUT INTO A HOLD. HE FELT THAT IF WE HAD ACKNOWLEDGED OUR PROB THAT THEY WOULDN'T LET US LAND EVEN THOUGH WE WERE OPERATING AS A LIFEGUARD FLT. AFTER LNDG I STATED MY OBJECTIONS TO WHAT HE HAD JUST DONE. HE TOLD ME THAT HE DIDN'T CARE. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SOME CREW MEMBERS HAVE ALMOST NO REGARD FOR SAFETY AND THEY HAVE NO IDEA WHAT CREW COORD MEANS. HE WAS ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF POSSIBLY HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE AND EVEN AFTER BEING REMINDED OF THAT FACT, STILL DIDN'T SEEM TO CARE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.