Narrative:

San diego, air carrier gates restr by a keypad lock release. There are no crash bars on the doors. In the event of emergency evacuate/evacuation from an aircraft on the gate (fire, etc) the only way off the airplane would be the aircraft's alternate escape system. The jetway could become a crowded funeral pyre. There are locks at the gate lounge entrance also. Seems like local airport security concerns override FAA guidelines and local fire marshall requirements. Hazard is accident waiting to happen. In addition, makes preflight inspections of aircraft impossible unless code is known. We go into over 130 airports nationwide, so it would be impossible to know all codes and combinations. This needs to be rectified. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporting pilot states that he is concerned with the safety problem not only at san but also at other airports. There is no ready access to the terminal from the aircraft in case of an emergency on the aircraft. Preflight inspections are impeded by having to have special keys or codes to open doorways to the ramp. He believes that there should be a confrontation between the fire marshall and FAA security to settle the matter. He believes that this is a 'knee jerk' reaction to security problems at the ramp end of the terminal.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR CAPT COMPLAINS ABOUT THE STATE OF THE SAFETY PROB AT THE SAN TERMINAL.

Narrative: SAN DIEGO, ACR GATES RESTR BY A KEYPAD LOCK RELEASE. THERE ARE NO CRASH BARS ON THE DOORS. IN THE EVENT OF EMER EVAC FROM AN ACFT ON THE GATE (FIRE, ETC) THE ONLY WAY OFF THE AIRPLANE WOULD BE THE ACFT'S ALTERNATE ESCAPE SYS. THE JETWAY COULD BECOME A CROWDED FUNERAL PYRE. THERE ARE LOCKS AT THE GATE LOUNGE ENTRANCE ALSO. SEEMS LIKE LCL ARPT SECURITY CONCERNS OVERRIDE FAA GUIDELINES AND LCL FIRE MARSHALL REQUIREMENTS. HAZARD IS ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN. IN ADDITION, MAKES PREFLT INSPECTIONS OF ACFT IMPOSSIBLE UNLESS CODE IS KNOWN. WE GO INTO OVER 130 ARPTS NATIONWIDE, SO IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW ALL CODES AND COMBINATIONS. THIS NEEDS TO BE RECTIFIED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTING PLT STATES THAT HE IS CONCERNED WITH THE SAFETY PROB NOT ONLY AT SAN BUT ALSO AT OTHER ARPTS. THERE IS NO READY ACCESS TO THE TERMINAL FROM THE ACFT IN CASE OF AN EMER ON THE ACFT. PREFLT INSPECTIONS ARE IMPEDED BY HAVING TO HAVE SPECIAL KEYS OR CODES TO OPEN DOORWAYS TO THE RAMP. HE BELIEVES THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CONFRONTATION BTWN THE FIRE MARSHALL AND FAA SECURITY TO SETTLE THE MATTER. HE BELIEVES THAT THIS IS A 'KNEE JERK' REACTION TO SECURITY PROBS AT THE RAMP END OF THE TERMINAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.