|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0601 To 1200|
|Locale Reference||airport : bdl|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 100
|Controlling Facilities||tower : bdl|
|Operator||general aviation : corporate|
|Make Model Name||Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng|
|Flight Phase||descent : approach|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 90|
flight time total : 5750
flight time type : 1210
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : critical|
inflight encounter : weather
other anomaly other
other anomaly other
|Independent Detector||other other : unspecified cockpit|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : unable|
|Consequence||faa : investigated|
|Air Traffic Incident||other|
I was flying cpr light transport jet with the spoileron system inoperative and deferred. On approach to runway 6 at bradley international airport in ct, (bdl). The last wind report from the tower was variable 300 degrees to 350 degrees, 16 KTS gusting to 24 KTS. At 100 ft AGL on a stabilized approach at 145 KTS (a reference speed of 128 KTS plus the wind factor) the spoiler light on the warning panel illuminated indicating a fault in the spoiler system. 3-4 seconds later the aircraft made an uncommanded roll to the right which full left aileron could not fully correct. The aircraft was still rolling to the right and the nose was dropping while I added full power on both engines to attempt a go around. We were now at about 20-30 ft AGL. The aircraft would not climb with full power. 3-4 seconds after full power was added, and it was obvious that we were not climbing, the stall warning shaker was activated. We descended onto the runway with about a 40 degree bank to the right and the nose below the horizon with the stick shaker on and full power. At or slightly before impact, I reduced power to idle. I felt one impact and we departed the runway on about a 080 degree heading where I brought the aircraft to a stop 1100 ft later. My ____ and I were the only people on board (this was a ferry leg to pick up passenger). Neither of us were hurt but the aircraft suffered damage to the right wing, tip tanks and flaps. About 1 or 2 seconds before the spoiler light was illuminated we encountered a very strong gust of wind that felt as though the aircraft was being lifted with great force. There was no wind shear alert at the airport but I am inclined to believe that there might have been a sort of roll cloud that was created by the hills northwest of the airport. One thing that leads me to this conclusion is that with full power, the aircraft should have climbed at about 3000-4000 FPM in the confign we were in. I would also recommend that the spoileron system not be permitted to be deferred on the master MEL. I don't know how much difference this would have made but you can't predict when you will need full roll ability. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: a third party callback was conducted to elicit specific information about cpr light transport jet spoiler/spoileron system. This system consists of 4 spoiler panels, 2 per wing. The inboard set are used for speed brake and lift dump, while the outboard set assist the ailerons with roll control when flap settings of 25 degrees or more are used (the system is not operative if the flap setting is less than 25 degrees). The reporter notes that the master MEL for the cpr light transport jet permits, under far parts 91 and 135, category B deferral of the spoileron and/or spoileron computer system -- the aircraft may be legally operated with the system inoperative for a maximum of 72 hours. (This was confirmed through another, third party callback with the maintenance department of a large corporate operator). The reporter feels that although the unavailability of the spoileron system did not cause the loss of aircraft control, he could have satisfactorily regained control of the aircraft had the system been svcable. The reporter further advised that the FAA has classified this as an 'incident.' damage to the aircraft was such that both tip tanks required replacement, as did the outboard section of 1 wing. There was minor damage to the flaps from contacting runway lights during the runway excursion. It is the opinion of the reporter (as well as the maintenance manager of the referenced corporate operation), that the spoileron/spoiler computer system on the cpr light transport jet is part of the aircraft's primary flight control and as such should not be deferrable, excepting those circumstances where the aircraft flight manual permits landing with less than 25 degrees of flap, in which case the flaps should be placarded prohibiting landing with 25 or more degrees of flap. Further, the reporter recommends that current simulator training programs be modified to permit trainee experience with spoilerons inactive.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CPR LTT JET FLC SUFFERS LOSS OF ACFT CTL WHILE ON SHORT FINAL DUE WX FACTORS (WIND GUST, WIND SHEAR), BUT UNABLE TO EFFECT RECOVERY PRIOR TO CONTACT WITH RWY, AT LEAST PARTIALLY DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF MEL DEFERRED SPOILERON SYS.
Narrative: I WAS FLYING CPR LTT JET WITH THE SPOILERON SYS INOP AND DEFERRED. ON APCH TO RWY 6 AT BRADLEY INTL ARPT IN CT, (BDL). THE LAST WIND RPT FROM THE TWR WAS VARIABLE 300 DEGS TO 350 DEGS, 16 KTS GUSTING TO 24 KTS. AT 100 FT AGL ON A STABILIZED APCH AT 145 KTS (A REF SPD OF 128 KTS PLUS THE WIND FACTOR) THE SPOILER LIGHT ON THE WARNING PANEL ILLUMINATED INDICATING A FAULT IN THE SPOILER SYS. 3-4 SECONDS LATER THE ACFT MADE AN UNCOMMANDED ROLL TO THE R WHICH FULL L AILERON COULD NOT FULLY CORRECT. THE ACFT WAS STILL ROLLING TO THE R AND THE NOSE WAS DROPPING WHILE I ADDED FULL PWR ON BOTH ENGS TO ATTEMPT A GAR. WE WERE NOW AT ABOUT 20-30 FT AGL. THE ACFT WOULD NOT CLB WITH FULL PWR. 3-4 SECONDS AFTER FULL PWR WAS ADDED, AND IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WE WERE NOT CLBING, THE STALL WARNING SHAKER WAS ACTIVATED. WE DSNDED ONTO THE RWY WITH ABOUT A 40 DEG BANK TO THE R AND THE NOSE BELOW THE HORIZON WITH THE STICK SHAKER ON AND FULL PWR. AT OR SLIGHTLY BEFORE IMPACT, I REDUCED PWR TO IDLE. I FELT ONE IMPACT AND WE DEPARTED THE RWY ON ABOUT A 080 DEG HDG WHERE I BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A STOP 1100 FT LATER. MY ____ AND I WERE THE ONLY PEOPLE ON BOARD (THIS WAS A FERRY LEG TO PICK UP PAX). NEITHER OF US WERE HURT BUT THE ACFT SUFFERED DAMAGE TO THE R WING, TIP TANKS AND FLAPS. ABOUT 1 OR 2 SECONDS BEFORE THE SPOILER LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED WE ENCOUNTERED A VERY STRONG GUST OF WIND THAT FELT AS THOUGH THE ACFT WAS BEING LIFTED WITH GREAT FORCE. THERE WAS NO WIND SHEAR ALERT AT THE ARPT BUT I AM INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A SORT OF ROLL CLOUD THAT WAS CREATED BY THE HILLS NW OF THE ARPT. ONE THING THAT LEADS ME TO THIS CONCLUSION IS THAT WITH FULL PWR, THE ACFT SHOULD HAVE CLBED AT ABOUT 3000-4000 FPM IN THE CONFIGN WE WERE IN. I WOULD ALSO RECOMMEND THAT THE SPOILERON SYS NOT BE PERMITTED TO BE DEFERRED ON THE MASTER MEL. I DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH DIFFERENCE THIS WOULD HAVE MADE BUT YOU CAN'T PREDICT WHEN YOU WILL NEED FULL ROLL ABILITY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH REPORTER REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: A THIRD PARTY CALLBACK WAS CONDUCTED TO ELICIT SPECIFIC INFO ABOUT CPR LTT JET SPOILER/SPOILERON SYS. THIS SYS CONSISTS OF 4 SPOILER PANELS, 2 PER WING. THE INBOARD SET ARE USED FOR SPD BRAKE AND LIFT DUMP, WHILE THE OUTBOARD SET ASSIST THE AILERONS WITH ROLL CTL WHEN FLAP SETTINGS OF 25 DEGS OR MORE ARE USED (THE SYS IS NOT OPERATIVE IF THE FLAP SETTING IS LESS THAN 25 DEGS). THE RPTR NOTES THAT THE MASTER MEL FOR THE CPR LTT JET PERMITS, UNDER FAR PARTS 91 AND 135, CATEGORY B DEFERRAL OF THE SPOILERON AND/OR SPOILERON COMPUTER SYS -- THE ACFT MAY BE LEGALLY OPERATED WITH THE SYS INOP FOR A MAX OF 72 HRS. (THIS WAS CONFIRMED THROUGH ANOTHER, THIRD PARTY CALLBACK WITH THE MAINT DEPT OF A LARGE CORPORATE OPERATOR). THE RPTR FEELS THAT ALTHOUGH THE UNAVAILABILITY OF THE SPOILERON SYS DID NOT CAUSE THE LOSS OF ACFT CTL, HE COULD HAVE SATISFACTORILY REGAINED CTL OF THE ACFT HAD THE SYS BEEN SVCABLE. THE RPTR FURTHER ADVISED THAT THE FAA HAS CLASSIFIED THIS AS AN 'INCIDENT.' DAMAGE TO THE ACFT WAS SUCH THAT BOTH TIP TANKS REQUIRED REPLACEMENT, AS DID THE OUTBOARD SECTION OF 1 WING. THERE WAS MINOR DAMAGE TO THE FLAPS FROM CONTACTING RWY LIGHTS DURING THE RWY EXCURSION. IT IS THE OPINION OF THE RPTR (AS WELL AS THE MAINT MGR OF THE REFED CORPORATE OP), THAT THE SPOILERON/SPOILER COMPUTER SYS ON THE CPR LTT JET IS PART OF THE ACFT'S PRIMARY FLT CTL AND AS SUCH SHOULD NOT BE DEFERRABLE, EXCEPTING THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE ACFT FLT MANUAL PERMITS LNDG WITH LESS THAN 25 DEGS OF FLAP, IN WHICH CASE THE FLAPS SHOULD BE PLACARDED PROHIBITING LNDG WITH 25 OR MORE DEGS OF FLAP. FURTHER, THE RPTR RECOMMENDS THAT CURRENT SIMULATOR TRAINING PROGRAMS BE MODIFIED TO PERMIT TRAINEE EXPERIENCE WITH SPOILERONS INACTIVE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.