Narrative:

I was descending into bur's airspace under an IFR clearance being vectored to the ILS runway 8 at bur. Bur approach control issued a hard altitude of 6000 ft heading 255 degrees. I was given a frequency change to another sector. The next controller was very busy and did not respond to 5 of my check-in calls over a time period of about 3-5 mins. All of the check-in calls were followed by the controller's call to other aircraft. The controller's xmissions contained multiple instructions to multiple aircraft in 1 call. The aircraft radios were not in question, just the inability to communication to approach control was my concern. I became more concerned since I was in IMC on a vector toward a level ii WX system as painted by the previous controller. At the time, there appeared to be 3 to 4 other aircraft being vectored to the same approach. The bur controller issued me a descent to 4000 ft. I made an attempt to keep my speed up so as not to disrupt the flow of the airline inbound traffic. The bur controller then issued me a base leg turn to 300 degrees and another descent to 3500 ft with a speed reduction to 120 KIAS. At this time, the turbulence was moderate with heavy rain. The bur controller indicated this heading would take me through the final approach course. Another heading of 110 degrees was given to intercept the final approach course. The intercept was inside silex at 120-110 KIAS. At this time, I was about 3 mi from the OM at vny airport. As the descent continued, the bur controller indicated to expect a turn off the final approach course for spacing because of airline traffic closing from behind. As I was instructed to turn off the final approach course, I broke out into VFR conditions. I responded to the turn by saying, 'this is unsatisfactory we're cancelling and proceed VFR to whp.' due to the severity of the WX and the congestion, I elected to cancel my IFR clearance and proceed to whp as the safest option. The controller snapped back and issued a turn 20 degrees to the left and to squawk 1200. After confirmation of cancellation and the squawk, bur controller said radar service terminated frequency change approved. To my surprise, I was in the vny air traffic area at 3300 ft without communication with vny tower. My attempt to contact vny tower was fruitless due to the traffic communication from the tower. Finally, I was able to make contact and their response was a frequency change to whp tower. By this time, I was in the whp air traffic area by about 3 mi at 3500 ft trying to stay above the tpa. This situation has always been a problem at bur when being vectored to the ILS. GA aircraft are given low priority for the ILS due to their lower speed as compared to the acrs. The GA traffic becomes the sacrificial lamb. First come, first serve does not apply here. The hazard developed from the coordination of traffic by bur approach control. The sector appeared to be saturated and the controller aggravated the hazard by giving me a speed reduction, thereby losing IFR separation. I am not sure if there was a slower aircraft ahead which required the speed reduction. But, due to the severity of penetrating a level ii WX system, the saturation of the sector, and the high stress level of the controller, I elected to control the hazard by removing myself from the risk. In doing so, the controller left me in the vny air traffic area without a clearance when radar service were terminated. This situation created another hazard of a possible midair. In trying to obtain a clearance, my risk exposure increased as I transitioned through the vny air traffic area without radio communication. The situation is not an isolated case. I have been flying this area for 10 yrs and the same scenario has transpired many times. In fact, on an IFR night I have had my ILS approach clearance cancelled 3 times for airline traffic closing. I realize the difficult of separating airline traffic and GA traffic but it is not that difficult if the controller uses foresight and proper planning. But when all else fails, break-off the GA traffic. I have even requested longer final approach paths to aid in sequencing traffic and avoid a cancelled approach. On other occasions, bur approach control has forgotten me and I had to make my own turn to avoid terrain. Also, on 1 occasion, bur approach control issued a vector to another aircraft and completely forgot his traffic and that aircraft flew into a mountain on that vector. This area is dangerous and something needs to be changed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA ON DSCNT FOR APCH TO BUR REQUESTED TO TURN OFF FINAL APCH COURSE DUE TO FASTER TFC BEHIND. HAPPENS OFTEN AT THIS ARPT TO GA ACFT.

Narrative: I WAS DSNDING INTO BUR'S AIRSPACE UNDER AN IFR CLRNC BEING VECTORED TO THE ILS RWY 8 AT BUR. BUR APCH CTL ISSUED A HARD ALT OF 6000 FT HDG 255 DEGS. I WAS GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE TO ANOTHER SECTOR. THE NEXT CTLR WAS VERY BUSY AND DID NOT RESPOND TO 5 OF MY CHK-IN CALLS OVER A TIME PERIOD OF ABOUT 3-5 MINS. ALL OF THE CHK-IN CALLS WERE FOLLOWED BY THE CTLR'S CALL TO OTHER ACFT. THE CTLR'S XMISSIONS CONTAINED MULTIPLE INSTRUCTIONS TO MULTIPLE ACFT IN 1 CALL. THE ACFT RADIOS WERE NOT IN QUESTION, JUST THE INABILITY TO COM TO APCH CTL WAS MY CONCERN. I BECAME MORE CONCERNED SINCE I WAS IN IMC ON A VECTOR TOWARD A LEVEL II WX SYS AS PAINTED BY THE PREVIOUS CTLR. AT THE TIME, THERE APPEARED TO BE 3 TO 4 OTHER ACFT BEING VECTORED TO THE SAME APCH. THE BUR CTLR ISSUED ME A DSCNT TO 4000 FT. I MADE AN ATTEMPT TO KEEP MY SPD UP SO AS NOT TO DISRUPT THE FLOW OF THE AIRLINE INBOUND TFC. THE BUR CTLR THEN ISSUED ME A BASE LEG TURN TO 300 DEGS AND ANOTHER DSCNT TO 3500 FT WITH A SPD REDUCTION TO 120 KIAS. AT THIS TIME, THE TURB WAS MODERATE WITH HVY RAIN. THE BUR CTLR INDICATED THIS HDG WOULD TAKE ME THROUGH THE FINAL APCH COURSE. ANOTHER HDG OF 110 DEGS WAS GIVEN TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH COURSE. THE INTERCEPT WAS INSIDE SILEX AT 120-110 KIAS. AT THIS TIME, I WAS ABOUT 3 MI FROM THE OM AT VNY ARPT. AS THE DSCNT CONTINUED, THE BUR CTLR INDICATED TO EXPECT A TURN OFF THE FINAL APCH COURSE FOR SPACING BECAUSE OF AIRLINE TFC CLOSING FROM BEHIND. AS I WAS INSTRUCTED TO TURN OFF THE FINAL APCH COURSE, I BROKE OUT INTO VFR CONDITIONS. I RESPONDED TO THE TURN BY SAYING, 'THIS IS UNSATISFACTORY WE'RE CANCELLING AND PROCEED VFR TO WHP.' DUE TO THE SEVERITY OF THE WX AND THE CONGESTION, I ELECTED TO CANCEL MY IFR CLRNC AND PROCEED TO WHP AS THE SAFEST OPTION. THE CTLR SNAPPED BACK AND ISSUED A TURN 20 DEGS TO THE L AND TO SQUAWK 1200. AFTER CONFIRMATION OF CANCELLATION AND THE SQUAWK, BUR CTLR SAID RADAR SVC TERMINATED FREQ CHANGE APPROVED. TO MY SURPRISE, I WAS IN THE VNY ATA AT 3300 FT WITHOUT COM WITH VNY TWR. MY ATTEMPT TO CONTACT VNY TWR WAS FRUITLESS DUE TO THE TFC COM FROM THE TWR. FINALLY, I WAS ABLE TO MAKE CONTACT AND THEIR RESPONSE WAS A FREQ CHANGE TO WHP TWR. BY THIS TIME, I WAS IN THE WHP ATA BY ABOUT 3 MI AT 3500 FT TRYING TO STAY ABOVE THE TPA. THIS SIT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A PROB AT BUR WHEN BEING VECTORED TO THE ILS. GA ACFT ARE GIVEN LOW PRIORITY FOR THE ILS DUE TO THEIR LOWER SPD AS COMPARED TO THE ACRS. THE GA TFC BECOMES THE SACRIFICIAL LAMB. FIRST COME, FIRST SERVE DOES NOT APPLY HERE. THE HAZARD DEVELOPED FROM THE COORD OF TFC BY BUR APCH CTL. THE SECTOR APPEARED TO BE SATURATED AND THE CTLR AGGRAVATED THE HAZARD BY GIVING ME A SPD REDUCTION, THEREBY LOSING IFR SEPARATION. I AM NOT SURE IF THERE WAS A SLOWER ACFT AHEAD WHICH REQUIRED THE SPD REDUCTION. BUT, DUE TO THE SEVERITY OF PENETRATING A LEVEL II WX SYS, THE SATURATION OF THE SECTOR, AND THE HIGH STRESS LEVEL OF THE CTLR, I ELECTED TO CTL THE HAZARD BY REMOVING MYSELF FROM THE RISK. IN DOING SO, THE CTLR LEFT ME IN THE VNY ATA WITHOUT A CLRNC WHEN RADAR SVC WERE TERMINATED. THIS SIT CREATED ANOTHER HAZARD OF A POSSIBLE MIDAIR. IN TRYING TO OBTAIN A CLRNC, MY RISK EXPOSURE INCREASED AS I TRANSITIONED THROUGH THE VNY ATA WITHOUT RADIO COM. THE SIT IS NOT AN ISOLATED CASE. I HAVE BEEN FLYING THIS AREA FOR 10 YRS AND THE SAME SCENARIO HAS TRANSPIRED MANY TIMES. IN FACT, ON AN IFR NIGHT I HAVE HAD MY ILS APCH CLRNC CANCELLED 3 TIMES FOR AIRLINE TFC CLOSING. I REALIZE THE DIFFICULT OF SEPARATING AIRLINE TFC AND GA TFC BUT IT IS NOT THAT DIFFICULT IF THE CTLR USES FORESIGHT AND PROPER PLANNING. BUT WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS, BREAK-OFF THE GA TFC. I HAVE EVEN REQUESTED LONGER FINAL APCH PATHS TO AID IN SEQUENCING TFC AND AVOID A CANCELLED APCH. ON OTHER OCCASIONS, BUR APCH CTL HAS FORGOTTEN ME AND I HAD TO MAKE MY OWN TURN TO AVOID TERRAIN. ALSO, ON 1 OCCASION, BUR APCH CTL ISSUED A VECTOR TO ANOTHER ACFT AND COMPLETELY FORGOT HIS TFC AND THAT ACFT FLEW INTO A MOUNTAIN ON THAT VECTOR. THIS AREA IS DANGEROUS AND SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE CHANGED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.